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ABSTRACT
Part I examines the global rise of both public and private debt and its recent
manifestations in the US housing bubble and the financial panic of 2007-8. A review of
the most popular theories of the debt crisis is provided, including an explication of
securitized banking and economic theory. The underlying condition of increasing
ecological and energetic scarcity is accorded central significance in the broad trajectory
of world growth and debt,
Part II explicates systems theories of social order and the social significance of markets.
The theories of Niklas Luhmann, Talcott Parsons, Mario Bunge, Anthony Giddens, and
Jürgen Habermas are evaluated with respect to their theories of social order and crisis. A
central finding is that, although declining rates of exergy production inhibit the global
economic recovery as measured by conventional economic tools, this fact is not likely to
be widely recognized. A central theme of Part II is how social systems handle
uncertainty, risk, and to what extent complex social systems can be regulated normatively
by the public sphere. As global society becomes increasingly interconnected and
dependent upon the depletion of material and energy resources, the communication
channels that facilitate the self-understanding of modern society at the same time
proliferate, becoming increasingly disconnected and self-referential. Luhmann‟s systems
theory is used to explain why collective recognition and action is at once rendered more
necessary and increasingly unlikely given the complexity of global society that Earth‟s
terrestrial stock of nonrenewable energy resources has engendered.
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INTRODUCTION
Explaining the Global Debt Crisis
The following study offers a comprehensive explanation of the global debt crisis (GDC) that
remedies many of the shortcomings of traditional economic and sociological theory. Most
importantly, most of economics and sociology still regards the economy or society (respectively)
as separate and autonomous from the natural environment. Factors such as biophysical
resources, energy, and the scarcity of raw materials play virtually no role in most descriptions of
our most pressing social problems found in the fields of sociology and economics.
I argue that this ecological blind spot is a consequence of the prevailing framing devices in
economics and sociology. In mainstream economics (e.g. neoclassical and Keynesian), society is
presumed to be a perpetual motion machine running without limits, whereas in sociology, much
more theoretical focus has been placed upon the agency/system distinction, or that between
manifest and latent functions (Merton 1967), obscuring the indirect means by which ecological
scarcity conditions both intended and unintended social outcomes.
Phenomena are always embedded in a larger context, which Thomas Kuhn has called a
paradigm, and Joseph Schumpeter has called a pre-analytic vision (1954). Herman Daly
describes this pre-analytic vision as follows:
[P]rior to analytic thought there must be a basic vision of the shape and nature of the total
reality to be analyzed and some feeling for where natural joints and seams lie, and for the
way in which the whole to be analyzed fits into the totality of things. Our basic
definitions arise out o this preanalytic vision, which limits the style and direction of our
thinking. (1991: 14)
The content of social phenomena, however, is not independent of the reference frame by which
we view and understand them. This study has been undertaken with the conviction (or perhaps
suspicion) that because the very definition of social phenomena binds the observer to some
presuppositions which are usually hidden, and furthermore, that these presuppositions are
probably wrong, unless empirically corroborated. The real problem, however, is not in testing
explicitly stated hypotheses, but in uncovering the assumptions hidden or not explicitly stated in
any and all preanalytic visions. The problem, in short, is to find an adequate starting point for
empirical research. Consequently, part of my dissertation has been meta-theoretical.
The task of finding adequate foundations however, can prove interminable. To avoid a flight
into philosophy and meta-physics, there ideally should be a feedback relation between the
theoretical context that is being developed, the basic worldview, and the phenomena at hand.
Because social phenomena are always already mediated by some theory, it is not necessarily the
case that the same phenomenon will appear when apprehended through an alternative frame of
reference. In this study, I therefore conducted an extensive survey of many meta-theoretical
approaches, including classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian economics, and a variety of general
1

theories, systems theories and others within sociology. The latter set of theories include the
works of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, Luhmann, Habermas, Bunge, Giddens,
Grannovetter, and others.
Initially, what I had set out to accomplish was an explanation of the global “financial crisis”
rooted in systems theories, with an understanding that the latter frame of reference would amend
or even contradict the significance of the phenomena that I was initially targeting in terms of the
financial sector of the global economy. The theoretical frame would influence and specify my
empirical work, which would in turn further specify and elaborate my theoretical work, in what
some might call a dialectical manner. The work that follows presents the preliminary results of
this long-term investigation.
The basic premise of this study is that the material growth is always limited, whether of an
economy or a population of bacteria. The qualification “material” is used here because the
conservation law and entropy law of thermodynamics only pertains to physical magnitudes. Nonphysical stocks (e.g. wisdom or happiness) are not conserved. Concordantly, my argument can
be understood as a contribution to the “limits to growth” genre (Meadows et al. 1972).
What has been called the “financial crisis” is better termed a global debt crisis (GDC). The
inordinate rise in debt, both public and private, and the break neck pace at which lending
institutions (i.e. “finance”) have grown relative to the rest of the economy, has generated
unsustainable asset bubbles, such as the housing bubble in the United States, which began to pop
in 2007. Debt is nothing more than a promise to pay, which implies an expectation that the
borrower will be able to pay the principle and the interest. Whether or not debt is sustainable or
not depends upon a myriad of factors, the most important of which is that the growth rate of
income exceeds or is equal to the growth rate of debt. When the growth rate of debt exceeds the
growth rate of income, debt, after reaching some fraction of total income, crosses a tipping point
beyond which systematic default or extensive debt devaluation in the form of inflation is
unavoidable. To explain why debt generates financial crises and panics, therefore, it is necessary
to identify not only that the levels of debt origination were high. It is also necessary to explain
why the rates of debt origination were “too high” in relation to rates of income growth. One
must explain, in other words, not only the anticipation of future growth qua debt, but the realitytest that disconfirmed the anticipation. An explanation of growth is therefore warranted.
An intuitive explanation of the waves of systemic default and over-indebtedness is that growth
is predicated upon growth in the extraction and use of energy and raw materials, most notably
fossil fuels such as coal, petroleum, and gasoline. The standard “peak oil” theory is that
economic growth, at the global level, will stop once oil production peaks. The point is therefore
not that oil will “run out”, but rather, that oil production will not continue to increase, which
ostensibly means an end to economic growth. As evidenced below, the growth rate of petroleum
extraction has declined since the 1970s, and has nearly flat-lined since 2005. A decline in
growth rates, combined with rising rates of debt, would generate economic stagnation and
systemic debt defaults.
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There does appear to be some “de-linking” between economic growth and energy consumption.
This began at around the same time that energy prices began to rise in the mid-1970s.
Mainstream economists have interpreted this as proof that there are no absolute limits to growth,
only provisional, local, and temporary limits to certain kinds of production. Upon closer
reflection, however, the de-linking is only a widening of the gap between economic growth rates
and rates of energy consumption. A growth in the latter might still be a precondition of
economic growth, as it is organized in its specificity. More importantly, GDP is a metric that is
rooted in accounting identities found in economic theory. Although it has been used as a proxy
for standard of living, it is arguable to what extent continued economic growth improves quality
of life in the most wealth nations, considering that it has begun to decouple from both
employment and also happiness, and at the same time has coincided with a massive rise in
inequality. GDP measures economic activity, a flow variable that is only indirectly correlated
with physical throughput of production. From the perspective of the distinction of stocks and
flows (to be explicated below), it is incoherent in that it “adds together three very unlikely
categories: throughput, additions to capital stock, and services rendered by the capital stock”
(Daly 1991: 30). Although it can be decomposed in various ways, GDP is ultimately
embedded in a self-referential theoretical-economic system. In addition, energy scarcity pertains
to a global variable, the affects of which will most certainly be articulated differently across
geographic space, economic sectors, and between persons occupying roles in economic
organizations. In short, the object that GDP measures, is inseparable from the GDP metric itself.
The global debt crisis can be explained in part as a consequence of the declining growth and
profit rates which set in around the 1970s, which in turn can be explained in terms of increasing
scarcity of raw materials and energy. This results from what Jason W. Moore has called the
tendency of the ecological surplus to fall: because "all financial instruments represent a
deferred, and expanded, claim on ecological process … there is a general tendency for the
expansion of finance capital to outrun the expansion of the relative ecological surplus" (2009:
28).
The link between energy and economy, however, is not deterministic. Ecological scarcity
constitutes only a background condition or parameter that indirectly influences the causes and
consequences of the performance of the economy, understood as a self-referential, operationally
closed system. Changes in these background ecological conditions imply a change in the
relationship between fundamental variables of a system so that what once facilitated growth and
therefore improvements in human well-being may engender neither. In other words, the
relationships between variables are themselves variable. A change in the parametric conditions
of an economic system may engender new patterns between fundamental variables, such as
growth, employment, debt, and inequality.
In a nutshell, the global debt crisis is a result of too much debt and too little growth. Explaining
the former requires invoking cultural (i.e. ideological) factors, whereas explaining the latter
entails an explanation of the link between economic growth and energy scarcity. It is my
hypothesis that energy scarcity constitutes one such parametric change, and that the rising levels
of debt have been a primary means of facilitating economic “growth” as measured by
conventional accounting techniques such as GDP since the 1970s. Cultural and lifestyle factors
3

have played an important role as well, since previous rising incomes have accustomed both
consumers and firms to expect the future growth rates to resemble past rates. In mainstream
theory, savings facilitate investment and hence growth. If growth is assumed to be automatic,
however, there is little or no reason to save. The Protestant Ethic of sacrificing the present for
the future becomes, once rapid income growth is achieved, the propensity to take the future for
granted, thereby sacrificing the future for present gratification. Moreover, this propensity to
spend in the present accelerates the drawing down of resources, reinforces the need to borrow in
order to sustain expected income levels.
Increasing ecological scarcity, or falling ecological surplus, constitutes only a long term secular
tendency. It is also necessary to examine how these trends are translated into proximate
economic and ecological effects via social structure. In any empirical investigation, the details
matter. The specific means by which virtual claims on ecological surplus are distributed, as in
the secondary “repo” markets, mediate between general trends and specific social outcomes. In
this study, I examine how increasing scarcity of energy and raw materials at a global level
amplify global interconnectedness and thus systemic vulnerability and risk.
This study begins with the most detailed analysis and ends with its consequences for more
general theories, including economics and sociology. I then draw conclusions for a revised
general theory of society and economics towards a study of the financial crash, including
possible policy implications. Part I provides a detailed description of the global debt crisis,
including the including the housing asset bubble, the rise of finance, and rise of international
problem of debt growth. I then evaluate the question of whether or not politics or economics is
the primary cause of the global debt crisis, focusing on specific policies that advocates of each
thesis have used to exemplify their argument. I then give a detailed outline of the structure of the
financial system (securitized banking and the repo markets) that generated the global debt crisis
and the financial panic of 2007-8. Next, I provide a detailed analysis of some common
explanations of economic crises, including theories of under-consumption, over-accumulation,
and Marx‟s falling rate of profit thesis. Lastly, I present original findings on the role that
ecological scarcity, manifested in rising energy prices and declining rates of production, have
played on the recent debt crisis.
Part II examines some meta-theoretical reflections on social order and more specifically, the
sociological significance of markets and the economy in modern society. The systemstheoretical perspectives of Parsons and Luhmann are central to this analysis. In particular,
Luhmann‟s theory of the economy as a system of autopoietic communications that take the form
of payments yields interesting insights into the recent financial panic. Money, as a steering
medium increasing the odds that communications will be accepted by codifying motivations,
becomes the primary means by which the allocation of goods and services is distributed across
time, that is, the medium by which moments are bound together in a coherent temporal horizon
that is collectively shared and negotiated. This function of time-binding, although necessary for
the functioning of global markets in their current specificity, is not caused by this functional
requirement. The monetary medium is an accident of history that makes possible modern
temporality. Whether or not it continues or to what extent this medium successfully facilitates
the autopoeisis of payments is contingent upon numerous other accidents of history, including
4

necessary conditions that the economy, as a channel of communication, cannot thematize
directly. Modern society, because of its sheer size and increasing interconnectedness, becomes a
complex and uncertain communication system, the channels of which are increasingly selfreferential. Everything is connected in some way to everything else in the tangible field of
energy, but not everything that is relatable can be focalized as a theme of communication at the
same time. Topics or themes of communication begin to emerge at an aggregate or macro scale,
to which people can contribute, but not radically change or alter, except in exceptional cases.
A central theme of Part II is how social systems handle uncertainty, risk, and to what extent
complex social systems can be regulated normatively by the public sphere. In short, whereas
Part I the underlying parametric condition of increasing ecological and energetic scarcity is
accorded central significance in the broad trajectory of world growth and debt, Part II explains
why collective recognition and action is at once rendered more necessary and increasingly
unlikely given the complexity of global society that Earth‟s terrestrial stock of nonrenewable
energy resources has engendered. Finally, I conclude with an unorthodox policy proposal that a
basic, minimum income be guaranteed as a modern right of global citizenship.
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PART I. THE GLOBAL DEBT CRISIS
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I. THE HOUSING BUBBLE, FINANCE, AND THE RISE OF DEBT
1. The US Housing Bubble

The Boom: 1997-2005
The Housing Boom began in 1997 and lasted until 2006 (Jarsulic 2010; Baker 2010). During
this period, high-risk, high-cost mortgages grew substantially in absolute dollar figures and in
terms of the relative share of total mortgage lending. Figure 1 presents two time-series of
housing price indexes, Standard and Poor's Case-Shiller Index, and the Federal Housing Finance
Agency's Housing Price Index. 1 The Housing Price Index (HPI) time-series for the percentage
change of the composite housing index for the US is given in Figure 2.
Between 1995 and 2006, house prices rose more than 70 percent, adjusting for inflation.
Moreover, according to the National Association of Realtors, by 2004 approximately a quarter of
all homes were being purchased as investments (Baker 2009: 73).
Rising prices, of course, does not necessarily imply a bubble. Case and Shiller (2004), however,
showed that this increase, prior to the financial crisis, could not be explained by the so-called
fundamentals, such as the incomes of the borrowers, inflation, or population.
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Figure 1. Case Shiller and Housing Price Index (1996-2009)
1

Data are available at: http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-priceindices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidff--p-us---- and http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87
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Housing Price Index % Change 1996-2009
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Figure 2. Housing Price Index percentage change (1996-2009)

Jarsulic (2010) argues that the bubble had two effects. First, it generated a temporary validation
of the lending boom, and second, it caused a widespread shift in the expectations of the
households and a "self-willingness to pay ever higher prices for houses", thus further fueling the
bubble (3).
To put this in perspective, Robert Shiller notes that in the 45 years ending in 1997, the real value
of home prices was basically unchanged. Between 1997 and 2006, however, real house prices
increased at a compound rate of 6.8 percent, for a total increase of 85 percent (Jarsulic 2010:
12). Moreover, this growth was accelerating from a growth rate of 3.37 percent in 1997 to 9.38
percent by 2006. 2
Reinhart and Rogoff estimate that by 2008, the total value of mortgages outstanding in US was
approximately 90 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product of the US (Reinhart and Rogoff
2009). During this period, home ownership also rose by 5 percent between 1995 and 2005;
between 2004 and 2006, the majority of new homeowners were Alt-A and subprime borrowers, a
significant portion of whom had taken out loans with high and variable interest rates (Schwartz
2009).

2

Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) place this figure even higher: “Between 1996 and 2006 (the year when prices
peaked), the cumulative real price increase was about 92 percent- more than three times the 27 percent cumulative
increase from 1890 to 1996! In 2005, at the height of the bubble, real housing prices soared by more than 12
percent (that was about six times the rate of increase in real per capita GDP for that year)." (207: italics in original).
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Prior to the collapse, Greenspan and others (including Bernanke) testified in 2002 that there was
no bubble. It is worth exploring Greenspan's line of reasoning in more detail. Greenspan
provided 4 explanations for the rise in housing prices. These were: 1) a shortage of land; 2)
environmental restrictions; 3) growing incomes; and 4) a growing population.
As a number of commentaries have pointed out, none of these explanations made sense. Even if
there was a shortage of land, there was no reason why this should have suddenly occurred when
housing prices began to rise. Environmental restrictions had already been in place and hadn't
become tighter in the 1990s. Although incomes did grow from 1996 to 2001, afterward the
growth was weak and cannot account for the inordinate rise in housing prices. Finally, the baby
boomers began buying houses in the 1970s and 1980s, so Greenspan was off by at least a
decade.
Baker (2009) points out two additional ways to check if economic "fundamentals" are
responsible for a housing boom. First, compare housing prices with rents. If the fundamentals
are responsible for housing prices, then rents should also go up. Baker points out, however, that
rents didn't rise substantially.
Second, check vacancy rates. If increased demand caused the rise in housing prices, then
vacancy rates on rental properties should be low. According to the Census Bureau, however, in
2007 vacancy rates in the US were 50 percent higher than at any point in the post WWII period
(Baker 2009: 79). From the 1990s until 2001, subprime originations ranged from $125 to $160
billion, constituting 10 to 15 percent of loans. By 2006, subprime3 and near prime (Alt-A) loans
constituted approximately one-third of all mortgage originations, with combined value of
approximately $4 trillion (Jarsulic 2010: 6).
DiMartino and Duca (2007) find that all nonprime loans (subprime and Alt-A) rose from 9
percent of total new mortgage originations in 2001 to 40 percent in 2006 (in Bullard et al. 2009:
405). According to Fligstein (2010) among the non-agency mortgage originations (i.e. those not
being issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), subprime mortgages went from 10 percent of the
total market to nearly 70 percent by 2007 (2010: 8).4
In addition, much of the CDO's (collateralized debt obligations) were subprime, that is, they
made heavy use of subprime tranches as collateral. The rating agency Moody estimates that
between 2003 and 2006 41-49 percent of the collateral used in the CDO's they rated was
subprime (Jarsulic 2010: 11). Figure 3 lists the number of non-agency MBS issuance by type
and is taken from Fligstein (2010).

3

Near prime (Alt-A) loans refer to those loans issued to borrowers with good credit histories, but are either selfimployed or lack adequate income documentation. The term subprime, strictly speaking, refers to the credit scores
of borrowers, not the terms of the mortgages, although the two have often become conflated (Friedman 2009).
4
Unfortunately, I could not acquire the data used in these three studies because they are proprietary data provided
by Inside Mortgage Finance.
http://www.imfpubs.com/data/
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Figure 3. Fligstein. Non-Agency MBS by Type.

In addition to an increasing amount of total mortgages being subprime loans, an increasing
amount of mortgages were also adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs). In an ARM, the interest rate
resets annually based on the current level of some reference rate, such as the 12 month Libor
(Murphy 2009: 40).
In an ARM, the initial rate is almost always a lower, teaser rate, which subsequently goes up.
According to Baker (2009), ARMs constituted 35 percent of all mortgages between 2004 and
2006, compared to a previous average of only 10 percent. Among all nonprime loans, ARMs
constituted 40 percent of the market in its peak in 2006. Friedman (2009: 139) places this
number even higher at 90 percent.
Not surprisingly, resets on ARMS triggered defaults. Jarsulic (2010) cites a Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis study in 2006 which showed that "When payment shock was larger than 5
percent and the LTV was greater than 90 percent, the probability of default increased by 83.5
percent" (11).
Lending standards declined dramatically during the boom. One important indicator is the loanto-value (LTV) ratio, which measures the ratio of the dollar value of the loan to the dollar value
of the mortgage. A loan that covers the entire cost of the house and hence requires no down
payment from the home buyer has a LTV of 100%, or 1. Traditionally, an LTV of 80% was
regarded as standard (Murphy 2009). By 2006, the share of loans with an LTV of 90% or higher
reached a peak of 30 percent of total mortgage loans (Jarsulic 2010: 8).
10

Figure 4. Housing Bubble. Low Documentation and High Leverage.

Conversely, we can infer that at least 30 percent or more borrowers were low income borrowers
relative to the houses they were purchasing. The share of total subprime loans containing
incomplete documentation of the borrower's credit history and income increased from 20 percent
in 2001 to 35 percent in 2006 (Jarsulic 2010: 8).
One explanation for the lack of documentation is that it enabled lenders to avoid state predatory
lending statutes. Figure 4shows the share of loans to borrowers with incomplete documentation
and the share of loans with a high CLTV (combined loan-to-value) ratio (at 90% or higher) are
provided by Gerardi (et. al. 2008: 81).
Moreover, statistical studies confirmed that variables like low FICO scores, higher LTV ratios,
and missing documentation correlated with the likelihood of defaults. In their summary of the
study they conclude:
We find that the quality of loans deteriorated for six consecutive years before the crisis
and that securitizers were, to some extent, aware of it. We provide evidence that the rise
and fall of the subprime mortgage market follows a classic lending boom-bust scenario,
in which unsustainable growth leads to the collapse of the market. Problems could have
been detected long before the crisis, but they were masked by high house price
appreciation between 2003 and 2005. (Demyanyk and Hemert 2008: my emphasis).
In addition, denial rates for subprime loan applications declined during the boom period. Banks
were turning away fewer and fewer high-risk borrowers. Mian and Sufi (2008) show that the
declining denial rates could not be explained by improved economic conditions, stating that:
The expansion in mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 to subprime zip codes occurs
despite sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income growth in these
neighborhoods. In fact, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the last eighteen years when
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income and mortgage credit growth are negatively correlated. (Mian and Sufi 2008:
abstract)
The Bust: 2006-2008
The housing boom was ultimately unsustainable and must eventually pop. The decline in
housing values had a dramatic impact on housing construction. Housing starts are the number of
privately owned new houses on which construction has been started in a given period.
Figure 5 shows data for housing starts from 1996 to 2010, measured as thousands per month, and
calculated as a moving average of 4 months. From its height in 2006, the national monthly
average for housing starts dropped by over 70% by the end of 2009. This is important,
moreover, because construction constitutes about a quarter of all business investment and 5
percent of total GDP.
Nation-wide housing prices began to decline in the third quarter of 2006. What is interesting to
note is that by mid 2008, average house prices had fallen back to 170 percent of 2000 levels.
This was still a 70 percent return over 8 years. The question is then, how did this cause a
widespread financial and economic crash? It should be noted that some cities were hit harder
than others. Housing values were nearly cut in half in Las Vegas, Miama, Los Angeles (Murphy
2009).
An analysis of supply and demand shows that an excess supply of houses for sale had steadily
accumulated throughout the bubble, an obvious anomaly if housing price appreciation is
ostensibly due to increased demand.
Housing Starts 1996-2010
(quarterly moving average: thsnd/month)
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Figure 5. Housing Starts (1996-2010). Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency.
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It wasn't rising aggregate demand, however, that was fueling the boom, as would be reflected in
rising incomes or population growth, but rather, the belief that aggregate demand would continue
to rise forever that fueled the growth (Jarsulic 2010: 38).
Evidence of a growing supply houses during the boom period are reflected in both the data on
homes for sale and vacancy rates. Data for home sales and vacancies are both collected by the
US Census Bureau.5 Data for mortgage borrowing is taken from the Federal Funds Flow of
Funds Accounts. Figure 6 depicts the number of houses for sale, houses sold, and mortgage
borrowing for the United States from 1996 to 2010. Housing data are measured in thousands of
unit houses, and mortgage borrowing data is measured in billions of US dollars.
The most important finding is that the peak for houses sold precedes the peak for houses for sale.
The peak year for mortgage borrowing, housing values (CSI), and houses sold is 2005. This
indicates that the proximate cause of the failure of housing values to appreciate was an
inability to sell at prevailing (inflated) prices. This failure to sell houses at prevailing prices in
turn generated subsequent devaluations in the secondary securities markets.

Thsnds Houses and Billions USD$

Houses for Sale and Sold, and Mortgage Borrowing
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Figure 6. Houses for sale, houses sold, and mortgage borrowing (1996-2010)

5

Houses for sale is measured in thousands of units and is located at:
http://www.census.gov/const/www/newressalesindex_excel.html
Vacancy rates are located at:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/index.html .
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Figure 7. Housing vacancies (1976-2009)
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Figure 8. Percentage of total homes unoccupied (1976-2009)
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Figure 9. Unemployment Rates. United States, monthly (1990-2010)

Figure 7 depicts housing vacancies in the United States from 1976 to 2009. House vacancies
include homes for sale, homes for rent, homes unoccupied but held off of the market, and homes
that are year-round vacant. In short, any home that is unoccupied is vacant. The data clearly
indicate a glut in the market. Over the longer term, from 1976 to 2009, there is a steady increase
in the percentage of total homes that are unoccupied, or vacant. Housing vacancy data are given
in 8.
The human and social costs of the bust are indicated by the sharp rise in unemployment. Figure
9 depicts the official United States unemployment statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

2. Debt and the Rise of Finance
The housing bubble was generated through credit creation, that is, debt. The statistics are
startling. As a percentage of total US corporate profits, profits from financial services (i.e.
income generated from lending), has grown substantially. The financial sector includes
insurance and banking. Financial profits are derived from interest on loans. A rise in financial
profit therefore indicates a greater amount of lending and therefore a greater amount of debt.
In 2004, financial profits account for 40 percent of all US corporate profits. 6 Moreover, this
profit corresponds with a concurrent rise in financial borrowing and financial debt. A lending
6

Data for debt-outstanding and borrowing for this section are taken from the Federal Reserve‟s Flow of Fund‟s
Accounts. Data for Gross Domestic Product are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis‟s National Income
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institution makes its profits via lending, not borrowing. The correlation between profits and debt
indicates that much of the lending that occurred during this period was financed by borrowing as
indicated by the ratio of financial debt to total debt. Total debt includes also household and nonfinancial corporate debt.
This ratio is depicted along with the ratio of financial profits to total profits in Figure 10. The
ratio of total debt to GDP for the United States is depicted in Figure 11. A comparison of the
ratios of financial and non-financial business debt to gross private fixed investment is depicted in
Figure 12.
Figure 12 shows a sharp rise in financial debt as a percentage of gross private domestic
investment. Financial debt eclipses non-financial debt by 1993 relative to total private
investment (including both financial and non-financial investment). The financial sector
borrowed more per year and accumulated more debt in absolute terms than both the household
sector and non-financial business sector.
Moreover, financial debt rose from 15 percent of GDP in 1976 to over 118 percent of GDP by
2008, as indicated in Figure 13. Crotty (2009) reports that the size of all financial assets in US
grew from 4 times GDP in 1980 to 10 times GDP by 2007.
Financial Debt and Financial Profit as a %of Total Debt and Total Profits
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Figure 10. Financial debt as a% of total debt and financial profits as % total corporate profit (1976-2008)
and Product Accounts (NIPA), Table 1.1.5. These are total, rather than per capita, figures, and are not deflated by
the GDP deflator. Nominal rather than real figures are used to make the numbers compatible with the Federal
Reserve figures, which are not deflated, and because most of the figures are ratios.

16

Total Debt to GDP Ratio
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Figure 11. Ratios of debt to GDP, consumption, and investment (1976-2008)
Ratio of financial and Non-Financial Business Debt to Private Investment
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Figure 12. Ratio of financial and non-financial debt to gross private fixed investment (1976-2008)
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Ratio of Financial Debt to Total GDP
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Figure 13. Ratio of financial debt to total GDP (1976-2008)

It is informative to compare and contrast stock and flow variables. Whereas debt-outstanding is
a stock variable, borrowing is a flow variable. Debt is a stock that accumulates from the flow
variable of borrowing and is drained by the flow variable of making payments. Gross domestic
product and gross domestic income are likewise flow variables. Borrowing in the US economy
by the financial sector, households, and non-financial corporate sector, is depicted in Figure 14.
In addition, financial borrowing as a percentage of total borrowing rose dramatically,
constituting well over 90 percent of total borrowing from 1998 to 2000. Figure 15 depicts
financial borrowing as a percentage of total borrowing in the United States from 1976 to 2008.
In 1998 the total amount of financial borrowing exceeds the total possible. This is because in
that year, the Flow of Funds accounts records that the Federal Government had a surplus of
$52.6 Billion. This number is then deducted from the total, which equals $1005.5 Billion,
compared to $1026.8 Billion in financial sector borrowing. The numbers are staggering. When
the total is recalculated so that Federal borrowing is set to zero (rather than a negative), the total
percentage of borrowing from the financial corporate sector is over 94 percent.
Household debt likewise increased dramatically. Figure 16 depicts the ratio of household debt to
total GDP.7 Figure 17 depicts the ratios of total household debt and mortgage debt to personal
disposable income in the United States from 1976 to 2008. Disposable Income refers to income
that is available after taxes.

7

Other studies provide discrepant results. For example, according to Dynan and Kohn, the household debt-toincome ratio increased from .6 in 1983 to 1 in 2004 (cited in Jarsulic 2010); according to Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009: 220), the household debt to GDP ratio had been roughly stable at 80 percent until 1993, when it began to rise
reaching 130 percent by mid-2006. My numerical results differ, but the overall trend is confirmed.
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Taking yet another look at this, we can see that debt grew at a faster rate than income. Figure 18
is a time-series index (1976=1) for household debt, mortgage debt, and personal disposable
income. Figure 19 depicts total household debt as a percentage of personal compensation and
personal income (rather than disposable income). Taken as a percentage of compensation, total
household debt rises well over 100 percent. Moreover, mortgage debt becomes an increasingly
larger percentage of total household debt. The ratio of mortgage debt to total household debt is
provided in Figure 20. Between 1996 and 2006, the percentage of total household debt
consisting of mortgage debt rose from 68 percent to approximately 76 percent.
To recap, the year 2005 is a peak year for all of the following: 1) consumption to income ratio;
2) borrowing to disposable income ratio; 3) houses sold; 4) mortgage borrowing (in nominal
dollars); and 5) the Case Shiller Index (CSI) for housing values. The boom became a selffulfilling prophecy, at least for awhile. Rising prices meant that even the weakest of borrowers
could either sell their homes at a profit, or refinance (e.g. home equity loans) to cover any late
payments. This inability to pay was further reinforced by ARM resets.
The failure of housing prices to appreciate generated a spike in late payments and defaults, and
by mid-2008, delinquencies on all mortgages made in 2007 were at three times the level for 2005
vintage mortgages, with 15 percent of subprime, 7 percent of Alt-A, and 1 percent of prime
mortgages made in 2007 counted as delinquent (WSJ 8/9/2008 in Schwartz 2009: 176).
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Figure 14. Borrowing by sector of the US economy (1976-2008)
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Figure 15. Financial borrowing as a percentage of total borrowing (1976-2008)
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Figure 16. Ratio of total household debt to GDP (1976-2008)
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Figure 17. Ratio of mortgage and total household debt to personal disposable income (1976-2008)

x Larger than in 1976 (=1)
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Figure 18. Household debt, mortgage debt, personal income (1976-2008)
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Total Household Debt as a % of Personal Compensation and Income
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Figure 19. Total household debt as percentage of personal income and compensation (1976-2008)
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Figure 20. Mortgage debt as a percentage of total household debt (1976-2008)
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Moreover, a large increase in foreclosures occurred in both prime and sub-prime at the same
time. From 2006-2007, there was a larger percentage increase in ARM prime mortgages than in
subprime ARMs (Woods 2009). This suggests that ARM resets served as a significant trigger
for defaults. It also suggests that many prime borrowers were in reality nonprime borrowers
and/or living well above their means.
A more comprehensive account of accumulating household debt is the Financial Obligations
Ratio (FOR) calculated by the Federal Reserve. The FOR measures the ratio of debt payments
to disposable personal income, where debt payments “consist of the estimated required payments
outstanding mortgage and consumer debt.”
The FOR also includes automobile lease payments, rental payments, property homeowner‟s
insurance, and property taxes. This ratio has trended upwards until recently. Figure 21 presents
quarterly FORs from 1996 to 2009. The FOR peaks in the first quarter of 2008 and then begins
to decline sharply. This indicates that consumers are “de-leveraging”, that is, they are paying
off their debts and borrowing less.

3. The Global Debt Crisis
The economic crisis has extended beyond the housing bubble in the United States. The ongoing
debt crisis in Greece, for example, threatens the economic health and stability of the EU. The
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Figure 21. Total homeowner Financial Obligations Ratio (1996-2009)
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underlying common denominator in the EU and US for these events has been an inordinate and
unsustainable rise in debt. Figures 22-29 depict public debt as a percentage of GDP for France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States from
1999 to 2009.8
A similar pattern is exhibited in each case. Beginning around 2007, public debt begins to
accelerate and outpace growth in GDP. It is important to emphasize that this data represents
public or government owned debt. Much of the growth that occurred after 2005 can be
attributed, however, to growth in private debt. Data for private international debt are much
more difficult to obtain than public debt. The exponential growth in public debt beginning
around 2007 represents a shifting of private debt to public debt, so we can infer that similar
patterns are exhibited for privately issued debt in the years preceding 2007. This is confirmed in
my analysis of the US housing bubble. Private borrowing in the mortgage markets peaks in
2005. This is also the year that global petroleum production begins to stagnate. Beginning in
2007, this debt crisis is shifted from the private to the public realm, but without steady growth,
the stock of debt is unlikely to decline in absolute terms.
A comparison of a decomposition of GDP and total debt by sector for the United States in 2008
is provided in Figures 30 and31. Data are provided by NIPA Table 1.3.5, and the Federal
Reserve‟s Flow of Funds Accounts, respectively.
Business constitutes only 74.8 percent of total GDP and 84.2 percent of total US debt. Over 50
percent of all US debt is located in the financial sector, and much of this is channeled to
individuals rather than companies, as evidenced by the disproportionate amount of debt located
among US households.
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Figure 22. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. France. (1999-2010)

8

These data are available in spreadsheet format from http://buttonwood.economist.com/content/gdc
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Figure 23. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. Germany. (1999-2010)
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Figure 24. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. Greece. (1999-2010)
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Figure 25. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. Iceland. (1999-2010)
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Figure 26. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. Ireland. (1999-2010)
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Figure 27. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. Portugal. (1999-2010)
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Figure 28. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. United Kingdom. (1999-2010)
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Figure 29. Public Debt as a percentage of GDP. United States. (1999-2010)
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Figure 31. Components of total US debt by sector 2008.

In addition, the debt to income ratio for households is far greater than that of businesses. I
calculate the business debt to income ratio as the ratio of total business debt (including financial
and non-financial) to the business component of GDP, and the household debt to income ratio as
the ratio of total household debt to the household component of GDP. In 1976 this ratio was
0.86 for businesses and 5.102 for households. By 2008, the respective ratios were 2.579 and
7.66.
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II. A FAILURE OF POLITICS OR ECONOMICS?
There are two mainstream views regarding the origins of the crisis. The first is that government
policy and regulation caused the crisis, and the second is that a lack of government regulation
and oversight, including efforts to deregulate the financial markets beginning in the 1980s,
caused the crisis. I‟ll address the arguments from both perspectives.

A failure of politics?
Jeffrey Friedman in an article entitled "A Crisis of Politics, Not Economics" (2009), cites five
regulatory factors at work which led up to the crisis. These factors include:
1) directives by the department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, beginning in 1994, to increase their subprime and nonprime home
mortgage loans;
2) regulations in place since 1936 which authorized only three ratings "agencies";
3) a 1975 Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) decision to confer legally
protected status on the existing ratings agencies;
4) the loose monetary policy of the Federal Reserve (Fed) after 2001; and
5) the so-called "no-resource" laws in most states which prohibited lenders from seeking
legal and financial retribution against borrowers who declared bankruptcy.
I will discuss each in turn.
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae
Mortgage backed securities (MBSs) were not the invention of Wall Street but of the federal
government. The first MBS was offered by Ginnie Mae on April 24, 1970 (Fligstein 2010).
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was originally founded in 1938 in
order to repurchase mortgages from banks, so that banks would be more willing to issue them.
Fannie Mae was converted by the Johnson administration into a GSE (government sponsored
enterprise) in 1968, the year the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was
also created. The Johnson administration sought to expand home ownership, but couldn't have
the government offer loans directly because of federal deficits at home and political opposition.
It thus moved the loans off the government books. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) was founded in 1970 in part to compete against Fannie Mae. Fannie,
Freddie, and Ginnie are under directives from HUD (Dept of Housing and Urban Development).
Although the shares of these GSEs are owned by private investors, their congressional charters
suggested they would be bailed out (which in fact happened in September of 2008).
The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) already had the job of subsidizing home ownership for
the poor; issuing 1 million no-down-payment loans in each of the years 1998, 1999, 2000, and
2001, but in 1994, HUD ordered Fannie and Freddie to supplement FHA by directing 30 percent
of their mortgage financing to low-income borrowers (Friedman 2009: 130). In 1997, Fannie
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introduced the 3-percent down payment, whereas traditionally, non-FHA mortgages required a
20 percent down payment. In 2000, HUD increased the GSE's low-income target to 50 percent.
Fannie launched the American Dream Commitment in 2000 and Freddie its Catch the Dream
campaign in 2002, both of which were designed to increase lending to lower-income borrowers.
According to Friedman (2009), 40 percent of all subprime and nonprime loans were guaranteed
by GSEs by 2007.
Community Reinvestment Act
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed in 1977 in order to encourage depository
institutions to lend in low income neighborhoods. Critics charge that the CRA encouraged risky
lending in the subprime market, which contributed to (or even caused) the crisis. The first
securitization of subprime mortgages occurred in 1997, when Bear Sterns securitized $385
million of loans pooled together by First Union Capital Markets as a result of the CRA
(Friedman 2009: 131). The subprime market then fizzled out, only to be revived again
beginning around 2001.
There are a number of problems with this argument. First, the timing is off. The CRA was
passed in 1977, but the crisis did not really begin until 2007. Second, the mere existence of
subprime loans was not the problem, as evidenced by Gorton (2010) rather it was their complex
and opaque securitization. Third, the CRA only pertains to federally insured depository
institutions and to the geographical areas they serve. The CRA does not regulate what mortgage
brokers and mortgage bankers do. According to a Federal Reserve study, only 10 percent of all
mortgages were made by banks and their affiliates to lower income households located in their
CRA assessment areas (cited in Jarsulic 2010: 144). About half of all subprime loans came
from banks not regulated by the CRA, plus another 25 to 30 percent with very little CRA
exposure, totaling 80 percent of subprime loans. Finally, non-CRA-covered firms issued
subprimes at twice the rate of CRA-covered firms (Gordon 2008).9
Ratings Agencies and the Basel Accords
The capital requirements for banks in most Western countries are established by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) located in Basel, Switzerland. Under the Basel Accords, banks
must have capital reserves equal to at least 8 percent of its total assets. In the United States, this
requirement is set to 10 percent for "well capitalized" banks. In 1991 and 1992, the United
States phased in Basel I. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) assigned a 20
percent risk weight to both GSE issued securities and all asset backed securities that had received
an AA or AAA rating from the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs) (Friedman 2009: 145).
In other words, the reserve requirements were adjusted according to the risks associated with
those reserves. Cash is clearly the best, most "liquid" reserve, but assets that it already had could
9

Available at:
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=did_liberals_cause_the_subprime_crisis
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be converted into securities, which if AAA-rated could further reduce its reserve requirements.
The bank could also purchase securities from GSEs to accomplish the same end.
The three NRSROs included Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch, all of which enjoyed
oligopoly status, conferred upon them by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1975. In
effect, the federal government forbade institutional investors from buying securities that were not
rated as investment grade by these specific firms. In addition, the 1975 ruling effectively shut
out any potential competitors (Friedman 2009: 134).
Friedman‟s argument is that a lack of competition between ratings agencies, and a widespread
ignorance about the effective monopoly status granted to these three ratings agencies,
exacerbated the risks that companies took when purchasing securities. Other ratings agencies
could have, in theory, graded these assets more realistically. How much competition would
have been required? How many ratings agencies would have been necessary to obviate the rush
to purchase mortgage backed securities and mortgage backed CDO‟s?
The facts of this case belie the neat and tidy distinction between politics and economics
established by Friedman. The fact that these institutions were granted effectively monopoly
status does not demonstrate that the valuation of risk would have been less homogenous in the
absence of these regulations. Friedman regards businesses as the passive objects of regulatory
failure, but one can also, with equal justification, reverse this causal analysis and attribute the
crisis to insufficient, rather than inadequate, regulatory oversight. The key difference lies in the
counterfactuals that one imagines.
For example, one problem addressed by those who see the crisis as a failure of economics, is that
the ratings agencies are paid by the companies whose securities they are rating. This creates the
incentive for the ratings agencies to give the rating preferred by their clients, since these
companies could take their business elsewhere if they perceived that their securities were being
graded too stringently.

A failure of economics?
An exemplary analysis of the deregulation hypothesis is put forth Yves Smith in her book
Econned. In chapter 6 entitled "How Deregulation Led to Predation" she writes:
Deregulation ... changed everything, leading financial companies to become much more
like the fiercely competitive firms idealized in neoclassical economics. With each
company fighting for market share and profits, the aggressive impulses that had been
checked by oversight and by quaint notions like propriety were now unleashed. It was
easy for predatory firms to take advantage of their customers thanks to the rapid growth
of a 'shadow banking system,' involving, in particular, over-the-counter markets
derivatives The financial services industry developed a range of products and services
that were both very difficult for their clients to understand and also substantially outside
of the reach of regulation (2010: 130).
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I will discuss two laws that are the most commonly cited examples of deregulation thought to
generate the crisis: the Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act of 1999, which ostensibly repealed GlassSteagall, and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which prohibited the
regulation of credit default swaps (CDSs)
The Repeal of Glass-Steagall
The law popularly known as Glass-Steagall separated investment banks from commerical
(depository) banks. It was ostensibly repealed in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA). Originally, Glass-Steagall consisted of only 4 short statutory provisions. These are
described by Wallison (2009):
Section 16 generally prohibits banks from underwriting or dealing in securities,[6] and
Section 21 prohibits securities firms from taking deposits.[7] The remaining two sections,
Section 20 [8] and Section 32,[9] prohibit banks from being affiliated with firms that are
principally or primarily engaged in underwriting or dealing in securities
GLBA repealed sections 20 and 32, enabling banks to become affiliated with investment banks.
It did not repeal sections 16 and 21. Investment banks are firms that trade securities. They do
not take deposits, are not backed by FDIC, and are meant to be risk takers. Most banks in the US
are subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs), which are ordinary corporations that might
also control firms engaged in securities trading. The big banks in the US, prior to the crisis,
include Citibank, Wachovia, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo.
Contrary to popular misconception, Glass-Steagall did not prohibit banks from buying and
selling securities, but instead only prohibited banks from "underwriting" and "dealing" in
securities. Wallison further explains this crucial distinction:
"Underwriting" refers to the business of assuming the risk that an issue of securities will
not be fully sold to investors, while "dealing" refers to the business of holding an
inventory of securities for trading purposes. Nevertheless, banks are in the business of
making investments, and Glass-Steagall did not attempt to interfere with that activity.
Thus, although Glass-Steagall prohibited underwriting and dealing, it did not interfere
with the ability of banks to "purchase and sell" securities they acquired for investment.
The difference between "purchasing and selling" and "underwriting and dealing" is
crucially important. A bank may purchase a security--say, a bond--and then decide to sell
it when the bank needs cash or believes the bond is no longer a good investment. This
activity is different from buying an inventory of bonds for the purpose of selling them,
which would be considered a dealing activity and involves considerable market risk
because of the volatility of the securities markets. (2009)
Banks, before and after Glass-Steagall, were therefore permitted to buy and sell loans. They
were also permitted to securitize loans, including government securities and mortgage-backed
securities. This was not changed by GLBA. In addition, although it was possible after GBLA
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for banks to have investment banks as subsidiaries, regulations by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) stipulate that these investment firms be treated as subsidiaries of the
BHC, rather than the bank itself. These regulations are stipulated in sections 23a and 23b of the
Federal Reserve Act, which, moreover, stipulates that the affiliation of banks with investment
banks will have few negative consequences for the former.
Credit Default Swaps and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) stipulated that most over-thecounter derivatives transactions would not be regulated either as futures or as securities.
Derivatives would therefore not be regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
which regulates securities, or by the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC), which
regulates futures. This effectively meant that these entities would not be regulating credit default
swaps, which, as the story goes, ultimately contributed to the financial collapse.
Firms purchasing CDO's (or any securities) can purchase insurance against the risk that the value
of these securities will decline. Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) are a type of derivative 10 contract
insuring against the default of a particular bond or tranche. In the case of default, the insurers
(e.g. AIG) would be required to compensate for any losses. Credit default swaps transfer risk,
for a price, from one party to another. If an investor who possesses a security does not want to
incur the risk of that security, it can either a) sell the security, or b) transfer the risk of the
security.
According to Wallison (2009):
A CDS is nothing more than a contract in which one party (the protection seller) agrees to
reimburse another party (the protection buyer) against default on a financial obligation by
a third party (the reference entity). (381).
A CDS works as follows. A lender lends money to a borrower (the reference entity), who posts a
bond in exchange as collateral. The bond is a promise to pay the principle plus interest, and can
be backed up by collateral (i.e. securitized) or not. A "repo" contract is a typical example for
which CDSs might be used.
Figure 32 is adapted from Wallison (2009: 381) and illustrates the transfer of risk associated
with credit default swaps. The "fee" that is charged for the protection is called the CDS
premium, or spread. The amount charged for the premium is based on an assessment of the risk
of default by A. In this example, the risk is passed along from A to E. If A defaults, then the
lender will seek insurance payment from the CDS dealer, which in turn will seek payment from
D, which in turn will seek payment from E. Ultimately, whoever holds the CDS bears the risk.
The CDS then transfers the risk. If the insurer defaults before A, then the firm purchasing the
insurance will have to purchase its insurance elsewhere.

10

A derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived from something else.
There are four kinds of derivatives: swaps, forwards, options, and futures contracts. (Derivates User Guide);
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Figure 32. Credit Default Swaps (CDSs)

If, however, the insurer defaults after A defaults, then insurance purchaser incurs the risk. For
example, assume that A defaults and shortly therefore, E defaults. The insurance company D
would then have to pay.
Arguably, CDSs do not generate systemic risks that were not already present (Walliston 2009).
In the above example, CDSs do not increase the risk associated with the original $10 million
loan. It is still $10 million that has to be paid. If no CDS were purchased, and A defaults, then B
would lose the $10 million, and because B most likely owes others, a default by B could generate
systemic shocks to the financial system. On the other hand, CDSs can exacerbate opacity,
especially since CDSs are over the counter (i.e. private) transactions, rather than "market"
transactions. Estimates for outstanding CDSs range from $45 trillion to $62 trillion in 2007
(Brunnermeier 2009).
The failure of AIG has frequently been attributed to its inability to redeem its CDS contracts to
Lehman Brothers. According to Wallison (2009: 378), however, AIG only owed about $6.2
million to Lehman:
The collapse of A.I.G., then, had nothing to do with credit-default swaps per se. The
cause was the same as with the collapse of the financial system as a whole: the faulty
evaluation of the risks of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) that contained
subprime loans.
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When the value of the RMBSs declined, AIG had to immediately post more collateral as part of
its CDS agreements. This resulted in loss and marginal spirals, and ultimately insolvency.
Conclusions
The global debt crisis is the result of a confluence of conditions (a “perfect storm”) that include
decisions, and their unintended and intended consequences, as well as non-decisions, such as
ecological conditions of increasing energy scarcity. Although it is implasubiel to argue that deregulation qua the repeal of already extant legislation caused the global debt crisis, or more
proximately, the financial panic of 2007-8, it is not entirely implausible that some set of
counterfactual policies might have obviated at least some aspects of the latter. To regard this is a
failure of “regulation” however is to assume a level of control that is incompatible with the
system as it is currently established, much like attempting to cap an erupting volcano. The
system at work producing the global debt crisis as its own crisis of anticipation is strung together
from communications that are nominally designated as belonging to both the state and economy.
It is likely that, in this case, the distinction obscures more than it reveals.
The question concerning the primacy of the economy or society, the latter identified with politics
or the state, has, since the birth of the modern era, been a prevailing distinction used to provide
meaning and attribute causality to social events. Following Parsons, we can designate that the
ability to create credit is a political function. The crisis would thus be a political crisis, but this
designation would of course be arbitrary. We can also say that, following Luhmann, the crisis, at
least in its credit and monetary (i.e. value as opposed to ecological) dimensions pertains to
money and is therefore economic. The system at work is an emergent system operating globally,
which means that it cuts across both nation-states and sectors of society (i.e. across the economy,
the state, culture, and so on). An important element missing from this distinction is the medium
of cultural and ideological expectations regarding the future. Expectations of future income
growth, by both firms and individuals and also creditors and borrowers, became a universal
background condition that enveloped both sides designated by our habitual distinctions. It
became like the water in which fish swim. The fact that the water is becoming inhospitable is
recognized only indirectly in symptoms which appear disparate and unrelated.
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III.

THE SYSTEM OF BANKING AND FINANCE
A Primer on Banking

Modern banking is often called fractional reserve banking. Fractional reserve banking occurs
whenever a bank issues more certificates of deposit than it holds in reserves. To make a profit,
banks typically make long term loans with short term deposits. This is referred to as lending
long and borrowing short. Everything else being equal, short-term loans yields lower interest
rates than do longer term loans. Lending long and borrowing short, however, means that the
bank bears some funding liquidity risk.11 Another term for this basic idea is maturity mismatch,
which occurs whenever short-term debt is used to finance, or fund, long-term assets. To
"finance" a long term asset means to raise money to make a loan, such as a mortgage. The
mortgage is an asset for the bank because it constitutes a future income of monthly payments.
Moreover, if the homeowner defaults, the bank can seize the house as collateral, which in periods
of rising housing prices means the bank can sell the house at a profit.
The banks profits from the difference in interest rates, called the net interest income. Banks
attempt to maximize their return on equity (ROE). Note that a bank would incur no liquidity risk
if its loans are paid back before having to pay its depositors. When the duration of a bank's loans
is equal to the duration of its borrowings, the bank is said to borrow to term. A simplified
representation of how banks earn profits is provided in Figure 33. 12
A bank can also acquire reserves from its own profits, or equity. Selling assets is another form of
equity funding. The primary sources of debt funding are deposits, interbank money markets, and
bonds. The reserve requirement only applies to transaction accounts, not to savings accounts, or
deposits by companies. Other names for the reserve requirement include cash reserve ratio, cash
asset ratio, and liquidity ratio. Because of maturity mismatch a bank can rarely pay back a
depositor with the depositor's money. The bank won't have enough funds from the loan funded
by the deposit until after the loan is paid off. Considering the example above, a bank that owes
its depositor $103 might only have the $10 held in reserves, plus some fraction of the $99 loan.
Assuming the bank only has $10, the bank would then have to borrow the remaining $93 from
elsewhere. In normal circumstances, the bank can simply dip into its reserves acquired from the
money it borrowed from other depositors. Another way to say this is that the bank must roll its
funding.
11

According to the European Central Bank, "funding liquidity is defined as the ability to settle obligations
immediately when due. Consequently, a bank is illiquid if it is unable to settle obligations on time. Given this
definition, it can be said that funding liquidity risk is driven by the possibility that, over a specific horizon, the bank
will become unable to settle obligations when due" (Drehmann and Nikolaou 2009). John Taylor distinguishes
liquidity problems, in which there is a shortage of funds to lend, from liquidity risk or what he prefers to call,
balance sheet risk. The difference, however, is not at all clear to me. Indeed, Taylor acknowledges that "Liquidity
is not always defined the same way by different market participants, and indeed the concept is elusive" (2009: 48).
12
In this model I have sacrificed realism for clarity of conceptual exposition. It does not depict bank equity or other
forms of bank borrowings (e.g. commercial paper, repurchase agreements, securities, etc). To make this more
realistic, one would also need a string of zeros to the numbers I use above. This model will become progressively
more complex as required to explain the dynamics of the 2007 bank panic.
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Figure 33. Simple Bank Model.

Because the bank only has 10 percent of its total deposits on reserve, however, it necessarily
cannot redeem all deposits at the same time. A mass withdrawal by depositors is called a bank
run. When a bank run happens, the demands for cash exceed the bank's ability to pay, and if the
bank cannot raise enough money, the bank becomes insolvent. Bank runs are so called because
prior to the introduction of federal insurance people would literally run to the banks to withdraw
their holdings. When bank runs occur on a mass scale, a banking panic occurs. Banking panics
were common in the United States until the introduction of federal deposit insurance in 1934.
According to Gorton (2010), the financial crisis that began in 2007, what he refers to as the
"Panic of 2007), was essentially a bank run in the unregulated shadow banking system, to be
discussed below.

Interest rates and the time value of money
Interest is the price paid in the future for money in the present. More simply, interest can be
regarded as the price of money. The price of money is constituted by three factors: 1) a
compensation for perceived risk; 2) the discount rate, which is a compensation for delaying
gratification (aka the time value of money); and 3) a compensation for expected inflation.
Perceived risk is relatively easy to understand. The less likely a borrower will pay back the
lender, the higher the price the lender will charge the borrower for borrowing money. Higher
perceived risk generally translates into a higher interest rate.
The rate at which the value of money diminishes in the future is the discount rate, one
component of the total rate of interest. It explains why, for example, long term loans are more
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expensive than short term loans, everything else being equal. This is so because money in the
present is worth more than money in the future, even if there is no inflation. The discount rate is
used to calculate present discounted value, which is the amount a future payment is worth in the
present, if paid immediately. Present-discounted value is calculated as:
PV=FV/(1+R)^t
In this equation PV means present value, FV means future value, R is the discount rate, and the
exponent t is the amount of time that passes. For example, $100 today, at a discount rate of 5
percent per year is only worth $78.35 in 5 years.
100=100/(1+.05)^5=78.35
Note that this assumes that the future value of the $100 has not been diminished by inflation.
The discount rate presents a problem that is rarely discussed in finance and economics, which
has been adequately described as a discount rate mismatch. The discount rate mismatch refers to
the difference between the risk-free return on investment that investors demand and the risk-free
return on investment that is likely or possible in the real world. 13 The discount rate is already
built into many of institutional investors at a standard rate of about 5-6 percent. This means that
investors will demand real returns in excess of this amount, even disregarding expected inflation.
This would not matter in a world where risk and inflation could be accurately evaluated by
everyone. Because we do not live in that world, however, the discount rate has skewed the
distribution of investments towards higher-return, but ultimately unsustainable and higher-risk
assets.
The final component of the interest rate is perceived risk. Perceptions are often inaccurate, as
indicated by the massive downgrading of mortgage-backed securities. One of the most
frequently used indicators of perceived counter-party risk is the 3-month London Inter-Bank
Offered Rate, or LIBOR. The Libor is the interest rate that banks charge each other.
There are two important sources of debt-funding for financial institutions: central banks and
other large, private banks and lending institutions. In the United States, the rate set by the central
bank (the Federal Reserve) is called the federal funds rate. In general, the short term rate set by
central banks (e.g. the Fed or the European Central Bank) is called the short rate. The primary
source of debt-funding for private banks, however, is from other banks.

Leverage: another word for Debt
In a traditional banking model, a bank originates loans, which means that it finds people who
want to borrow money; raises money to make the loan, which is called funding or financing the
loan; services the loan, which entails collecting payments, modifying terms of the loan,
managing late payments and defaults, and so on; and finally, the bank retains the loan, which
13

This phenomenon was brought to my attention by an anonymous blogger whose analysis can be found here:
http://baselinescenario.com/2010/04/19/discount-rate-mismatch/
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means it keeps the loan on its books and incurs the risk of loan default. In the originate-andretain model of banking, the bank can make more money in three ways. The bank can:
1) pay less for its funding (i.e. it can borrow at lower interest rate);
2) originate higher spread assets (i.e. issue loans with higher interest rates); or
3) originate more assets (i.e. lend out more loans)
Banks and lending institutions cannot under normal circumstances control the first two options.
Competition between banks for funding enforces some uniformity of interest rates, everything
else (e.g. perceived risk and duration) being equal. To grow, therefore, a bank must originate
more assets, that is, make more loans. There are only two impediments to making more loans:
a) capital (i.e. its equity, whatever it has that isn't borrowed) and b) funding. After a certain
point, however, a bank can no longer grow from deposits alone and must seek other sources of
funding. In the UK, for instance, prior to 2001 deposits funded loans, which means aggregate
customer lending approximately equals aggregate customer borrowings. After 2001, lending
grew faster than deposits, a signal of increasing funding liquidity risk (Murphy 2009).
One way a bank can increase its assets is to increase its leverage. The concept of leverage is
closely related to funding liquidity risk and maturity mismatch. Leverage measures the degree to
which assets are funded by borrowed money. Leverage is calculated by the debt-to-equity ratio.
A bank's balance sheet consists of "assets" on one side, and equity and liabilities on the other
side. Assets equal equity plus liabilities.
A bank that issues ("funds") $100 worth of loans with only $10 has a debt-to-equity ratio, also
called a leverage ratio, of $90/$10, or 9. A generic, simplified formula for leverage is:

L is leverage, D is already existing debt (liabilities), and E is equity. To calculate the changes to
the leverage ratio with added borrowings B, use the following:
.
I include the time subscripts to distinguish debt already owed from the new debt added, since
they are both debt. New borrowings could also be be represented as
, for example. To
determine how much more a bank can borrow to meet its maximum leverage ratio, solve for B:

For example, assume that the maximum leverage ratio is 10 rather than 9. Starting out from the
same initial $10 in equity, a leverage ratio of 10 would enable the bank to borrow 10*10-90, or
an additional $10. The banks total assets would become $110, $10 of which is equity, and $100
of which is debt. Increasing leverage also means increasing funding liquidity risk. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) establishes the guidelines for capital
requirements for bank holding companies in the United States. Capital requirements are
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measured by the capital ratio, also known as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). The CAR is the
ratio of capital (primarily equity) to a bank's risk-weighted assets. It is therefore similar to
leverage, except the capital ratio is measured as debt-to-assets rather than debt-to-equity.
The standard for adequate capitalization is currently a Tier 1 capital ratio of at least 4 percent,
which consists of shareholder's equity and retained profits. Shareholder's equity refers to the
original amount of money required to purchase the bank's stocks, not the stock's current trading
value. Meanwhile, the reserve requirement for large US commercial banks is 10 percent of
demand deposits (e.g. checking accounts). Table 1 depicts a simplified version of a bank‟s
balance sheet. Table 2 gives a numerical example of a bank‟s balance sheet, and Table 3 shows
how a bank can maximize its leverage. In this example, assets have been decomposed into
reserve requirements and loans. The bank's cash reserve ratio is $10/100, or 10%; its capital
ratio is $100/$110, or 9.1 percent.
Often a bank will find that its reserve requirements are below the legal mandate. In these cases,
the bank can borrow from other banks ("depository institutions) on a short-term basis, usually
overnight. One bank lends its credits in the Federal Reserve Bank to another bank. The lending
and borrowing banks determine the interest rate. The weighted average interest rate of all of
these transactions is known as the Federal Funds Effective Rate. The Fed has no direct control
over this rate.
Table 1. Components of a bank’s balance sheet.

A Bank's Balance Sheet
1) Equity (capital), and

Assets =
(loans)

2) Debt = Liabilities
(deposits and other debt)

Table 2. Example of a bank’s balance Sheet.

A Bank's Balance Sheet
Equity $10

Assets
$10 cash reserves
$100 loans

Debt $100 (demand
deposits)

Table 3. Example of bank leveraging.

Maximizing Leverage
Assets
$100→$110

Equity $10
Debt $90→$100
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A bank can also borrow money from the Fed directly, a process known as going to the window.
The interest rate charged by the Fed is called the discount rate14, and it is usually higher than the
Federal funds rate.

US Banking Prior to Federal Deposit Insurance
Financial bubbles are not new. Prior to the Great Depression there were “panics” in: 1819,
1830s, 1857, 1873, and 1907.15 Moreover, many of banking panics correlated with recessions or
depressions. Prior to the Civil War from 1837-1862, no national currency was issued. Instead,
individual banks issued their own currencies, which were backed by state bonds issued by
whatever state in which the bank was chartered. In other words, the currency was redeemable on
demand for state bonds. This era is known as the Free Banking Era. During this era, the value
of the collateral backing the state bonds was questionable, resulting in frequent bank runs.
Afterward, the US federal government took over the printing of currency, ushering in the US
National Banking Era from 1864-1931. During this era, there was a national currency but no
central bank to serve as a lender of last resort. Bank runs were common. Towards the end of the
era, however, private banks organized into what eventually became known as the Clearinghouse
Committee. In the panics of 1893 and 1907, the clearinghouse issued a new form of money,
called the clearinghouse loan certificates. During a bank run, banks do not have sufficient cash
reserves to honor the requests of all the depositors who are withdrawing their money. The
clearinghouse response was to suspend convertibility, that is, to refuse to convert the demand
deposits into cash, issuing the clearinghouse certificates instead. These were essentially
promises to pay the money back at a later time. The clearinghouse system did not prevent bank
panics, but it did prevent the banks from becoming insolvent. Moreover, the clearinghouse
certificates were designed as claims on the entire clearinghouse system, rather than claims on
individual banks.
The Great Depression ushered in major reforms in banking. The two most important in the US
were the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Together,
they created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC oversees securities
markets, requires securities traders to disclose all relevant information about the securities to
buyers, and made misleading or fraudulent statements in order to sell securities illegal (Murphy
2009: 123). In particular, the Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), which provided deposit protection. Federal Deposit Insurance effectively
ended banking panics arising from a run on demand deposits, leading to the Quiet Period of US
Banking from 1934 to 2007. At the time, most economists, bankers, and even FDR, opposed the
introduction of deposit insurance on the grounds that it would create moral hazard. Moral hazard
14

This should not be confused with the rate at which the value of money is discounted in the future, which is also
called the “discount rate.”
15
For a thorough historical review of financial crises and panics see: Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber
Manias, Panics, and Crashes (2005[1978]); and Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff's This Time is
Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2009).
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occurs when "an individual or firm engage in riskier behavior when they are protected from the
danger that such behaviors create" (Bullard et al. 2009). Gorton describes the introduction of
deposit insurance as follows:
During the Civil War the government took over the money business; national bank notes
(“greenbacks”) were backed by U.S. Treasury bonds and there were no longer private
bank notes. But, banking panics continued. They continued because demand deposits
were vulnerable to panics. Economists and regulators did not figure this out for decades.
In fact, when panics due to demand deposits were ended it was not due to the insight of
economists, politicians, or regulators. Deposit insurance was not proposed by President
Roosevelt; in fact, he opposed it. Bankers opposed it. Economists decried the “moral
hazards” that would result from such a policy. Deposit insurance was a populist demand.
People wanted the dominant medium of exchange protected. It is not an exaggeration to
say that the quiet period in banking from 1934 to 2007, due to deposit insurance, was
basically an accident of history." (2009: 4)
The Banking Act of 1935 added several clauses to the 1993 Banking Act. Four provisions were
intended specifically to separate banking from securities trading. These provisions are
collectively known as the Glass-Steagall Act, after Senator Carter Glass and Henry Steagall, who
helped get the legislation passed.

The Originate and Distribute Model of Banking
Beginning in the 1990s the banking system underwent significant but largely unregistered
transformations, none of which bear resemblance to either traditional banking or traditional,
competitive markets. One of the narratives surrounding these transformations is the birth of the
so-called originate and distribute model (ODM) of banking. According to this theory, instead
of retaining their loans, banks began selling (i.e. "distributing") their loans to third party
investors. The ODM model of banking is depicted in Figure 34.
As Acharya and Richardson (2009) note:
Securitization alters the original idea of banking: banks are now intermediaries between
investors (rather than just depositors) and borrowers. (199)
Consider the following example. A bank pays $100,000 for a mortgage valued at $115,000. The
bank profits by selling the mortgage at any price above $100,000, while the investor should end
up making a profit by purchasing the mortgage at any price below $115,000. In effect, the bank
trades expected future income for income in the present.
The value of future money relative to money in the present is measured by the interest rate. The
interest rate can be regarded as the cost of postponing gratification in the present. In other
words, it reflects a preference for present consumption over future consumption, which means
that the former has a higher price. The interest rate is in theory intended to compensate for the
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Figure 34. Originate and Distribute Model of Banking.

value depreciation of the principal of the loan. The general depreciation that occurs solely as a
result of time, is calculated as a discount rate.16 In theory, both parties to the transaction benefit.
Large banks, of course, do not sell individual loans, but rather a portfolio of loans, bundled
together. A mortgage backed security (MBS) is one example. The selling of assets, (i.e. loans)
provides the bank with profit (i.e. equity), enabling it to borrow more money and make more
loans. This system, referred to as the shadow banking system (to be discussed below), is the
principle means by which the regular banking system has been funded for the past 30 years.
(Gorton 2010).

The ODM revised
The originate-and-distribute model, however, is somewhat misleading. Banks didn't sell all of
their loans. Some of them were sold, and others were retained. In addition, many of the loans
that were sold ended up in the hands of other banks, effecting a relative concentration of public
debt in the financial sector. In short, debt was not distributed but stock-piled.

16

Three, roughly approximate, methods of discounting the value of a present commodity over time are:
1. (1+d)^ -TIME
2. exp(-d*time)
3. (1+d*dt)^(-time/dt), or (1+d*dt)^(-time),
where d is the rate of discount and dt is the derivative of time. The discount rate presupposes that the future is
worth less than the present. Some argue that this attitude towards time, contributes to environmental degradation
and resource depletion, among other social ills (cf. Deb 2009).
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Figure 35. Ratio of Loan Sold to Loans Kept.

The ratio of loan sales to loans outstanding began to rise in the 1990s, but never exceeded 30
percent. Figure 35 is a time series depicting the ratio of secondary market loan sales to
commercial and industrial loans outstanding. The data are provided by Gorton (2010: 42).
Moreover, the securities markets were heavily concentrated. As Fligstein and Goldstein report,
Contrary to view that there were too many players to control any facet of the market, by
the end of the boom, 5 firms controlled at least 40% of the market (and in some cases
closer to 90%) (2010: 8; my emphasis).17
Numerous studies corroborate these findings. Acharya and Richardson (2009) note that about 30
percent of the world's AAA-rated asset backed securities were on the bank's balance sheets, and
another 20 percent were on their off-balance-sheet-entities (SIVs). In total, about half of the
securities were kept by the banks rather than sold to other investors (Friedman 2009: 145).
This indicates that the market was not characterized by perfect competition, but was instead
dominated by a few big players; and second, banks were themselves the primary investors of
asset backed securities. What then, explains the inordinate growth of securitization? For an
individual bank, it is often more profitable for banks to sell loans than to keep them, but en
masse, the banks were in large part simply securitizing and selling the loans to each other. One

17

Available at:
http://sociology.berkeley.edu/profiles/fligstein/pdf/The%20Anatomy%20of%20the%20Mortgage%20Securitization
%20Crisis5.pdf
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convincing explanation is provided by Acharya and Richardson (2009): the banks securitized
loans in order to circumvent capital requirements.

Securitized Banking, or, the "Shadow Banking System"
The need for low-risk (secure), short-term lending between giant financial institutions gave rise
to what is called the shadow banking system, also known as the parallel banking system. The
pillar of the shadow banking system is the repo. In the shadow banking system (aka securitized
banking), banks both sell loans and retain loans. Banks also move their assets off the books to
what are variously called off-balance sheet vehicles, special instrument vehicles (SIVs) special
purpose vehicles (SPV), or special purpose entities (SPE). The SPV is, for all intents and
purposes, a part of the bank, but legally it is a regarded as a separate entity.
The process of securitization can be broken down into a few steps, depicted in Figure 36. First,
the bank pools the cash flows from its assets and sells them to the SPV. Second, the SPV divides
up the pooled assets into tranches, or slices, creating asset backed securities of varying risk. A
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) is a type of ABS that is divided into tranches (a French
word meaning "slice") of varying risk. So-called "structured finance CDOs" create securities
from other securities, pooling together tranches of equal rating (e.g. AAA, Alt-A, etc) into a new
security. Examples of collateral used in CDOs include residential mortgages, student loans, auto
loans, and credit card debt. Central to the subprime crisis was the devaluation of residential
mortgage backed securities (RMBSs).

Figure 36. Securitized Banking.
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In a CDO, securities in the senior (AAA) tranche receive lower returns in exchange for a lower
risk. Losses are born first by the lowest tranches. CDO issuance more than tripled between
2004 and 2006 (Jarsulic 2010: 27). In addition, there were CDO-squared and CDO-cubed
bonds, which pooled CDO's of varying risk (Friedman 2009; Crotty 2009).
Securitization was the primary channel of funding for mortgages during the bubble. Whereas in
1989 47.2 percent of all mortgage originations were securitized, by 2007 approximately 75
percent were securitized (Jarsulic 2010). Among subprime mortgages, between 2001 and 2006
the percentage securitized had risen from 60 percent to 80 percent.
It should be emphasized that securitization was a means to increase leverage. Securitizing
enabled the banks to borrow more money, both by a) moving its assets off of its balance sheets
and b) by holding reduced risk-weighted ABSs. Once the bank sells the securities to its SPV, it
can then move all of those assets off its books. A bank with $100M in assets, consisting of $90M
in loans financed by $10M in equity, for example, can move (if it can find the investors) $40M
of the $90M to the SPV. The capital ratio has just gone from 10 ($100/$10) to 5 ($50/$10). It
can thereby get around its capital requirements and borrow more money. Using SIVs thus
enabled banks to exploit a loophole in the Basel I rules and allowed them to dramatically reduce
their capital reserves. This gets around the capital requirement regulations, but how does the
bank convince the lenders to lend it money? The banks issued the ABSs as collateral for the
money they borrowed to buy and/or originate more loans, which they could in turn securitize
into more ABSs.
Moreover, there was a strong incentive to securitize generated by the Basel I rules, which
assigned a lower risk weight to all securities issued by GSE's (e.g. Fannie and Freddie) and to all
ABSs receiving a AAA or AA-rating. According to Friedman (2009): "SIV purchases were
paid for with money borrowed from money-market funds, and 95 percent of a money-market
fund's investments have to be in double-A or triple-A securities"; he also adds that "of the $1.323
trillion in [MBSs] held by banks and thrifts in 2008, 93 percent were either rated triple-A or were
issued by a GSE" (145).

Repos and short term borrowing
To acquire securities, the banks often borrowed money on the repo market. Repo is short for
"repurchase and sale agreement." A repo is a "form of banking in that involves the short-term
(mostly overnight) 'deposit' of money on call, backed by collateral" (Gorton 2010: 16). The
repo enables both a) banks with excess funds to deposit them short term in lieu of alternative
investments, and b) provides funding (i.e. loans that have to be paid back) to banks who need
cash immediately in order to fund long-term investments such as ABSs.
One problem for banks, as they become larger and larger is deciding what they are going to do
with their cash in the short run. Banks and other institutional investors need a place to keep (i.e.
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deposit) their cash that is both a) short-term (i.e. they can recall their deposits on demand) and b)
interest-bearing. Unfortunately, however, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corproation (FDIC)
does not guarantee deposits over $100,000. The solution to this problem was the repo.
Recall that bonds are, promises to pay, which can be secured or unsecured. Secured bonds are
backed up by collateral, whereas unsecured bonds, such as US Treasuries, are not. Secured
bonds are called securities. In a repo, securities are used as collateral in exchange for short-term
borrowings. Any kind of security can be used as collateral in a repo contract. Often,
government bonds, such as US Treasuries, are used as collateral in the repo. During the housing
market boom, mortgage-backed securities were also used.
In repo, the borrower agrees to buy back the security at a fixed price at some future date. When
the future date arises, the two parties can either cancel the contract or agree to renew the repo
agreement, which is equivalent to rolling funding. The steps of the repo are outlined in Figure
37 and Figure 38. In a repo contract, a Bank A (representing any lending institution) provides
some collateral to Bank B in exchange for a loan. In this example, Bank A provides Bank B
with a Treasury valued at $110. The discrepancy in values can be attributed to the discount rate,
the rate at which the ability to spend in the future is valued less than the ability to spend in the
present, and the risk of default. 18 Step one consist of the initial exchange. After an agreed upon
period of time, the contract terminates and Bank A must provide Bank B with the $100 cash,
plus interest. In return, Bank B returns the T-bill to Bank A. In case of default, Bank B will get
to keep the $110 Treasury bill.
A repo is similar to a mortgage contract. In a mortgage contract, the lender provides cash up
front in exchange for some collateral to secure against default. When the borrower pays off the
debt, the lender returns the collateral (e.g. the mortgage). Repo is analogous except that it is
primarily between banks and other large financial institutions, and the lending is very shortterm. To understand this, imagine that every time you made a deposit into your savings account,
you required some collateral approximating the value of your deposit, just in case the bank lost
your money before you have a chance to withdraw it. This would of course presuppose that your
deposits are not protected by federal deposit insurance.

Haircuts and Rehypothecation
A margin, or haircut, is the difference between a security's price and its value as collateral
(Brunnermeier 2009). A haircut refers to the excess value of the security relative to the cash
loan, and can therefore also be thought of as overcollateralization (Gorton 2010).
For example, if a bank provides a cash loan of $90 in exchange for a security valued at $100, the
haircut is said to be ($100-90)/$100, or 10 percent. It is thus similar to a loan-to-value ratio
(LTV).
18

Note, this meaning of "discount rate" is generic and does not refer to the interest rate set by the Federal Reserve,
which is also called the "discount rate."
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Figure 37. How a Repo Works.

Figure 38. Securitized Lending: Repos and Mortgages.
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Figure 39. Repos and Rehypothecation.

In a repo market, once the lender receives the securities as collateral in exchange for a short-term
loan, it can then spend this collateral elsewhere, using it as collateral for its own borrowings.
The collateral, then, becomes akin to writing checks. This process is called rehypothecation.
According to Gorton, "hypothecation means the pledging of securities to secure a loan” 2010:
185 fn. 7). The collateral becomes a form of money, and was included in the Federal Reserve's
estimates of M3, before being discontinued. The process of rehypothecation, in which the same
asset can continue to exchange hands as collateral for loans, is depicted in Figure 39.
I chose to use short-term Treasuries, or T-bills, as the collateral, to emphasize that MBSs are not
the only asset exchanged in repos, and also to underscore how the value of assets can rise or fall
relative to cash. A Treasury is an IOU for more money in the future. A firm can receive Money
(Mt) now in exchange for more money (M't+) in the future. The claim to future money, M't+ can
then be traded as collateral in a repo deal for cash in the present. It should be noted that the
origination of the T-bill itself is a kind of repo: The Treasury issues a bond, as a collateral for
cash in the present, which it promises to pay off at the termination of the contract. In this
example, the value of the T-bill rises against the dollar.
The appreciation in value could occur, for instance, in times of inflation and insecurity.
Whoever ends up legally owning the T-bill, is guaranteed $110 at some future date. This means
that, in the secondary markets, the value of the $110 at time (t) itself changes value.
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Figure 40. Haircuts.

Next, consider the second example, in which an MBS is traded on the market, depicted in Figure
40. This illustration can be read from left to right. In step 1, a small bank sells an MBS, whose
expected value is $100, or E($100). It is important to emphasize that it is not entering a repo
contract. In steps 2 and 3, however, the banks lend cash up front and keep the MBS temporarily
as collateral in case of default. In step 2, the expected value of MBS remains constant at $100.
Bank C is actually owed $100 plus some amount of interest that accumulates until it cancels the
contract. In step 3,a downward revision in the expected value of the MBS. It is now worth only
$95. In this case, Bank C could only borrow $95 even if haircuts remained at zero.
The fact that Bank A is still willing to offer Bank C $95 for the mortgage whose expected value
is $95 means that: a) Bank A is not any more concerned about Bank C's default than before the
devaluation, and also b) Bank A is confident that the value of the MBS will not fall any further.
If either of these assumptions is called into question, Bank A would impose a haircut upon Bank
C. This is depicted in the red line, indicating that Bank A is only willing to provide Bank C with
a $90 loan for $95 in collateral.
Devaluation in the expected value of the securities has the following aggregate consequences:
1) Banks are less able to borrow because the value of their assets has fallen
2) Banks are less willing to lend to each other because, in the aggregate, the banking
system cannot increase the sum total of its collateral assets in a single instant
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This is known as a loss spiral, which follows as a result of systemic downward shocks in asset
prices. If asset prices fall quickly enough, banks won't be able to borrow and lend at previous
rates, causing a contracting of liquidity or a liquidity crisis. This is Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz's now canonical interpretation of what happened during the Great Depression.
However, if uncertainty is introduced, then a number of other consequences will follow, and a
qualitatively different situation can emerge. I will add this consequence to the list:
3. Banks raise haircut rates, exacerbating the loss spiral. Banks are simultaneously less
willing to borrow and less willing to lend.
Haircuts arise from a perceived risk of default, also known as perceived counterparty risk. 19
Haircuts are thus a proxy for perceived uncertainty, as is the Libor-Repo spread, to be discussed
below. Although a loss spiral can precipitate a haircut/margin spiral, the two should be kept
analytically distinct. The former can generate a contraction of credit entirely because of a lack of
liquidity resulting from asset losses, whereas the latter can generate the same effects due to a
heightened uncertainty regarding a) the value of the securities, or b) the risk of default. In my
opinion, because the value of the securities is an expectation generated from observations of
other expectations, an observed volatility of expectations (valuation) is sufficient to generate
contagion.
It should be noted that the speed at which the money is put back into circulation is variable. In
liquidity crunches (aka credit crunches), banks have cash but refuse to make any loans due to the
perceived risk of the loans. Normally, the collateral offered in exchange for the loan, plus the
interest rate, is sufficient to entice banks to make loans. Problems arise, however, when the
value of the collateral is unknown, and the banks (or other lending institutions) suspect that the
loans might not be repaid. Under these circumstances, banks hoard cash. Injecting more cash
(aka liquidity) into the system becomes tantamount to pushing on a string.

Reinforcing Feedback loops: How Loss Spirals Happen
Consider an investor who buys $100 million worth of assets, borrows $90 million, and finances
only $10 million from equity. The capital ratio is $100/$10 or 10. Assuming that it cannot
legally maximize this ratio any further, if the value of assets then falls to $95 million, the
investor loses $5 million in capital.
Consider what happens next. Holding the capital ratio constant at 10, the investor is forced to
reduce the overall position to $50 million (5/50), which means selling $45 million, exactly when
the price is low. This can cause a fire-sale in which prices are depressed even further.

19

Bullard (et al. 2009) defines counterparty risk as the ""danger that a party to a financial contract will fail to live
up to its obligations" (407).
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Table 4. Fire Sale and Loss Spiral.

Fire Sale as a result of asset price drop
1- Initial Balance Sheet

Assets: $100M

Equity: $10M
Debt: $90M

2- Drop in Asset prices causes Assets: $95M
a decline in equity

Equity: $5
Debt: $90

3- Must sell assets to retain
required capital reserves

Equity: $5
Debt: $45

Assets: $50M

Figure 41. Repo Haircuts and withdrawals.
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Table 4 shows how a loss spiral is reflected in a bank‟s balance sheet. The numbers used in this
illustration are taken from Brunnermeier (2009). One way to think about this is that when the
value of securities declines, the expected profits deriving from that security undergo a downward
revision. This, according to standard accounting practices, results in a decline in the bank's
equity. Think of the security as a form of money, which can be traded as a result of
rehypothecation.
A decline in value means the bank, by definition, cannot acquire the same amount of liquid cash
in exchange. A decline in equity forces a bank, whose capital and/or leverage ratios are already
maxed out, to sell assets in order to raise money, since they cannot legally borrow any more. If
all banks do this at the same time, however, it means that banks prefer cash over the securities,
and so the value of the securities will have to decline relative to cash in order to attract buyers.
A fire sale occurs.
Repo haircuts operate in the same manner, and can also generate fire sales. Importantly, an
additional haircut is equivalent to a withdrawal. The difference has to be made up or financed
by the trader's own equity capital. For instance, if a bank borrows a $1 million, and provides to
the lender $1 million in securities, then the haircut is effectively zero. After a day (or several
days), the contract terminates. The lender can either demand all of its $1 million back plus
interest, or the lender can renew the contract, keep the security, and continue to earn interest,
much like a depositor to a personal savings account.
Instead of literally withdrawing money, the lender has yet another option, not available to a
savings account depositor: the haircut. When the contract terminates, the lender can decide to
apply a haircut, which means that it demands more collateral. The result is an effective
withdrawal from the borrowing bank, which must use up its assets.
According to Gorton (2010: 48), haircuts were zero until August 2007, when haircut rates on
structured debt began to climb, reaching approximately 45 percent by 2008 and 2009. Although
there are no official data estimating the size of the repo market, Gorton estimates that it is
between $8 trillion and $10 trillion (2010: 50). This process is depicted in Figure 41. If repo
haircuts increased by an average of only 20 percent, then the banking system would have to rise
between $1.6 and $2 trillion dollars. This is essentially a bank run.
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Financial Panic: perceived counterparty risk and the repo markets
In a series of articles and books variously with titles like "Slapped by the Invisible Hand" (2010)
and ""Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand" (2009 in Gorton 2010), former Federal Reserve
Employee and Yale School of Management professor Gary Gorton depicts the crisis as
essentially an old-fashion bank run. In Gorton's view, a bank run began in 2007-8. The
difference between traditional bank runs and what Gorton calls the "Panic of 2007-8" is that the
latter occurred in the repo market, and the depositors were not individuals, but other banks. In
his view, the shock in subprime loans was not sufficient to cause a general market downturn.
Specifically, the values of AAA rated student loan debt, car loans, and credit card debt all
dropped precipitously, but only after a few months after the housing bubble has burst.
According to Gorton (2009b), an adequate explanation of the crisis requires an explanation for
how the subprime shock spread to other "unrelated" assets. In his words:
"The outstanding amount of subprime bonds was not large enough to cause a
systemic financial crisis by itself. It does not explain the figure above. No popular
theory (academic or otherwise) explains the above figure. Let me repeat that another
way. Common “explanations” are too vague and general to be of any value. They do
not explain what actually happened. The issue is why all bond prices plummeted. What
caused that?
This does not mean that there are not other issues that should be explored, as a matter of
public policy. Nor does it mean that these other issues are not important. It does,
however, mean that these other issues – whatever they are – are irrelevant to
understanding the main event of the crisis." (5)
Gorton (2009b: 44) provides a time-series comparing the fall in the Libor-OIS spread,
Student loans, credit cards, and auto loan securities.

Figure 42. Gorton. Libor-OIS spreads.
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How did the economic shock become a widespread panic? The key link in Gorton's narrative is
asymmetrical information. Gorton compares the "toxic assets" in the securities markets to E.
Coli (2009). Even a few outbreaks of E. Coli could bankrupt the meat industry so long as the
sources of the contamination were not identified. Analogously, the distribution of risk was
generally not known, leading to a preference for liquidity, a fire sale of assets, and a general
decline in prices of all security types.
Gorton's time line of events is as follows:
1. Housing prices decline
2. Repo depositors (who accepted MBSs as collateral) become worried that they might
not receive all of their cash back. Uncertainty about the value of the collateral, which
they would receive in case of default, caused an increase in repo haircuts, meaning that
the value of securities falls relative to cash. The increase in repo haircuts and uncertainty
about which assets were at risk, leads to a widespread increase in haircuts.
3. The haircut increases generate a need for cash. Remember that the bank borrowed the
cash in exchange for the collateral (the securities). Now they can borrow less cash,
which means they have less liquid assets. To compensate for this loss, they must "sell
assets" (because presumably they can't borrow any more against their existing securities,
which have been devalued).
4. If all banks do this at the same time, this compounds and amplifies the devaluation of
the securities against cash. Everyone "selling assets" means that everyone prefers cash,
and so the assets have to lose value in order to be traded at all.
The general picture is of small shocks being amplified by uncertainty and opacity in the
markets. Collateral only works if it is information-insensitive, that is, if everyone comes to some
approximate agreement on the value or worth of the collateral. Once the worth of the collateral
is called into question, however, it ceases to be collateral in the traditional sense. An analogy
would be to not know whether the check someone writing is redeemable or worthless. Gorton
argues that, once the withdrawals (haircuts) to the shadow banking system were systemic, this
generated a widespread fire sale, in which banks attempted to sell their assets, rather than borrow
against them, in effect glutting the market and causing a further devaluation.

The LIBOR, LIBOR-OIS, and LIBOR-Repo spreads
Ordinarily, if central banks cut the short rate, banks will borrow from the central banks and pass
along these lower interest rates. In 2008, however, central banks cut their short rates, but the
Libor remained high, indicating that private banks were refusing to lend even when central banks
were providing them with the financial resources to do so. At zero interest, private banks could
borrow and lend the money at interest and make a profit. The refusal of private banks to lower
56

their interest rates in spite of a lowering of interest rates at which they could borrow indicates an
increase in the perceived risk of lending. Data on the LIBOR and LIBOR-OIS spreads are
depicted in Figures 43 and 44.20
Notice, however, that the interest rate might still be high because of the other two components of
interest: the discount rate and expected inflation. There is no clear measure of the discount rate,
but expected inflation can be taken into account by subtracting the Overnight Index Swap (OIS)
rate from the Libor. This is known as the Libor-OIS spread. The OIS (Overnight Index Swap) is
a measure of what the market expects the federal funds rate to be over a 3 month period.
Subtracting the "OIS from Libor effectively controls for expectation effects", so that "the
difference between Libor and OIS is thus due to things other than interest-rate expectations, such
as risk and liquidity effects” (Taylor 2009: 15).
In addition, as explained above, repo contracts are a form of secured loans, which means that one
borrows money using collateral. The Libor, however, reflects unsecured interest rates, that is,
the preferred rates that banks lend to each other without any collateral. These loans are
therefore made on good faith. Because secured loans have lower rates than unsecured loans,
subtracting the repo from the Libor can thus be interpreted as a measure of risk. Figure 45
prevents data on the LIBOR-Repo spread provided by Taylor (2008: 11). Notice that the
LIBOR-OIS spread tracks closely the LIBOR-Repo spread, suggesting that the changes in the
former are primarily due to changes in perceived credit risk.

Comments
Gorton has persuasively argued that at least some aspects of the economic downturn, most
especially those aspects having to do with the "credit crunch", were a result of a loss of
confidence among banks, which in turn generated a historically novel form of bank run.
However, he neglects to ask whether or not the "panic" was actually warranted. Gorton
compares the financial crisis to a case of E. Coli. This implies that the crisis would not have
spread had the location of the so-called "toxic" assets been known. The lack of information and
transparency in turn caused a reinforcing spiral of asset sales, which then caused the devaluation
of other "unrelated" types of securitized bonds.
Gorton's analysis not so much at fault for what it says and for what it omits. Gorton does not
address the larger macro questions, such as "What caused the housing bubble?" or "What caused
the explosion in debt?" His primary object of explanation is the mechanism of contagion
between mortgage and non-mortgage backed securities, because in his view, the devaluation of
subprime was insufficient to cause the devaluation of all securities. Gorton thus suggests that it
is entirely the result of panic in financial system that generated the downturn in the real economy
and does not consider the possibility that the two downturns may be mutually reinforcing.
20

Data are available from http://www.financialstability.gov/impact/data.htm :
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Figure 43. Libor rates.

Figure 44. Libor-OIS spreads.
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Figure 45. Libor-Repo spreads.

Three comments about the repo markets need be mentioned. First, Gorton says that banks had an
incentive to keep most of their assets (loans), rather than sell them. This is a static representation
of events. The fact that banks have an incentive to use loans as collateral in order to borrow
more money presupposes that the banks couldn't sell those loans instead. In my opinion it is
more fruitful to view this dynamically: for whatever reason, banks were simply not able to sell
their loans at a rate equal to the rate at which they issued them. In the interim, that is, between
issuing and selling loans, then, banks could use these loans as collateral to issue even more loans,
thus maximizing their return on equity (ROE). This concentration of loans implies a
corresponding concentration of market share among institutions trading securities.
The failure of the entire industry to engage in investment lending means both that short-term
lending is more profitable than are long run investments and also that there was and has been a
steadily declining ratio of productive investments to short run, inter-bank lending, or else the
financial sector would have not accumulated such massive quantities of (essentially idle) funding
in the short-term repo markets. In other words, the size of these financial markets suggests a
need to explain the lack of long term, productive investments.
Second, the term “securities market" is a misnomer. These securities were not traded in
markets, but negotiated in private transactions which were and are inherently non-transparent.
59

The EMH, whose exemplar is the stock market, therefore does not pertain in principle to the
shadow banking system. James Crotty, for instance, estimates that 80 percent of world's $680
trillion worth of derivatives prior to 2007 was sold in private deals, not open markets, between
investment bank and customers (2009: 566).
This line of reasoning is consistent, moreover, with models of "monopoly capitalism" in which
above-equilibrium profits are attained by charging above-equilibrium prices for goods and
services. This considered a form of rent, or transfer of wealth from consumers to firms.
Currently, Foster and Magdoff, espousing Baran and Sweezy's arguments from Monopoly
Capital, argue that surplus profits accumulate faster than their ability to be invested.
Finally, Gorton seems to imply that the banks did not take on too much risk. The only policy
solution would be to have an explicit bailout guarantee for the too-big-to-fail financial firms.
Deposit insurance for individuals who deposit in banks is not the same as a blank check for the
banks themselves, much less a preemptive one. In short, Gorton attributes the banking panic to a
psychological disposition, a perceived risk that is ultimately incorrect or at best a self-fulfilling
prophecy that can be reserved. Gorton does not consider the possibility that the perceived risk is
in fact real. Gorton thus never considers the possibility that the decision by profit-maximizing
firms to incur more debt can generate systemic debt levels that are ultimately unsustainable.

Central Banks and Fiat Currency
Every dollar in circulation today is owed to someone with interest. Consequently, if all debts
were paid off, there would be no money left in circulation. This implies that if growth targets are
not met, systemic defaults are inevitable. Since Bretton Woods, most currencies are fiat
currencies, the supply of which is controlled by central banks. Money is created by central
banks that control the money supply by introducing or subtracting currency by means of
monetary policies, depicted in Figure 46.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve generates money by purchasing US Treasury bills on
the open market. The value of US dollars is backed exclusively by US Treasury bills. US
Treasury bills are similar to IOU's issued by the US Treasury. US Treasury bills effectively
exchange dollars in the present for more dollars in the future. In exchange for purchasing the US
Treasury bills, the Fed credits new money to the seller's account in the Federal Reserve Bank.
I have again deliberately simplified this model to highlight its most important feature, namely,
that money is debt.21 I have depicted two stages to the process, but in reality, they can occur
21

Consider this passage from the now out of print, "Modern Money Mechanics" from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago: "Suppose the Federal Reserve System, through its trading desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
buys $10,000 of Treasury bills from a dealer in U. S. government securities.(3) In today's world of computerized
financial transactions, the Federal Reserve Bank pays for the securities with an "telectronic" check drawn on
itself.(4) Via its "Fedwire" transfer network, the Federal Reserve notifies the dealer's designated bank (Bank A) that
payment for the securities should be credited to (deposited in) the dealer's account at Bank A. At the same time,
Bank A's reserve account at the Federal Reserve is credited for the amount of the securities purchase. The Federal
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independently and simultaneously. Step 1 depicts how the US Treasury can create new money.
In this exchange, the Federal Reserve Bank "buys securities" from the Treasury, which means
that in exchange for money now, the Treasury promises to pay back the Federal Reserve later,
plus interest. If a bank requires funds, it can go to the window and "buy money." Again, this
means that the Bank can acquire money now, with a promise to repay at a future date, plus
interest. Usually this takes the form of a sale and repurchase agreement, or repo, as discussed
above.
New money is not only created directly from Federal Reserve deposits. The bank, having
received the deposits, now lends the new money it has borrowed. Because the newly circulated
money also eventually ends up in a bank, the amount of money created from an initial deposit by
the Fed is a multiple of the original amount. This is called the money multiplier process. The
money multiplier is the inverse of the reserve ratio. If the reserve ratio is 10 percent, for
instance, then the money multiplier will be 1/.10=10. This factor will be multiplied by the
amount of money initially put into circulation to derive the total amount of money that is
eventually generated from this amount. For example, a $10,000 loan from the Fed eventually
generates $100,000 of new money. 22

Figure 46. Creation of Money.

Reserve System has added $10,000 of securities to its assets, which it has paid for, in effect, by creating a liability
on itself in the form of bank reserve balances. These reserves on Bank A's books are matched by $10,000 of the
dealer's deposits that did not exist before" (6: my emphasis). In other words, money is created as a liability, or debt.
http://www.rayservers.com/images/ModernMoneyMechanics.pdf
22
If a bank receives $10,000 from the Fed, it will retain $1,000 and loan out the remaining $9,000. This $9,000
eventually finds its way into a bank, which then lends out 90% of the $9,000, or $8,100. The process repeats until
the remainder is vanishingly small. After 50 iterations, the total money in circulation is $99,484.62. The amount of
new money created approaches $100,000, or $10,000 x 10, as the number of iterations approaches infinity.
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The fractional reserve system requires some form of state intervention and regulation. Consider,
for example, that Bank A holds $1,000 and writes a check for $10,000. This approximates the
amount of money that would be generated on the basis of a reserve ratio of 10 percent by the
money multiplier process from the initial $1,000 deposit. Without any state regulation, the check
would eventually end up in the hands of another bank, Bank B. Bank B has no incentive to keep
the check, and seeks to cash it so that it can create its own money from the money multiplier
process.
Murray Rothbard, a member of the school of Austrian economists founded by Ludwig von
Mises, concludes:
And so if, to make the case simple, the Rockwell Bank gets a $10,000 check on the
Rothbard Bank, it is going to demand cash so that it can do some inflationary counterfeit
pyramiding of its own. But, I, of course, can‟t pay the $10,000, so I‟m finished.
Bankrupt. Found out. By rights, I should be in jail as an embezzler, but at least my
phoney checking deposits and I are out of the game, and out of the money supply. Hence,
under free competition, and without government support and enforcement, there will only
be limited scope for fractional-reserve counterfeiting. Banks could form cartels to prop
each other up, but generally cartels on the market don‟t work well without government
enforcement, without the government cracking down on competitors who insist on
busting the cartel, in this case, forcing competing banks to pay up… Hence the drive by
the bankers themselves to get the government to cartelize their industry by means of a
central bank. (The Case Against the Fed)23
Because all money in the existing fractional reserve system is created as a liability, or debt. The
money has to be paid back, plus interest. This means the following: the total amount of money
owed exceeds the total amount of money in circulation. To repeat: there would be no money in
circulation if all debts were paid off. The additional money required to pay back the interest can
only be created by issuing more money, that is, more debt.24 Debt is therefore built into the
monetary system and can only be paid off, at the aggregate level, with more debt. Aggregate
debt repayment, in turn, presupposes aggregate growth.
The money flows from the banks downward. The Federal Reserve ultimately "owns" the money,
and the banks that make student loans, car loans, and mortgages, ultimately, owe the Federal
Reserve. Considering the US monetary system as a closed system for simplicity (i.e. ignoring
for the moment currency exchanges), a transfer of wealth is built-in to the monetary system,
whose "core" and "periphery", to borrow terms from World Systems Theory, are the central
banks and working poor, respectively.

23

Available at: http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard202.html
In the circular flow model, it is theoretically possible that the interest paid to the creditors is itself spent, or recirculated into the economy. In this case, it would be possible to pay off all debts, plus interest, without issuing
more debt. The question is whether or not this is empirically plausible. The answer is that it is not. Considering
that debt is accumulated faster than it can be paid off, and also that creditors tend to retain a portion of their
earnings, thus accumulating capital, dictates that further debt is inexorable.
24
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The Federal Reserve System is a privately owned, for-profit, banking cartel. Although in
principle, the federal and/or state governments could tax the Federal Reserve banks, in practice,
Federal Reserve banks are exempt from paying all federal, state, or local taxes. Efforts at
redistribution are therefore hindered ab initio as the new funds that would be created would be
owed to the Fed, and any and all taxes currently collected are actually forms of debt-capture.

International Banking and the Bretton Woods Regime
Prior to the end of the end of the Second World War, the Allied Powers met in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire in 1944 and established the Bretton Woods System of International Trade and
Finance. Under this system, the US dollar became the international reserve currency. Bretton
Woods re-established the gold standard, which had been discontinued in 1933. This meant that
every dollar could be converted into a specific quantity of gold upon demand. In addition, all
other currencies were fixed to the dollar, and therefore also indirectly with gold. The Bretton
Woods regime began to unravel, however, in the late 1960s (Hudson 2005).
US purchases abroad constitute an exchange of foreign goods for US dollars. For instance, if the
United States (e.g. the Federal government or US firms) were to purchase $1 million of French
goods and services, the French would receive in exchange 1 million USD, which could be
converted back into gold upon demand. By 1968, however, the US had major trade deficits.
Foreign countries held more US dollars than the US could redeem into gold.
Because the United States could no longer exchange dollars for gold without significantly
depleting its reserves, the US began exchanging US dollars for Treasury bills instead.

Figure 47. Bretton Woods Regime.
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A Treasury bill is simply a promise to pay, or an "IOU." An exchange of dollars for T-bills is an
exchange of dollars for an IOU for more dollars at a future date.
During the Nixon administration in 1971, the US officially ended the Bretton Woods regime,
after which national currencies could be traded against each other in a floating exchange rate.
This history is depicted in Figure 47, with France as a representative example.

The Federal Reserve in the current crisis
The policies of the Federal Reserve (and in Europe the policies of the European Central Bank)
are frequently cited as a contributing factor to the economic downturn, by both those who argue
that the crisis resulted from government intervention and from those who argue that the crisis
resulted from a lack of adequate government intervention. Some have argued that the Federal
Reserve should be disbanded (e.g. Woods 2009). The main criticism is that the Federal Reserve
set interest rates too low after 2001 and thereby contributed to the credit boom and bust.
One of the most well known critics of Federal Reserve policy is John B. Taylor, professor at
Stanford and former Federal Reserve employee. Taylor argues that the housing boom and bust
was a result of the monetary policies of Federal Reserve. Taylor is regarded as a monetarist. As
the name suggest, monetarism regards monetary policy as the most effective means for managing
key economic variables such as inflation and unemployment. As a variant of neoclassical
theory, monetarism becomes the prevailing regulatory philosophy after the global demise of
Keynesian policies and the rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
After the collapse of the "Dot Com" bubble, the Federal Reserve began lowering interest rates.
When growth is sluggish, central banks often lower interest rates in order to increase borrowing
and lending, and hence, economic activity. Taylor argues, however, that the interest rate cuts
after 2001 were excessive. During the 1980s and 1990s, the US experienced a decline in both
output and inflation volatility. Taylor calls this period of the Great Moderation. If the Fed had
employed the kind of interest rate policy that had worked so well during this period, Taylor
argues that the actual interest rate adopted by the Fed during the 2000s would have been
considerably higher. The Federal Reserve departed from its previous guideline, known as the
Taylor Rule, for calculating the target federal funds rate. The excessive credit found its way
into the housing market, which generated a housing boom. No boom, no bust.
The bust was caused by the boom which was a result of "excessively loose" monetary policy.
The problem is that the Fed loaned too much money, which was ultimately unsustainable,
resulting in a subsequent contraction, much like a rubber band being pulled too wide will snap
back suddenly when let go.
Taylor argues that the policies of the Federal government prolonged the crisis. Taylor argues
that the Federal Reserve, headed by Bernanke since 2006, had treated the crisis as a liquidity
crisis rather than a problem of uncertainty and counterparty risk. Bernanke, a scholar of the
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Great Depression, began implementing policies designed to inject liquidity into the markets in
the hope that inter-bank lending would begin to pick up, rejuvenating the flow of credit, and
hence spending, in the overall economy. In December of 2007, for instance, the term auction
facility (TAF) was introduced in an attempt to lower interest rates to encourage lending. The
Federal Funds rate is not determined by the Fed directly, but is instead determined privately by
banks who use their Fed credits to loan to other banks with a shortage of credits. The federal
funds rate is established by the private banks. Ordinarily, the interest rate the Fed charges for
'going to its window' is higher than the privately negotiated Fed funds rate.
Figure 48 is a counterfactual calculated using time-series regression methods, of what would
have happened in the housing market had the Federal Reserve adopted the Taylor Rule and kept
interest rates much higher than they actually were.
TAF enabled banks to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve via auction. It also enabled
banks to use more kinds of collateral against which they could borrow. The TAF rates were
significantly lower than the discount rate, but inter-bank lending overall was not affected.
According to Taylor, liquidity was therefore not the problem. Banks were not insolvent or
without cash, they were instead hoarding it. In February Congress passed the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008, providing checks worth more than $100 billion to individuals and families
in the US. The aim of this policy was to increase spending, but Taylor argues that the policy was
mostly ineffective. Finally, Taylor discusses the initial interest rate cuts adopted by the Fed in
the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis. According to the Taylor rule, the cut was again
too drastic, and in his opinion, had little impact on interbank lending. He does, however, think
that the interest rate cuts may have been responsible for the rise in oil prices beginning in 2007.

Figure 48. Taylor's Counterfactual.
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Comments
Taylor's story regarding the origins of the crisis does not withstand scrutiny. First, the housing
bubble began in 1997, prior to the Fed's significant departures from the Taylor rule beginning
around 2002. Second, data from other countries suggests that monetary policy has little relation
to housing price busts. For example, the United Kingdom had large house price increases and a
high interest rate, whereas Canada and Germany had low real interest rates but no house price
bubble (Jarsulic 2010: 142). The International Monetary Fund corroborates this analysis,
concluding that "Overall, since 1985, monetary policy conditions are generally not a good
leading indicator of house price busts" (IMF World Economic Outlook October 2009: 105).
Finally, it must be emphasized that the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve is only one
instrument of credit creation (i.e. debt) and by no means the most important one. Predominantly,
credit during the boom was generated privately through leverage.

Conclusions
The Federal Reserve is a central component of what may be called the domestic and international
banking systems. Like the ratings “agencies” and Fannie and Freddie Mac, the Federal Reserve
seems to be both economic and political at the same time. Does a mismanagement of interest
rates by the Federal Reserve constitute an economic or political failure? The question itself
seems misplaced. The very distinction between the state and the market in this case, is
inadequate. The monetary system bears no resemblance to the free and open markets posited by
neoclassical theory, but nor can it be adequately described as a political entity obeying a logic of
power. Both the sociology of markets and economic theory are therefore inadequate tools for
grasping the fundamental characteristics of this system or the crisis that emanated from it.
In earlier periods of US history this capacity was distributed, but still codified as organizational
decisions. The distinction between central and decentralized monetary creation, and between
asset-backed (e.g. gold) and fiat currencies, however, is secondary in my analysis to the
realization that in all cases the distribution of wealth via virtual assets (i.e. money) is secondary
to the production of wealth itself. This latter process is conditioned by the material-energetic
requirements of production and the extent to which social progress is viewed through the
distorted lens of what Herman Daly calls “growthmania.”
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IV.

MAINSTREAM ECONOMIC THEORIES AND
EXPLANATIONS OF THE CRISIS

Economics, since its inception, has regarded the economy implicitly or explicitly, as a system of
interdependent parts. In the classical tradition, perhaps the most famous exponents of the
systems view are Léon Walras, the father of General Equilibrium Theory (GET) and Vilfredo
Pareto, who also made important contributions to the systems theoretical tradition in sociology.
Systems ideas, however, are also explicitly codified in the works of Ricardo, Malthus, Marx, and
others. Economics as a discipline, however, has rarely reflected on the relationships between the
economy and society as a whole. The economy, moreover, is usually regarded as independent of
both the physical biosphere in which it is embedded. In most economic models (equilibrium or
otherwise), the economy is depicted as a self-regulating and autonomous. The fact that
economics does not depict or explain the boundary relations between economy and society is
regarded as irrelevant to the study of economics, a result of a necessary abstraction from reality.
This task, of representing the economy in its relation to society as a whole, is the task of
sociology.
Below I review, in brief, some of the fundamental tenets of economic theory, including the
relevant differences between classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian economics. I treat these as
rough ideal-types, in the Weberian sense, whose specificity can be modulated depending on the
theoretical task. I demonstrate that, despite their differences in emphasis and orientation, they
are all inadequate to understanding the social significance of economic phenomena. Most
importantly, economics treats the economy as if it were capable of perpetual motion. This makes
traditional theory incapable of understanding the current crisis in its full significance, that is, of
providing normative guidance for how best to mitigate the social impacts of increasing
ecological scarcity.

Classical, Neoclassical, and Keynesian Theory
The neoclassical tradition can be traced back to the "marginalist" revolution and the writings of
Alfred Marshall, who is credited with the technique of using supply and demand curves to
calculate equilibrium prices, and Léon Walras, the founder of General Equilibrium Theory
(GET). The term "neoclassical" 25 was originally introduced in 1900 by Thorstein Veblen in his
Preconceptions of Economic Science. Neoclassical economic theory is distinguished from the
writings of classical political-economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus,
Karl Marx and others. In a nutshell, neoclassical theory asserts that markets work (i.e. that
markets are efficient).26
25

The "neoclassical tradition" is the mainstream of economic theory, so I will use the terms "neoclassical",
"mainstream economics" and "economics" interchangeably.
26
That market equilibria are Pareto-efficient is the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. The Second
Theorem of Welfare Economics holds that every efficient allocation of resources will be an equilibrium allocation
with non-zero prices.
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The neoclassical approach differs from the classical tradition with respect to both 1) its theory of
value and 2) its theory of price. In the classical tradition, value is regarded as a common
substance, such as embodied labor, inhering in qualitatively distinct commodities. Value among
the classical economists thus refers to an absolute, rather than a relative, frame of reference, and
explains the equivalence of commodities from the point of view of an objective observer of the
exchange. Adam Smith first distinguishes exchange-value and use-value, as two dimensions of
commodity value. 27 In neoclassical economics , on the other hand, value is regarded as a
relative attribution determined by the preferences of utility-maximizing consumers and
producers. There is no concept of use-value in neoclassical theory.
With regard to price, classical theorists mostly calculate price as a function of costs of
production. Marginal theorists, on the other hand, calculate price as the intersection of supply
and demand curves. According to neoclassical theory, supply and demand curves are not
random or chaotic, but instead exhibit law-like regularities, derived from the law of diminishing
returns. The concept of diminishing marginal returns takes two forms in neoclassical theory: on
the supply side, it manifests as diminishing marginal productivity, and on the demand side,
diminishing marginal utility. Diminishing marginal productivity implies that the supply curve
slopes upward, whereas diminishing marginal utility implies that the demand curve slopes
downward. According to the laws of supply and demand, rising prices elicit greater quantities
of supply and smaller quantities of demand. 28 Costs of production are thus determined primarily
by capacity constraints. Figure 49 is a typical supply-demand curve. The vertical axis represents
price, and the horizontal axis represents quantity.

Figure 49. Supply and Demand.
27

Marx later extends this duality to the commodity of labor, distinguishing between the use-value of labor (which
generates value) and the exchange-value of labor-power (which is paid its fair value, the wage). In Marx‟s model,
the discrepancy between the value created by labor and the value of labor-power constitutes the source of profit.
28
A clear distinction should be made between supply and demand, and quantity supplied and quantity demanded.
Supply refers to a relationship between quantity supplied and price at every price. Likewise, demand refers to a
relationship between quantity demanded and price at every price. Supply and demand refer to lines, whereas
“quantity supplied” and “quantity demanded” refer to points along supply and demand curves. The slope of supply
and demand curves are known as the elasticity of supply and the elasticity of demand, respectively. Elasticity
measures the percentage change in quantity divided by the percentage change in price. Goods with elasticity of less
than 1 are said to be inelastic, because a percentage change in price corresponds to a small percentage change in
quantity supplied or demanded. The demand curve for insulin for a person who is diabetic would be highly
inelastic. In this case, the amount actually purchased depends primarily on a person‟s income rather than on the
commodity‟s price.
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These theories are not innocuous. They have important implications for how economists think
about markets. For instance, classical theories espoused a view of profit as surplus (or rent),
whereas in neoclassical theory, profit is understood as the payment made to investments (or
capital).
It is therefore possible to formulate a theory of exploitation in the classical tradition, whereas in
the neoclassical tradition, exploitation is only possible under monopolistic conditions in which
monopolies can charge above-equilibrium prices. The best known classical approaches to
economic theory today are Marxian and Sraffian schools.
The major area of disagreement between neoclassical and Keynesian theories is over the concept
of inadequate effective demand.29 Keynesians believe in contradiction to Say‟s Law, that
recessions (and depressions) are demand driven.30 Forty years ago, the economics profession
was dominated by Keynesians. Since the 1970s, however, the profession has been dominated by
neoclassicals.31 Within Keynesian economics, two camps can be distinguished: New
Keynesians and Structural Keynesians. 32 The prevailing form of Keynesianism within academic
institutions is New (or neo-) Keynesianism33. The primary difference between difference
between structural and neo-Keynesianism is that the latter emphasize the Keynes‟ notion of
fundamental uncertainty and the irrationality of markets, and recognize the possibility of wagesqueeze and under-consumption as theories of economic stagnation (Palley 2010).
An important line of continuity between classical and neoclassical and Keynesian economics is
the concept of equilibrium. Equilibrium is the point where supply and demand curves intersect.
29

This is also known as under-consumption, over-production, over-accumulation, and realization failure. One
important distinction to keep in mind is that under-production sometimes refers only to a lack of adequate consumer
demand. A lack of effective aggregate demand, however, incorporates all aspects of demand, which is usually
decomposed into 1) consumer demand; 2) business investment; 3) government spending; and 4) net exports.
30
The idea that crises are demand-driven is also held by many Marxian economists. Some Marxian economists,
however, prefer to explain crises as driven not by demand, but by falling rates of profit (cf. Kliman 2007).
31
There are a number of reasons for this. One primary reason was the phenomenon of stagflation, the coincidence
of inflation with unemployment. Prior to the stagflation of the 1970s, economists had modeled an inverse
relationship between inflation and unemployment, which until that time had been empirically corroborated. This
relationship is known as the Phillip's Curve, after William Phillip's, a New Zealand economist who hypothesized the
relationship in 1958. Because he was associated with the Keynesians, monetarists such as Milton Friedman began
arguing that the empirical refutation of the Phillip's Curve in the 1970s meant that economists should once again
presume market efficiency. This latter argument is of course a logical non-sequitor. The nomothetic aspirations of
economic theory are clearly apparent in this historical ideological confrontation. It appeared as unacceptable, or
perhaps even unthinkable, that relationships themselves between aggregate economic variables might themselves be
in flux.
32
New Keynesians are also referred to, by critics, as bastard Keynesians and/or military Keynesians. Foster and
McChesney (2010) explain: “ [Joan]Robinson termed “bastard Keynsianism” became the order of the day for
mainstream economics and policymakers from Harry Truman to Richard Nixon. This sanitized version of
Keynsianism dropped much of the concern with inequality and social spending, and regarded Keynes as providing a
toolkit of government policies to manipulate the short-term business cycle and thereby avoid recession and inflation.
In the United States, this meant, in practice, “military Keynesianism.”
33
Paul Krugman describes the New Keynesians and neoclassicals respectively as saltwater and freshwater
economists, the former so called because they are located along the East Coast (e.g. in Harvard, Princeton, and
coastal universities), whereas the latter resided at inland schools, most notably the University of Chicago.
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An equilibrium price for a commodity is that price at which everything produced is
purchased. The idea that markets always clear is commonly referred to as Say's Law, after
French economist Jean Baptiste Say, who argued in the 19th century that supply and demand, in
the aggregate, are always equivalent because every product sold is by definition a product
purchased.34 There were numerous critics of this idea. 35 According to Say‟s Law, supply
creates its own demand. An alternative to Say‟s Law is often formulated as Keynes‟ Law: the
idea that demand creates its own supply. Neither Keynes nor Say actually proposed and
defended these terse formulations, but they are useful for describing and summarizing two broad
points of view.
Léon Walras is generally regarded as the father of General Equilibrium Theory (GET) in
economics. Walras sought to determine the conditions under which exchange would be mutually
motivated. According to Walras's "theorem of maximum utility," the utility, or pleasure, people
derive from consumption is subject to the law of diminishing returns. 36 Extending the principle
of diminishing marginal utility to exchange, Walras concluded that voluntary exchange between
utility maximizing individuals will take place until all mutually advantageous exchanges have
been exhausted.37
In the 1960s GET was extended to the stock market under the guise of the "efficient market
hypothesis" (EMH), according to which asset bubbles cannot occur because of the presumption
that changes in asset prices are statistically independent of each other, a necessary condition of a
Gaussian distribution. 38 An offshoot of GET is the rational expectations hypothesis, later
repacked as "new classical economics." This form of GET was invented by the 1975 Nobel
Memorial Prize winner Robert Lucas, who extended the efficient market hypothesis to the entire
34

In fact, Say's argument is a bit more nuanced than this, because his argument pertains only to the economy as a
whole. Say regarded as possible supply-demand mismatches between sectors.
35
For example, Karl Marx wrote: “In actual fact, supply and demand never coincide, or if they do so, it is only by
chance and not to be taken into account for scientific purposes: it should be considered as not having happened.
Why then does political economy assume that they do coincide? In order to treat the phenomena it deals with in their
law-like form, the form that corresponds to their concept, i.e. to consider them independently of the appearance
produced by the movement of demand and supply” (CIII:291: my emphasis)
36
A frequently cited example of this phenomenon is eating ice cream. Eating ice cream will result in satiation at
some point, after which continuing to eat more ice cream will generate less and less satisfaction. As the desire for
ice cream diminishes, so does the utility, or happiness, derived from consuming it. At some point, continuing to eat
more ice cream will generate displeasure and sickness, or negative utility. If the goal is to maximize utility from ice
cream, then it would be rational to continue to eat ice cream until the utility derived from it is zero.
37
Walras's method involved solving systems of paired equations representing supply and demand for different
sectors of the economy. The unique solutions to these equations ostensibly represent market-clearing prices, which
could in theory equilibrate supply and demand in every sector simultaneously.
38
According to Eugene Fama, all asset price movements in financial markets follow a random, Gaussian
distribution. Cooper (2009) explains that this conclusion follows from the following paradox: if an investor could
reliably predict how prices would move, he could reliably make a profit. On the other hand, if this investor could
reliably and with certainty make a profit, then the asset must not be correctly valued, for the profit of the investor is
acquired by betting that the current price is over or under-valued, which means that the current price must be
wrong. Consequently, asset prices cannot be accurately predicted, nor can profits be reliably acquired, at least not
for individual assets. The stock market thus follows a "random walk." Moreover, as Cassidy (2009: 94) points out,
the theory itself is based on an internal contradiction. If stock markets already reflect all relevant and available
information, then there is no incentive for investors and market researchers to find that information, and if nobody
finds and records the information, the markets cannot be efficient.38
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economy. The gist of this theory is that the market, if left unregulated, is always optimally
efficient at all times.
In addition, because the market is the sum total of mutually beneficial exchanges, the market is
Pareto-efficient: at least one person is better off and no one is made worse off. 39 Because this
equilibrium condition is also the condition towards which markets naturally gravitate and
eventually settle. Markets, guided only by an invisible hand 40 yields the optimum, equilibrium
condition. Markets necessarily yield the best of all possible worlds. Proponents of neoclassical
theory has tended to adopt this conclusion in principle, whereas Keynesians are more inclined to
argue that individually rational actions can lead to collectively irrational results, and therefore
that market regulation is in some cases desirable.

Under-Consumption and Over-accumulation
Below I examine some conventional perspectives on the debt crisis, including 1) underconsumption theories (both Keynesian and Marxian varieties) and 2) theories of overaccumulation (including Baran and Sweezy‟s idea of Monopoly Capital as well as Ben
Bernanke‟s concept of the “Global Savings Glut”).
To over produce is tantamount to under-consuming. Because over-accumulation seems
synonymous with over producing, it would seem that all three terms are synonymous. Wherein
is the relevant distinction? To avoid confusion, the distinction between over-accumulation and
under-consumption primarily pertains to the question of who accumulates too much and/or does
not accumulate sufficiently. In theories of under-consumption, individuals (aka households,
workers, consumers) do not spend sufficiently. According to theories of over-accumulation, on
the other hand, businesses (aka firms) do not invest sufficiently. Whether or to what extent these
distinctions correspond to real distinctions has been a subject of controversy since the issue was
debated between David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus. We need not rehearse these arguments
here. Instead, I review the theories with respect to a) what they attempt to explain, and b) the
potential fruitfulness of adopting the explanatory frame of reference.

Keynesian Theories of Under-consumption
Aggregate demand includes four components: consumer demand, business investment,
government spending, and net exports. This is a standard way of decomposing the GDP.

39

The terms Pareto-efficient, Pareto-improvement, and Pareto-optimum, were of course not used by Walras himself,
who wrote his treatise Elements of Pure Economics in 1874, before Pareto became widely known. Vilfredo Pareto
and Walras both taught at the University of Lausanne, and in fact, Pareto took Walras's position upon his retirement
in 1893.
40
This term is of course borrowed from Adam Smith. The phrase, however, only appears once in The Wealth of
Nations (1776).
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Figure 50. Components of GDP by type of income. United States (2009)

The distribution of US GDP for 2009 is provided in Figure 50. Consumption constitutes about
70 percent of GDP in the US and has remained relatively stable across time.
Under-consumption theories explain economic slumps (or “downturns”) as demand-driven. The
upshot is that economic slumps can be fixed by stimulating demand. This can be accomplished
by monetary policy (i.e. by lowering interest rates) or by means of fiscal stimulus, or government
spending. Krugman (2009), a self-described Keynesian, argues that the Great Depression ended
as a result of the Second World War, which in his view acted as a massive public works
program. The policies of the New Deal, on the other hand, were too small to generate any
sufficiently strong stimulus. Krugman has argued that the government response to the current
downturn has likewise been too small. Another noted Keynesian economist, Dean Baker,
calculates that the US economy had lost roughly $1.2 trillion in demand by 2008, and that the
stimulus programs replaced only about $300 billion (2009). This notion of demand-driven
recessions is of course incompatible with neoclassical theory.
To say that economic recessions are generated by a decline in aggregate demand is, taken by
itself, a tautology, for recessions are defined in terms of quarterly GDP growth, which can be
decomposed as components of demand. What causes the slowdown in growth or decline in
demand? Although under-consumption can refer to all of the aggregate components of demand,
it is often used primarily to refer to a decline in consumer demand, specifically. This can occur
for a number of reasons. One explanation is called the paradox of thrift, which occurs when
consumers en masse begin to save more and therefore spend less. At the aggregate level, this
generates a decline in business revenue, which then feeds back to generate a systemic downturn.
Thomas Palley, a self-described Structural Keynesian, argues that the current downturn is a
consequence of the “neo-liberal growth model” which generated rising inequality and stagnating
wages:
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The essence of the argument is that the post-1980 neoliberal growth model relied on
rising debt and asset price inflation to fill the hole in aggregate demand created by wage
stagnation and widened income inequality.
Contrasting his view with mainstream views of the crisis, he adds:
The new Marxist-SSA-structural-Keynesian “financialization” interpretation of the crisis
is far more pessimistic. Financial regulation is needed to ensure economic stability, but it
does not address the ultimate causes of the crisis, nor will it restore growth with full
employment. Indeed, paradoxically, financial reregulation could even slow growth
because easy access to credit is a major engine of the neoliberal growth model. Taking
away that engine while leaving the model unchanged, therefore promises even slower
growth. (2010)
The state variable of this model is growth. The neoliberal model, which generates short-term
growth at the cost of rising inequality and stagnating wages, is ultimately unsustainable. Growth
of course would not matter if it did not feedback upon wages. The argument then be recast as
having the following feedback structure:
1) Falling wages (in pursuit of short-term growth)  2) inadequate demand (in the
middle run)  3) falling profits  4) slower growth  5) falling wages
Step 3 is not explicitly discussed, but it is not clear how slower growth could occur otherwise.
Notice that the ultimate explanation of growth is still neoclassical: a portion of profits are
invested, and these investments generate future growth. Palley emphasizes the first step in this
chain, whereas Foster and others (see below) emphasize the inability to invest. Next, I discuss
some Marxian variants of this approach and evaluate the empirical evidence.

Marxian Theories of Under-Consumption
Some Marxian economists have attributed economic slumps (defined either as declining profit
rates, or declining growth rates) to a mismatch between wage growth and productivity growth.
A simple version is as follows: the profit-motive compels capitalists to cut wages as much as
possible and/or lay off workers and to reinvest in production; over time declining wages means
that workers are not able to purchase the commodities that they produce, thus generating market
gluts. Therefore, income inequality is ultimately unsustainable for capitalism.
There is a long dispute within Marxian circles over whether “crises” can be attributed to
distributional issues, or whether they must have some prior cause in the sphere of production.
The latter is Marx‟s famous argument regarding the falling rate of profit (FRP), which occurs as
a result of increased mechanization. Marx can be quoted to support both interpretations:
It is a pure tautology to say that crises are caused by the scarcity of solvent consumers, or of a paying
consumption. The capitalist system does not know any other modes of consumption but a paying one .
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. . . If any commodities are unsaleable, it means that no solvent purchasers have been found for them,
in other words, consumers . . . . But if one were to attempt to clothe this tautology with a profounder
justification by saying that the working class receive too small a portion of their own product, and the
evil would be remedied by giving them a larger share of it, or raising their wages, we should reply that
crises are precisely always preceded by a period in which wages rise generally and the working class
actually get a larger share of the annual product intended for consumption. From the point of view of
the advocates of „simple‟ (!) common sense, such a period should rather remove a crisis. It seems,
then, that the capitalist production comprises certain conditions which are independent of good or bad
will and permit the working class to enjoy that relative prosperity only momentarily, and at that always
as a harbinger of a coming crisis. (1933: 475-6, quoted in Sweezy 1970: 151).

Compare the quote above with the following:
The last cause of all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses as
compared to the tendency of capitalist production to develop the productive forces in such a way that
only the absolute power of consumption of the entire society would be their limit. (Marx 1933: 568,
quoted in Sweezy 1970: 177).

One of the earliest proponents of this theory was J.A. Hobson of England. Regarded by Lenin as
a liberal reformer, he argues that low wages at home created insufficient demand. Capitalism
avoided a crisis of overproduction, however, by expanding abroad. Colonialism was then a
means to prop up demand. He was regarded as a reformer (which for Marxists is a pejorative)
as opposed to a radical because he believed overproduction could be obviated by implementing
minimum wage laws and other domestic reforms. In short, capitalism need not be abolished.
Marxian economists Conrad Schmidt, Karl Kautsky, Louis B. Boudin, Rudolf Hilderding, and
Rosa Luxembourg all emphasized realization failure in their crisis theories. Sweezy (1942) and
Baran (1957) elaborated realization failure (RF) theories of crisis. Sweezy describes a crisis of
over-production (under-consumption) as one that results from a decline in the ratio of the rate of
growth of consumption to the rate of growth of the means of production (1970: 183). According
to Sweezy, the production of consumer goods may lag behind the production of the means of
production (factories, fixed capital, etc.) thereby generating a crisis of over-production.41
Another way of thinking about this is that over-production occurs when profits (which are
primarily reinvested into the means of production) grow at a faster rate than do wages.
Similarly, Analyzing the non-financial corporate business (NFCB) sector for the United States
between 1949 and 1979, Weisskopf finds that the decline in profitability arises “almost entirely”
from a “rise in the true share of wages, which indicates a rise in the strength of labor” (1979:
370).
More recently, Richard Wolff has argued that the current crisis can be attributed to stagnating
wages resulting from exploitation. Beginning in the 1970s, he argues that wage growth fails to
keep pace with rising productivity. He lists four additional factors contributing to the declining
wage share, including: globalization, in which firms relocate abroad in pursuit of low wages;
41

Marxian economists decompose the economy into three sectors: the sector for consumer goods, the sector for
capital goods (means of production), and the sector for luxury goods, which represents the goods that capitalists
purchase with their surpluses. Often the luxury sector is not included.
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immigration; women entering the workforce; and new technologies. All of these, he insists, has
a depressing impact on wages. He argues that the profit boom of the past 30 years has not been
distributed as compensation and wages to workers. Prior to the 1970s, he asserts that: "The
genius of U.S. capitalism before the 1970s consisted in the combination of rising real wages,
surpluses rising faster, and surplus distributions that reacted back to reinforce the pattern of
rising wages and faster-rising surpluses." (2010: 175). Beginning around the 1970s, the only
way that consumption growth can be maintained, in lieu of wage-growth, is via credit: rather
than receiving higher wages, workers received credit cards. Businesses profited from the wage
cuts, the increased spending, and the interest payments. Wolff argues that this ultimately was
unsustainable.
In my view that declining wages causes declining or stagnating growth is really a counterpart to
the argument that rising wages share causes declining or stagnating growth. The latter is the
neoclassical view, which attributes falling investments to a discrepancy between the rates of
growth between the wages and productivity. This means that as the rate of growth of the
economic pie gets larger or smaller, changes in the wages lag behind. This is known as the
wage-lag hypothesis. Raffalovich, Leicht, and Wallace (1992), find evidence in favor of the
wage lag hypothesis:
Consistent with prior research and the „wage lag‟ hypothesis, labor productivity- but not
compensation- increases with increasing rates of capacity utilization. Output therefore
increases faster (and decreases more slowly) than the total compensation of labor.”
(1992: 254).
If growth in wages exceeds that of productivity, then reinforcing feedback effects are plausible,
since wage growth would cut further into investments necessary for future growth. Data for the
wage share, calculated as the percentage of the Net Domestic Product, is provided in Figure 51,
followed by three additional calculations of the wage share.
In this time-series, the wage share remains fairly stable, despite a decline in 2001. Notice that
around 2005 it begins to rise. The coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean), is approximately 6 percent. The time sries is only descriptive. It does not indicate
which comes first, a decline in investment or a decline in compensation. Although the wage
share has remained fairly stable, it does not tell us anything about how income is distributed
among wage earners. Figure 52 shows the percentage of total income earned by the top ten
percent of income earners in the United States. The data include capital gains.
The wage share has declined in the past decade only slightly, but the growth in inequality has
been dramatic, beginning around the 1970s. A rise in inequality is compatible with demanddriven hypotheses of the downturn. The top 10 percent of income earners by 2007 were
receiving about half of the entire income in the US. Rising inequality coincided with rising debt
and a dramatic growth in finance. It is not inequality that fuels debt, nor does the evidence
suggest that a decline in personal consumption generated inequality. To the contrary, the
inordinate rise in consumption created a latent form of debt-peonage, exacerbating inequalities.
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Figure 51. Wage Share. Percentage of NDP as Employee Compensation (1998-2008)
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Figure 52. Income inequality. Share of income earned by top decile (1970-2009)
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Theories of Over-Accumulation
Ben Bernanke and the Global Savings Glut
Ben Bernanke is not usually put in the same category as the Marxists Paul Baran and Paul
Sweezy. However, their theories are homologous in the sense that they thematize the negative
consequences of the stock-piling of capital (aka money). Ben Bernanke replaced Alan
Greenspan as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 2006. Since the financial crisis began to
unravel in 2007, he has emphasized an international frame of reference for understanding the
current crisis. In the popular media, his theory has been dubbed the "Global Savings Glut." In
short, the idea is that the housing bubble arose as a consequence of excess savings by China and
other countries. These savings then find their way the United States, which contributed to the
housing bubble. National Public Radio has framed their reporting of the financial crisis similarly
as the "Global Pool of Money." Figure 53 is a pictorial illustration of the argument.
Bernanke's conceptual time line is as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Figure 53. Bernanke's Global Savings Glut.
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At a speech delivered at Morehouse College in Atlanta, GA on April 14, 2009, Bernanke asks
the audience "How did we get here?" He answers:
"[W]e need to consider how global patterns of saving and investment have evolved over
the past decade or more, and how those changes affected credit markets in the United
States and some other countries...
"Indeed, the net inflow of foreign saving to the United States, which was about 1-1/2
percent of our national output in 1995, reached about 6 percent of national output in
2006, an amount equal to about $825 billion in today's dollars.
"Financial institutions reacted to the surplus of available funds by competing
aggressively for borrowers, and, in the years leading up to the crisis, credit to both
households and businesses became relatively cheap and easy to obtain. One important
consequence was a housing boom in the United States, a boom that was fueled in large
part by a rapid expansion of mortgage lending. Unfortunately, much of this lending was
poorly done, involving, for example, little or no down payment by the borrower or
insufficient consideration by the lender of the borrower's ability to make the monthly
payments." (my emphasis)
Bernanke advanced the same argument in an earlier 2005 paper entitled "The Global Saving Glut
and the U.S. Current Account Deficit."42 In this paper, Bernanke focuses on the persistent trade
imbalance ("current accounts deficit") with the rest of the world. In his view, trade account
deficits can also be understood in terms of savings and investment.
Whereas in a closed economy, all investment must come from savings, in an open economic
system involving international trade, investment can exceed savings. This is the case in the
United States, for example, as I have corroborated in Figure 54, using data from the BEA.
Investment can only exceed savings in one country, however, if savings are borrowed from other
countries. In Bernanke's view, the US and other industrial countries have become net importers
of capital (i.e. savings) from the rest of the world. The key question is, why?
Bernanke writes:
Why is the United States, with the world's largest economy, borrowing heavily on
international capital markets--rather than lending, as would seem more natural?.... I will
argue that over the past decade a combination of diverse forces has created a significant
increase in the global supply of saving--a global saving glut--which helps to explain both
the increase in the U.S. current account deficit and the relatively low level of long-term
real interest rates in the world today. (2005; my emphasis)

42

Available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/#f7
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Figure 54. Net saving, investment, and borrowing. 1996-2009.

Bernanke dismisses the idea that the current accounts deficit is a result of government deficits, an
argument he calls the twin-deficit hypothesis. He notes that the US had a trade deficit even when
the federal government was operating at a surplus in the 1990s. In contrast, Germany and Japan
have run fiscal deficits and trade surpluses during the same decade. Second, Bernanke considers
population demographics. One explanation for the global savings glut may be that aging
populations in Europe and Japan might be saving more, thus providing the excess savings for US
investment. Bernanke points out, however, that Europe actually saved less in 2003 than it did a
decade earlier, and although Japan has one of the largest current account surpluses in absolute
terms, it cannot entirely account for the relative increase in savings. That leaves the developing
countries, including the oil exporters and the Asian countries, most notably China. According to
Bernanke's figures, developing countries collectively went from having a account deficit of $87.5 Billion in 1996 to having a current accounts surplus of $205 Billion by 2003.
What accounts for this? Bernanke provides two reasons. First, Bernanke argues that many
countries in Asia built up currency reserves after the 1997 Asian financial crises, stating that:
"These "war chests" of foreign reserves have been used as a buffer against potential capital
outflows." Second, Bernanke contends that international investment was attracted to the United
States because of its "rising productivity" and other "long-standing advantages such as low
political risk, strong property rights, and a good regulatory environment." The excess of savings
resulted in an unusually low interest rate, as lenders competed against each other for borrowers.
These low interest rates in turn generated the boom in credit creation, and ultimately, the housing
bubble.
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Comments
Bernanke does not provide a causal nexus between the current accounts deficits of the United
States and the housing bubble. In other words, he does not specify how low interest rates
generated decisions by individual firms to collectively borrow and lend more money than was
ultimately sustainable. Presumably, the "savings glut" generated a lower interest rate, and the
lower interest rate generated excess credit creation. This explanation, however, ignores the fact
that there was no "savings glut" at the aggregate. John Taylor points out that Bernanke ignores
simple arithmetic:
To be sure, there was a gap of saving over investment in the world outside the United
States during 2002-2004, and this may be the source of the term “saving glut.” But the
United States was saving less than it was investing during this period; it was running a
current account deficit which implies that saving was less than investment. Thus the
positive saving gap outside the United States was offset by an equal sized negative saving
gap in the United States. No extra impact on world interest rates would be expected. As
implied by simple global accounting, there is no global gap between saving and
investment. (2008: 5).
Thus, the excess savings in Asia should not have caused a decline in the interest rate. Moreover,
Bernanke cannot explain why developing countries did not invest more of their savings
domestically. Bernanke ignore the political dimensions of China's trade policy with the United
States that might account for these imbalances. Herman Schwartz makes this case:
The blindness of neoclassical economics to the issue of power obscures the barriers that
Asian states have erected in front of individuals' consumption. These barriers range from
compulsory savings (the Singapore National Provident Fund automatically captures
approximately 30 percent of wage income) to state oversight of capital goods purchases
(the Chinese state must approve every purchase of imported civilian aircraft.... Asian
states manipulate a key price- their exchange rates- to maintain export shares. (2009: 30).
Bernanke's explanation ultimately blames the crisis on the unwillingness of foreign countries to
purchase more US goods. This argument, however, can be turned on its head. The crisis can
also be understood as a predictable consequence of insufficient domestic demand arising from
wage stagnation. Bernanke attributes the downward pressure on wages in part to technological
advancements, but as pointed out by Turner (2008), this does not explain the explosion in debt
that fueled the financial bubble. Attributing the unequal distribution of value-added towards
capital at the expense of labor to technology also ignores the historical cases in which
technological innovation did not have this effect. This is the classical under-consumption
argument, which I will address below. Finally, Turner (2008: 14) also points out that US trade
policies, and more generally, the lowering of trade barriers and the lifting of capital restrictions
globally, have not maximized welfare according to the theory of comparative advantages, but
have merely exploited a wage differential.
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Over-accumulation and Monopoly Capitalism
Baran and Sweezy distinguished their theory from theories that focused exclusively on the role
of consumer demand by calling their theory a theory of accumulation crisis. In their view,
growth stagnation does not arise primarily from a decline in the wage share, although this may
play a part. Instead, they attribute a stagnation of growth rates to monopoly conditions. In their
1966 book Monopoly Capital, they write that the crucial difference between competitive and
monopoly capitalism is that "under competitive capitalism the individual enterprise is a 'price
taker,' while under monopoly capitalism the big corporation is a 'price maker' (53-4).
Furthermore, they argue that the “best theory of price formation is the one described by
neoclassical theory under conditions of monopoly” (54).
Under monopoly conditions firms are engaged in a “tacit collusion” to avoid price wars,
although in some situations they acknowledge in some sectors a "shake-down phase of
development" may occur. Exactly how monopoly conditions generate stagnation is described in
a recent article by Foster and McChesney:
The contradictions displayed by today‟s economy in this perspective thus go far beyond
neoliberal economic policy or a “super-Minsky cycle.” As explained numerous times in
Monthly Review, the underlying problem of accumulation in the advanced economies
today is one of a deep-seated stagnation tendency arising from a high degree of
monopoly (oligopoly) and industrial maturity. More actual and potential economic
surplus is generated than can be easily or profitably absorbed by consumption and
investment, pulling the economy down into a slow growth state. As a result, accumulation
becomes increasingly dependent on special stimulative factors….
The financialization of the capital accumulation process was a response to a deep
tendency to economic stagnation rooted in the development of the monopoly stage of
capitalism. Capital, faced with a shortfall of profitable investment opportunities, sought
refuge increasingly in financial speculation made possible (as Minsky repeatedly noted)
by the era of big government and big banks. Consequently, if stagnation was the chief
contradiction of monopoly capital proper, this has now evolved into the twofold
contradiction of stagnation-financialization under the phase of monopoly-finance capital.
No change in economic policy is possible under the system at this point. In this view,
neoliberalism would appear to be here with us more or less permanently, as long as the
stagnation problem lasts, since it is itself a reflection of the stagnation-financialization
trap that characterizes the age of monopoly-finance capital…. The fault is in the system.
(Foster and McChesney 2010: my emphasis)
There is a strong tendency in this style of analysis, evident in the above passage, to reify the
economic system. The concept of stagnation is also ill-defined. It might refer to GDP growth
rates of a particular country or industry, or to profit rates of some unspecified set of firms.
Furthermore, if monopoly capitalism is the problem, then why isn‟t the solution to simply break
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up the monopolies? It is a logical non sequitur to argue that because monopoly conditions retard
growth, that central planning should be implemented.
The big problem is that they fail to specify why accumulating more profit (because of higherthan-equilibrium prices) generates slow growth and therefore less profits in the long-run. It
would seem that if growth is a function of investments and investments a function of profits, that
more profits would generate higher investments and hence more growth. There may be exterior
barriers to growth, such as market share, but these are not tied down in any logical way to
monopoly conditions.
The claim that the United States or the global economy has become more monopolistic is
difficult to evaluate. First, the economy of the United States or the world are not composed of
single markets, so the claim that the US has become more monopolistic implies that markets, on
average, have become more monopolistic. This is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, and it
is not necessarily the case that trends in one market reflect trends in other markets or trends in all
markets, on average. How a market is defined is often controversial, as evidenced by various
anti-trust lawsuits that have appeared in US courts. For instance, in the 1990s, Microsoft had
alleged that it was a small fish in a large sea of software, including video game systems, and
under that definition, its market share was relatively low. Prosecutors, on the other hand, alleged
that the proper definition of a market was the set of all computer operating systems, and under
that definition it did possess a large degree of market share. There are various ways of
measuring market share, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, or H-index, but these
measurements depend upon an a priori decision regarding what defines the market. Moreover, it
is difficult to demonstrate that capitalism has ever been competitive in the sense envisioned by
neoclassical theory
As explained in the previous section, Fligstein (2009) has shown that the mortgage securities
markets were concentrated, but this is only one market. Moreover, market share in most markets
often have a similar level of concentration. The market share in most markets is dominated by a
half dozen firms (White 1981). In addition, there is evidence that increased international
competition, beginning around the 1970s, has increasingly eroded the market-pricing power of
US firms (Reich 2008, Wallerstein 2004; Brenner 2006).
Finally, it isn‟t clear whether over-accumulation refers to a phenomenon that can be empirically
observed (e.g. as in a time-series) or whether over-accumulation refers to a particular theory
about an observed phenomenon. In either case, a reference pattern would need to be identified.
For the proponents of over-accumulation theory, this is capacity utilization. 43 Because of the
introduction of just-in-time (JIT) production methods, firms rarely produce more than they can
sell. Instead, they closely monitor market conditions and produce products as market conditions
seem to warrant. Unsold inventories of goods are therefore not necessarily the best means of
detecting stagnation trends. Rather, stagnation will result in a decline in the utilization of
productive resources, that is, a decline in capacity utilization. There does not, however, seem to
be a determinate downward trend for capacity utilization as indicated in Figure 55.
43

That capacity utilization is the best indicator of stagnation arising from over-accumulation has been confirmed to
me by Foster (2010: personal correspondence).
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Figure 55. Capacity Utilization. (Source: EconStats.com)

In the time-series for capacity utilization, there appears to be an oscillatory pattern, but no clear
identifiable trend. I conducted an analysis of autocorrelation to determine that the data points in
the series correlated significantly with their prior values at a lag of one, (AR1). Regressing these
data on lag, year, and month yields a very small negative coefficient for year of -.002, which is
not statistically significant.44

Conclusions
I do not disregard these theories, but think they can be framed in a more fruitful manner in light
of systems theories. In particular, theories of under-consumption misidentify the cause of the
downturn as lack of consumption. Although personal spending did drop, this was after the
housing bubble had crashed, and can be attributed to debt, or credit creation. The stock-piling of
money, on the other hand, is a testament to the view offered above, namely, that the economic
system should not be characterized as a system of exchange, much less market exchange. I
disagree, however, with both Bernanke and the monopoly capital thesis as to the cause of these
developments. In my view, the distinction competition/monopoly and the continuum of
44

The estimated model is: 6.26+ .969*lag+ 6.0E-03*month-1.95E-03*year. The r-squared for this model is .97,
all of which is accounted for by the lag variable.
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comparison it establishes is not essential to an analysis of the dynamics of money accumulation,
or second-order stockpiling of stockpiled exchange. This is because market competition has
never been the driving force of economies, including in its present-day differentiated form. The
comparison is therefore akin to a double counterfactual: on the one side, a pure market utopia is
posited, while on the other, a pure socialist utopia. The empirical insights are thus muddled by
its transcendental orientation. Instead, emphasis should be placed on how the relationship
between merits and claims are codified within organizations, and how the power to purchase is
distributed and funneled through systems of communications these organizations channel.
The causal locus of the systemic crisis cannot, moreover, be attributed to a center that exercises
unilateral control over the entire system of which it is a part. The policies of the Federal Reserve
played a role, but these policies did not determine the lending practices of private banks, but
rather, remained parts of the relevant environmental stimuli that conditioned their operations.
Above all, the case of the banking system foregrounds the deficiency of the state-economy (or
society) distinction that permeates both economics and economic sociology. The banking
system operates according to a logic that can be given the generic formula of paying/not-paying
(Luhmann 1995). That it is an economic system, however, does not mean that it is a market
system. Economics and markets should be sharply delineated. Markets are, in general, one kind
of monetary encounter that proves to be the exception rather than the rule.
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V.

MARXIAN ECONOMICS AND VALUE THEORY

Marx‟s law of value asserts that value is determined by the expenditure of socially necessary
labor time. Marx adopted the use-value, exchange-value distinction from Adam Smith and then
applied it to labor. Labor has a use-value which he calls concrete labor; and labor has an
exchange-value (or price), which he calls abstract labor-power. Concrete labor has no value, if
by value we mean a price on the market. Concrete labor produces value. Labor-power,
however, receives its full value on the market in the form of wages. This is just enough money
to reproduce the worker‟s livelihood.
Marx writes: “what exclusively determines the magnitude of the value of any article is the
amount of labour socially necessary or the labour-time socially necessary for its production”
(1990: 129). He goes on to define socially necessary labor time as “the labour-time required to
produce any use-value under conditions of production normal for a given society and with the
average degree of skill and intensity of labour prevalent in that society” (1990: 129). This is one
way of saying that less efficient producers do not generate more value simply by expending more
labor time.
Two caveats need to be made. First, Marx is not saying that the wage is actually determined in
this way. Rather, he is attempting to demonstrate that the origin of surplus is exploitative even
when all commodities, including labor are exchanged at their fair value. In my view, Marx‟s
premise on the origin of value should be treated like a counterfactual.
Second, Marx does not argue that labor is the only source of material wealth, or use-values.45
Commentators frequently confuse the two.46 Machines and nature produce physical wealth.
Marx argues in Capital that use-values are the “combinations of two elements, the material
provided by nature, and labour” (1990: 133). Consequently, there is always a “material
substratum” that is “furnished by nature” (133). And again in the Critique of the Gotha Program
he states emphatically that, “Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the
source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!)” (1978: 525).
I will next briefly discuss Marx‟s quantitative identities. For Marx, all new value is created
solely by living labor, whereas machines merely transmit their existing values to the end product.
Workers, however, receive only a portion of the value they produce, which is equivalent to the
value of labor-power. Marx refers to the money advanced by capitalists to acquire labor-power
as variable capital (V). He refers to the money advanced to acquire machines and other nonlabor inputs as constant capital (C). The difference between the value of the output and the
value of inputs (variable and constant capital) is called surplus-value (S). Surplus-value is also
the difference between the value produced by living labor and the value of labor-power, and the
difference between necessary and surplus labor-time.
45

These are not necessarily physical objects. Marx stresses that a use-value satisfies a need. Whether this need
“arise[s] . . . from the stomach, or the imagination, makes no difference” (1990: 125).
46
John Roemer, for instance, argues that “labour power as a commodity is not unique in its magical property of
producing more surplus value than it embodies. Indeed, in an economy capable of producing surplus, any
commodity has this magical property” (1989: 100).
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The value of outputs equals the sum of these inputs:
1) C + V + S = T
2) L=V+S
In equation 2, L refers to living labor and T refers to total value, V to variable capital, and S to
surplus-value. Constant capital (C), including machines transfers its pre-existing value, but does
not generate any new value. Marx also distinguishes between fixed and circulating capital, the
latter being similar to what we would call finance, with money having the highest degree of
circulation (i.e. liquidity). Marx refers to the ratio of C to V as the organic composition of
capital.47 In modern terms, it is the capital to labor ratio. As the organic composition of capital
rises, the relative portion of available surplus falls. The rate of exploitation E is given by the
ratio S/V, and the Marxian rate of profit is the amount of surplus extracted over total investments
(both constant and variable capital):
3) E=S/(C+V)
In keeping with Marx‟s famous circuit of capital M-C-M‟, the rate of profit can also be thought
of as M/M‟, the ratio of the original money advanced to the money received (Sweezy 1970:
141).
Furthermore, Marx stipulates three aggregate equalities:
1. The (aggregate) value rate of profit equals the (aggregate) price rate of profit
2. Total profit equals total surplus-value
3. Total price of production equals total value
The price of production for Marx is simply the cost of inputs, which he calls cost-price, plus the
average rate of profit. These aggregate equalities connect up price and value, which has a
universal means of measurement. Individual commodities will tend to diverge from their values,
as measured by the socially necessary labor time that goes into them. 48 However, these price
changes can be regarded as redistributions of the existing total stock of value, produced at each
moment in time.
In other words, Marx envisions the production process as taking place in discrete time: first,
production, and then, exchange. Production determines the new total value, as determined by
labor time. In the market, this total quantity of value gets redistributed according to the laws of
47

The organic composition can also be thought of as c/(c+v), the ratio of constant capital to total capital (Sweezy
1970: 66).
48
Marx acknowledges this specifically, stating: The possibility, therefore, of a quantitative incongruity between
price and magnitude of value, i.e. the possibility that the price may diverge from the magnitude of value, is inherent
in the price-form itself. This is not a defect, but, on the contrary, it makes this form the adequate one for a mode of
production whose laws can only assert themselves as blindly operating averages between constant irregularities
(1990: 198).
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supply and demand.49 In the next production cycle, total value will grow, and this new aggregate
will again be redistributed in the market.
The only quantitative interpretation of Marx to have successfully deduced all three aggregate
equalities while successfully demonstrating his falling rate of profit thesis is the so-called
Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI). “Temporal” means that simultaneous linear
equations are not used to model the economy in “equilibrium.” In these models the outputs of a
sector have to equal the inputs in order for the equation to be “solved.” Rather, a dynamic
discrete model is used in which the outputs of one period equal the inputs to a subsequent period.
“Single-System” means that prices and values only equal each other at the aggregate level.
Values do not equal prices for individual commodities.
TSSI‟s were first proposed by those working on the transformation problem (Perez 1980;
Carchedi 1984) and subsequently used to defend (Ernst 1982) Marx‟s Law of the Tendential Fall
in the Rate of Profit (LTFRP). It first became collectively and self-consciously articulated,
however, with the publication of Marx and Non-Equilibrium Economics (1996), a collection of
essays edited by Alan Freeman and Guglio Carchedi. More recently, Andrew Kliman (2007)
defends and explicates the TSSI in his Reclaiming Marx’s Capital. I will primarily refer to this
interpretation below.
Most economists have dismissed Marx on the grounds that his theory is internally inconsistent,
and that his falling rate of profit thesis has been disproved. I will address each in turn.
Defending Marx against charges of inconsistency
The charge of internal inconsistency presumably tries to show that if labor-time determines value
that an equilibrium condition cannot result. In this case, "equilibrium" means a "steady-state"
economy in which goods and services remain at constant levels because new production exactly
equals depreciation. This has been shown to be incorrect (cf. Kliman 2007). Depending on how
the theory is modeled, it can generate steady-state conditions, or not. More importantly, Marx
never argued that capitalism should logically or historically be capable of existing in an
equilibrium state. A steady state economy is only one possible dynamic among many.
Marx, instead, showed that capitalism is inherently compounding, exhibiting a reinforcing, or
positive, feedback loop. This is Marx's circuit of capital, M-C-M'. The Marxian theory of
growth depicts capitalism as a process of "valorizaton," or expansion of value. Marx's circuit of
capital, when expanded, sketches a series of discrete temporal processes. The circuit of capital
(M-C-M') expanded is: M-C(L,MP)...P...C'-M', or in words, money is used by a capitalist (firm
or individual) to purchase labor and other means of production such as machines, which during
the production process produce a surplus of commodities, which is then translated into a surplus
of money on the market.
49

Supply and demand was frequently mentioned by Marx, although he wrote prior to the marginalist revolution.
One of the most important constraint on his model, widespread among all economists, is the belief in a tendency for
profit rates to equalize across sectors of the economy. This is assumed in most models because above-average
profits in a sector ostensibly attract more competition, thus driving down profits.
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The argument that the determination of value by labor time cannot possibly generate steady-state
conditions does not prove that the theory is "internally inconsistent" because the labor theory of
value envisaged by Marx never asserts the possibility of the steady state as a premise. In fact,
the logical impossibility of creating a steady-state economy under conditions of labor-time
determination is not logically inconsistent with the premise that value is determined by the
(socially necessary) expenditure of labor-time.
Defending Marx’s Falling Rate of Profit Thesis
The premise that value is determined by labor time is sufficient to generate (i.e. simulate) the
falling rate of profit thesis. Because labor is the source of value, an increased proportion of
production due to machines generates relatively smaller rates of surplus (i.e. profit) over time.
In short, a rising organic composition of capital (i.e. capital-labor ratio) would generate falling
profit rates, by definition.50 Most economists, including most Marxian economists, has
disregarded Marx‟s FRP thesis because it was supposedly shown by Okisio (1961) that rising
productivity would lead to a rising rate of profit. Improvements in productivity would therefore
offset the decline in profit rates, even assuming Marx‟s premise that value is determined by labor
time.
Okishio, however, used systems of simultaneous linear equations to model two separate
equilibrium periods. Demonstrating this requires some accounting. For example, if corn inputs
start out at 170, and you add 340 hours of labor to this (each of which is equal to one unit of
corn), but only pay labor 170 in corn wages (i.e. rate of exploitation is equal to 50 percent), and
total corn output is 510, the (simultaneist, physicalist) total profit (surplus value) is equal to:
510-170-170=170. The profit rate is equal to: 170/340-50%. The denominator 340 is the sum
of corn inputs and corn wages, or total capital.
Now, imagine that productivity increases, so that the next period, total corn inputs are 340
(reinvested from the previous time period), labor still generates 340 of value but only gets paid
170 in corn wages, but that the total output goes up to 765. Strictly speaking, in value terms, the
output cannot be more than the sum of constant capital (340 corn) and living labor (340), or 680.
By measuring the rate of profit in physical terms, however, profit is: 765-170-340=255; and the
new profit rate is: 255/510=50%. The rate of profit has not changed, even though the capitallabor ratio has gone up from 170/340=.5, to 340/340=1.
However, this presumes that the price per unit of corn remains constant. If instead, the total
value produced is determined by the value contributed by the inputs (living labor and constant
capital) in terms of labor-time, then the physical quantity of the output is irrelevant to its value.
Consequently, the value rate of profit still falls, despite productivity increases. These two
arguments are illustrated in Figure 5.

50

This is evident when one considers that aggregate profit equals aggregate surplus, and surplus value is some
fraction of labor, and furthermore, that the denominator of the profit rate is the numerator of the organic
composition. A rise in K/L leads to a fall in S/K, where P=S<L.
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Table 5. TSSI and physical profit rate calculations.
Year

Corn
inputs
(C)

Corn
Wages
(V) 

Physical
Corn
output

Physical
Profit Rate

Total Value
Output

TSSI
Profit Rate

1

170

170
L=340

510

510-340=170.
170/340=50%

510

510-340=170.
170/340=50%

2

340

170
L=340

765

765-510=255.
255/510=50%

680

680-510=170.
170/510=33.33%

Falling Rate of Profits and the Current Crisis
The argument over whether the economy as a whole can experience excess supply (or have a
deficit of "effective" demand) has cropped up repeatedly in economic theory. In the Marxian
literature, the debate is between those who argue 1) that economic downturns (which Marx refers
to as "crises") are caused by over-production (or equivalently, under-consumption), and 2) those
who argue that because a lack of effective consumer demand can in principle be compensated
and offset by an increase in business investment, an adequate explanation has to account for why
businesses fail to invest.
Of course, these two theories aren't mutually exclusive, but Marxian scholars tend to take one
side or the other. The two theories also point to different causal mechanisms of economic
decline. Those who posit under-consumption identify stagnating wage growth and income
inequality, and more generally, a distribution of value-added towards capital over labor, as the
primary causes or necessary conditions of economic decline. According to Kliman (2007; 2010:
personal correspondence), however, the fact that businesses purchase from each other means
that, in principle, a fall in consumer demand cannot qualify as an adequate account of economic
downturns because business investments could potentially increase, thereby obviating a decline
in aggregate demand. He therefore asserts that falling profitability provides a better explanation
of economic downturns because falling profits means businesses have less to invest. The causal
arrow is reversed: because businesses have fewer profits, wages decline.
The dispute over which comes first, investment or consumption, in my view is a consequence of
a misguided prejudice against circular causality. The fact that business investment could rise to
offset consumer demand does not mean that it will. In addition, whether or not profits are
invested depends on expectations of future market earnings, not on whether profit rates have
diminished in the immediate or long-term past. Furthermore, investment not only comes from
profit (i.e. the equity portion of a business's balance sheet); nowadays investment primarily
comes from borrowings, that is, debt. Any adequate theory of the current downturn would
therefore have to specify the mechanisms of contagion linking a decline in investments in the
financial markets to non-financial production markets elsewhere.
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The argument that sectors of the economy must balance each other is a reincarnated version of
Walras's argument that the economy is like a giant see-saw, so that if one sector has an excess
supply of investments, another will have an excess demand. At each moment of time, they will
balance each other out in the aggregate, and in the long run, equilibrium will be attained in each
sector as investments move from less profitable to more profitable industries.
Kliman (2010) thus overlooks the possibility of a feedback between consumer spending and
business investment. Keynes for instance argues that a decline in consumer spending can cause
investors to spend less. A decline in consumer spending in the aggregate will cause a general
decline in demand across the entire economy. This in turn can cause business investments to
fall, which in turn reinforces the tendency for consumers to spend less, and so on.
The question then becomes: what could cause a general decline in consumer spending? One
plausible answer for the US market is the fall in housing prices, which considerably reduced the
net worth of thousands, if not millions, of homeowners. The theory is sound if we presume that
people, at least in part, determine their spending according to their net worth, and not exclusively
according to their incomes (although for many trying to "flip" houses, a decline in home values
constituted an immediate drop in income as well). One plausible link is that people determine
their spending in part on expected future income or by an average income over many years. A
drop in home values might indicate a drop in future income, for example, if homeowners had
planned to eventually sell the house. This line of inquiry, however, doesn't specify what
precipitated the decline in home values. Also, the reset of adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs)
caused a spike in sub-prime mortgage defaults.

Empirical Analysis of the Falling Rate of Profit
Empirical measurements of the rate of profit are calculated as the ratio of profits to capital stock:
1) R = P/K
R is the rate of profit, P is profits earned in a given amount of time; and K is total capital stock.
There is considerable disagreement about whether the empirically measured rate of profit can be
used as a proxy for the Marxian value rate of profit, since the latter is measured in terms of
socially necessary labor time rather than prices. Nevertheless, the empirically measured rate of
profit is one means of evaluating the overall performance of an economy.
In Figure 56 I calculate the average rate of profit for US corporations from 1978 to 2008. Data
for corporate profits are calculated as before taxes. The denominator measured as the current or
historical cost of net private fixed assets.
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Rate of Profit for US Corporations (1978-2008)
Current and Historical Cost of Net Private Fixed Assets (NPFA)

Rate of Profit (P/K)

0.12

Variables
PR historical
PR current

0.10

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

1978

1984

1990

1996

2002

2008

Year
Ratio of Corporate Profits (before taxes) to NPFA

Figure 56. Corporate Profit Rates. United States (1978-2008)

The data show an overall decline in the rate of profit following its previous peak in 1978. The
profit rate begins to climb after the recession of 2001, but much of this rise can be attributed to
unsustainable borrowing and debt.
The rate of profit can be decomposed by dividing P and K by Y, or total income:
2) P/K = (P/Y)(Y/K),
(P/Y) refers to the profit share, and (Y/K) refers to the output-capital ratio (aka the maximum
profit rate). Profits would equal Y is wages were zero. Y can be decomposed into a profits and
wages:
3) Y = P+W,
W is the wage share. In other words,
4) P/Y+W/Y=1.
To test capacity utilization effects, the output-capital ratio itself can be decomposed:
5) R= (P/Y) (Y/Z) (Z/K)
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Here (Y/Z) is the rate of capacity utilization, and (Z/K) is the capacity capital ratio.

What does the falling rate of profit thesis mean?
The profit rate itself can exhibit one of three logically possible trends. It can fall forever; it can
rise forever; or it can oscillate. It should be pointed out that the FRP is a relative measure,
whereas the circuit of capital is an absolute measure. Money can continue to grow absolutely,
but at a relatively slower rate. Does this ever-slower rate, however, ever cross a tipping point
whereby returns (in absolute terms) become negative or reach zero? Mathematically, the FRP
does not constrain growth in any absolute sense (i.e. does not constrain profit margins), but does
constrain its rate of growth, which asymptotically approaches zero. The profit rate would then
constrain absolute growth so that it exhibits an S-curve trend over time, ceteris paribus.
More importantly, just because a model can be fitted to a theory does not make the theory right.
Marx generates a system in which value‟ sole metric is labor-time. Marxian economics is then
an alternative frame of reference to neoclassical theory. However, there is no way to observe
value categories. Marxian economists use conventional GDP accounts, but these are not
Marxian value categories, observed in terms of average, socially necessary labor hours.
The only explicit connection between the two reference frames of price and value is that at the
aggregate, but the only available data that can be observed are in terms of price. Nor is it clear
what sort of quantifiable impacts these identifies are supposed to engender. In other words, is
the theory purely an accounting exercise, a “Transformation” of values into prices (at the
aggregate level), or is there some determinate hypothesis arising from the theory that can be
tested?
The implications of the FRP have been debated, but to date there are generally two views: either
the FRP proves that profits will fall forever and capitalism will (somehow) destroy itself
(Howard and King 199251), or the FRP proves that the economy will exhibit periodic upturns and
downturns (Kliman 2007).52 The question then becomes whether other theories are more useful
for the purpose of explaining business cycles.
The FRP assumes, among other things, competitive conditions, a society with two classes 53 and
an entirely closed capitalist economy. The law, therefore, does not take into account military
conquest, or other extra-economic influences that might affect the rate of profit. In addition, as
Harvey notes, Marx himself identified several counteracting influences to the law, including:
“(1) a rising rate of exploitation; (2) falling costs of constant capital (which checks the rise in
51

Howard and King (1992) do not adopt this view themselves, however, but attribute it to Marx.
There is also a third option: Marx makes no empirical predictions whatsoever with his FRP and that it expresses
merely the abstract end of capitalism (Albritton 1999).
53
Marx, however, frequently discusses other classes, such as the landowners, the peasants, the petty-bourgeoisie,
and even the lumpen-proletariat. He thought, however, that capitalism increasingly split society into the two
antagonistic classes mentioned above.
52
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value composition); (3) depression of wages below the value of labor-power; and (4) an increase
in the industrial reserve army (which preserves certain sectors from the ravages of technological
progress by lessening the incentive to replace labour power by machines)” (1999: 178).
As already mentioned, economic data do not correspond to Marxian categories. Harvey (1999)
points out that, for instance, that surplus-value, the numerator of Marx‟s value rate of profit, is
distributed not only as profits, but as rents, interest, taxes, and so on. Nor does this law take into
account the importance of turnover times in the determination of the profit rate. 54 Other authors
(Moseley 1985, 1992; Shaikh and Tonak 1994) argue that surplus is distributed in the form of
compensation to unproductive labor, or capitalistically employed labor that consumes rather than
produces use-values. 55 Presumably, then, a Marxian profit rate would have to include the
compensation paid to employees engaged in non-productive activities as part of its numerator.
Because surplus-value is not exclusively distributed as profits, surplus-value can rise while
profits fall, and vice-versa.

Social Relations and the Reification of Value
Finally, I will mention the tendency in Marxian circles to reify the concept of value. Value is not
a thing. Instead, the concept of value describes designates an object-attribution mediating a
social relationship. This insight is important to Marx, of course, but he succumbs to a reifying
concept of value that treats value as a substance generated in linear proportion to labor time
performed. The economic system is not determinate, however, and does not distribute all
relations of power, but only those recursively identified as economic. Moreover, money is
societal in the sense that cuts across organizations and interactions, but it is distributed primarily
within organizations. It is therefore more informative to say that money facilitates the mediation
not of persons, but the relationships between organized communications and interactional
episodes.
From a sociological point of view, Adam Smith‟s dichotomy between use-value and exchangevalue can be understood as a consequence of processes of social differentiation and abstraction.
There is a direct connection between the ordinary meaning of “values” and the Marxian concept
of value, although this connection has become increasingly attenuated over time. In capitalism,
value spheres are no longer integrated into a mutually recognized value-hierarchy. The
fragmentation of society coincided with the abstraction of the social nexus, which could
moreover, be used in a variety of impersonal settings.
54

Harvey argues that, “without a common measure of turnover time, there can be no equalization of profit rates
because there would be no standard against which to determine whether the profit rate was higher or lower than
average, or even rising of falling” (1999: 187). He proposes that the credit system and the interest rate are
necessary to provide the common standard of “socially necessary turnover time” (187).
55
The distinction does not rely on whether a certain kind of labor is necessary or not. Non-productive labor may be
necessary in that it produces socially necessary outcomes, but it does not produce output. Moreover, non-productive
workers are exploited like other workers. Moseley (1985, 1992) argues that a falling productive labor to nonproductive labor ratio is a primary cause of the falling rate of profit in the United States. David Harvie in his aptly
entitled (2005) essay “All Labour Produces Value For Capital and We All Struggle Against Value”, vehemently
opposes this distinction, arguing that all abstract labor produces value.

93

Capitalism engendered processes that fractured the unified cosmology of the non-modern world.
Whereas money and exchange once served social, determinate ends, in capitalism the
accumulation of money itself becomes a means to a means (Postone 1992). This is discussed by
Marx in terms of the subordination of use-value to exchange-value. Marxian analysis attempts to
overcome the inherent circularity of the value-concept with reference to capitalism‟s own
objective propensities. By the time of the marginalist revolution, however, economics no longer
regarded the de-tautologization of the value concept as necessary or desirable. The history of
economic thought thus recapitulates the history of economic development.
In my view, Marx‟s analysis is better read today as a counterfactual which asserts that
capitalism, to the extent that it reduces labor to homogenous segments of time, makes value the
determinant of labor time. It is a tendency or a specification of an expectation, not something
real like a tree or a chair, and not a formula for figuring out how the economy “really” works
beneath appearances. Marx's primary insight I think was to understand capital as an
accumulation of time, i.e., as a possible claim on future labor. In this way, the tendency towards
capital accumulation can be regarded above all as a means of mediating a power discrepancy
while reifying and thus naturalizing the codified medium upon which the social recognition of
this discrepancy rests.

Limits to Growth and the return of classical economics
My primary arguments against Marxian and mainstream (i.e. neoclassical and Keynesian)
economics is that it a) fails to explain growth; and that b) it ignores the possibility that natural
resources could both spur and constrain economic growth.
It is not clear why the profit rate matters or at least the reason is not made explicit. After the idea
that falling profits will destroy capitalism is jettisoned, the FRP can become important only if it
explain cyclical downturns in growth, which matters to workers only if it affects their
livelihoods. A paradox also seems to arise because rising wages can cause a fall in profit rates,
which then generates a fall in wages.56 Kliman argues that falling profit rates ultimately
translates into stagnating wages and/or cyclical recessions in which capital is devalued in order
to restore profitability.
The surplus is necessarily a dynamic category: it refers to a comparison across time.
Distributional issues are static: it refers to how a prior surplus is divided at each moment of time
(e.g. between wages and profits). Proponents of the FRP attribute the prior declines in surplus
(as reflected in declining GDP growth rates) to a decline in the rate of profit. Theorists of the
FRP overlook that growth might be a determinant of the profit rate, rather than vice-versa. They
56

This is referred to by Robert Brenner as the “contradictions of Keynesianism” thesis (2006: 16), according to
which, the very policies that restored effective demand and established the conditions for the postwar boom by
empowering labor vis-à-vis capital were ultimately self-undermining, leading to reduced profitability and stagnation.
The premise of this argument is that declining productivity growth by itself cannot cause a fall in profitability unless
wage growth fails to decline in tandem.

94

regard technology as the primary determinant of falling rates of surplus value, but do not account
for it. The implicit presumption is that a decline in profit rates is prior to a fall in growth rates,
because profits are the means by which investments are made, and investments are the means by
which growth is attained.
A simple model might look like this:
Fall in profit rates  fall in investment  fall in growth rates
The distinction between under-consumption theories and falling rate of profit (FRP) theories is
whether falling profits cause, or are caused by, falling or stagnating wages. Both sets of theories
regard profit rates as central to growth rates, but profit is regarded as an entirely distributional
issue. They do not explain where the growing surplus comes from. Even if a surplus theory of
profit (e.g. Sraffian or Marxian) is favored over the neoclassical theory of profit, this
contradiction between present distribution and future growth is still embedded in the theory,
without any clear criteria for deciding which whether static or dynamic optimization is more
important. In addition, most of the radical models are linear, posit uni-directional causality, and
lack feedback relations. Furthermore, because our monetary system is based on debt, underconsumption occurs whenever consumption cannot sustain the ability of debtors to remain
solvent.
More importantly these theories overlook the possibility that economic growth over time can be
constrained by exogenous, natural limits. Classical political economists such as Smith, Ricardo,
Malthus, and Mill had all predicted that capitalism would eventually slow down and lapse into a
“stationary state with a zero rate of accumulation” (Harvey 1999: 177). With the exception of
Smith, classical political economists had located the cause of the decline in factors external to
the economic system. Ricardo, for instance, argued that declining productivity was the
inevitable result of population growth because increasingly less fertile agricultural land would
have to be utilized. Sraffa has also argued that the law of diminishing returns only applies to
non-renewable resources, such as oil. Marx, however, was scathing in his critique of this idea,
saying that Ricardo “flees from economics to seek refuge in organic chemistry” (1973: 754).
This is unfortunate, because it has contributed to a widespread ignoring of the role natural
limitations to growth, and energy production, play in economic processes.
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VI.

ENERGY AND LIMITS TO GROWTH

Towards the end of The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber wrote:
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism
was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly
morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order.
This is order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine
production which today determine the lives of all individuals who are born into this
mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible
force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt.
(1958: 181).
Not only does this passage eloquently articulate the binding imperatives engendered by the
“modern economic order”, it also unambiguously contravenes the view that the classical theorists
were unaware of the essential role that energy played in the creation and maintenance of that
order. Thus far I have paid little attention to the role that the natural environment plays in the
constitution of social systems. Thus far, the theme of ecology has remained a part of the
environment of this communication.
Below I explicitly address the relationship between natural resources and the modern economic
system. Specifically, I explain the relationship between energy use and economic growth, and
the relationship between “peak oil” and the global debt crisis. My primary finding is that the
economic activity, measured by GDP, has to some extent decoupled from energy expenditure,
both in the US and globally, since the 1970s. This does not imply that energy use is not essential
for economic activity. However, there is no one-to-one correspondence between geophysical
systems and monetary/economic systems. I conclude with some plausible explanations for my
findings.

Mainstream Economic Theory and Energy
Mainstream economic theory is blind to the realities of ecological scarcity and the laws of
thermodynamics. Nothing illustrates this better than the contemporary, textbook depiction of the
economy as a circular flow.
In this model, the economy is disaggregated into individuals (households) and businesses
(firms).57 The blue line represents the flow of money, and the green line represents the flow of
goods and services. Neither the monetary nor physical origins of surplus are explained.
57

The BEA‟s depiction has an added advantage of realism. In most economic textbooks (e.g. Mankiw 2010),
households are depicted as providing firms not only labor, but also land and capital. Capital is an ambiguous term,
but when distinguished from mere money, it means physical equipment, such as factories. Yet it is difficult to
understand how households could provide firms with factors of production other than labor. It is necessary,
however, in neoclassical theory to depict “capital” as a separate factor of production, so that profits are derived from
the contribution of capital rather than from the exploitation of labor.
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Figure 57. Circular Flow.

To account for the former (i.e. profit), neoclassical economic theory invokes the idea of returns
to factors of production, labor and capital. In contrast to Marxian and Sraffian theory,
neoclassical theory does not regard profit as a material surplus, but rather, as the price paid to the
marginal contribution of capital, understood as an abstract quantity of money, which moreover is
substitutable for labor. The system is a closed perpetual motion machine.
Figure 57 depicts the circular flow model from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Importantly, in this model there are no external inputs to the production process, nor are there
any waste products (aka “externalities”). It is a closed system. In reality, the production of
material wealth transforms low entropy inputs into high entropy outputs, and thus requires an
entropy gradient. As Herman Daly presciently observes: “The high-entropy output cannot be
directly used again as an input for the same reason that organisms cannot eat their own
excrement” (1991: 16).
Mainstream theory, including neoclassical and Keynesian, regards increased resource extraction
as a consequence rather than a cause of growth. The equilibrium conditions posited by
neoclassical theory pertain to utility, a concept derivative of the classical concept of exchangevalue. It ignores use-value, or material wealth. For instance, in Walras‟s model of exchange,
market outcomes can generate the best of all possible worlds with respect to utility, but it
presumes that the products from which utility is derived are already produced. In other words, it
cannot explain how growth occurs, or how efficiency of production is improved. Standard
calculations show that about a quarter of productivity growth can be accounted for by so-called
human capital (population increases, skill improvements, knowledge, etc.); another quarter can
accounted for by capital stock accumulation (Mankiw 2002). This leaves about half of
productivity growth unaccounted for in the standard growth models (e.g. the Cobb-Douglas
function), sometimes known as the Solow residual, after the economist Robert Solow.
Neoclassical theory attributes productivity growth to technology.
According to the mainstream models, growth derives from the investment of savings.
Quantitatively, the growth-from-savings theory can be expressed in terms of a decomposition of
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output Y. As stated above, the output of an economy Y can be decomposed into four
components: personal consumption (C), business investment (I), government spending (G), and
net exports (NX). Assuming a closed economy for simplicity of exposition, national income can
be written as:
Y=C+I+G.
Subtracting the money spend on consumption and government spending from both sides yields:
Y-C-G=I
The left side of the equation is also equal to national savings (S), so that:
S=Y-C-G=I
Savings can also be decomposed into private and public savings. Let T equal taxes. Savings is
then equal to:
S=(Y-T-C) + (T-G)
The left hand side is private savings, which is equal to total income minus taxes and consumer
spending. The right hand side is public savings, or the amount of tax revenue collected minus
the amount the government spends as transfer payments. When T exceeds G, the government
runs a budget surplus.
This theory is attractive because it links macro-economic growth to the time preferences of
individual actors, modeled as utility maximizing monads. An individual will save when the
expected utility of future returns exceeds the present utility of present consumption, taking into
account the greater weight attached to present consumption, both because the future is risky, and
because some sacrifice of present pleasure is required. Saving for the future, however, means
delaying the gratification derived from consuming/spending in the present. The weighting factor
which discounts the magnitude of expected utility is known as the "discount rate." The discount
rate refers to the tendency, first described by Pigou (1920), for people to prefer present
consumption over future consumption. Future consumption, therefore, has to be sufficiently
attractive to compensate for the postponement of preferred consumption in the
present. Sacrificing present consumption for future returns is another way of expressing Max
Weber's notion of the "the Protestant Ethic."
If growth is assumed to be automatic, why save at all? Moreover, investment can also derive
from credit (i.e. debt) in addition to savings. Through fractional reserve banking, banks create
temporary money to create savings without investments. The amount of investment that can be
generated is some function of the money multiplier, the amount of money the banking system
generates with each dollar of reserves. The money multiplier is the reciprocal of the reserve
ratio (Makiw 2002: 331). For instance, if the reserve requirement is 10 percent, or .10, then the
money multiplier will is equal to 1/.01 = 10. In a fractional reserve system that requires 10
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percent deposits, then, 10 times the amount of money originally deposited in a bank can be
generated.
This means that, increasingly, investment is financed through debt rather than equity (i.e.
savings). Debt has to be paid back, plus interest. Therefore, in order to remain solvent,
individual firms and households in debt must generate more income than previously: debt thus
fuels the growth imperative. Debt is generated by and generates growth, but it also compels
growth, in the sense that debtors have to grow in order to remain solvent. Consequently, the
notion that credit is created from savings (i.e. savers lend their money) does not imply a one to
one correspondence between them.
According to mainstream economic theory, physical resource stocks place no limitations on
economic growth. A typical mainstream view of the role that natural resources play in economic
growth can be found in Greg Mankiw‟s economics textbook58:
[M]ost economists are less concerned about such [environmental] limits to growth that
one might guess. They argue that technological progress often yields ways to avoid these
limits. If we compare the economy today to the economy of the past, we see various
ways in which the use of natural resources has improved. Modern cars have better gas
mileage…. More efficient oil rigs waste less oil in the process of extraction…..
In a market economy, scarcity is reflected in market prices. If the world were running out
of natural resources, then the prices of those resources would be rising over time. But, in
fact, the opposite is nearly true. The prices of most natural resources (adjusted for overall
inflation) are stable or falling. It appears that our ability to conserve these resources is
growing more rapidly than their supplies are dwindling. Market prices give no reason to
believe that natural resources are a limit to economic growth. (2002: 246-7).
The statement that “our ability to conserve these resources is growing more rapidly than their
supplies are dwindling” does not at all mean that the absolute stock of resources is no longer
declining. The fact that improved efficiency of extraction can coincide with increased rates of
extraction is known as the Jevons Paradox.59 Mankiw writes as if resources were infinitely
substitutable, and moreover, that resources are renewable at any possible rate of extraction. Both
of these assumptions are false.
Although the actual prices of most commodities, including energy, have fallen for most of the
past century, this does not mean that they will continue to do so. There is ample evidence that
we are approaching, or have already approached, the peak rates of oil supply (Deffeyes 2001;
Simmons 2005; Heinberg 2007). Moreover, economic growth has always been coupled to
58

According to Amazon.com, Mankiw‟s macroeconomics textbook is the “ #1 bestselling intermediate
macroeconomics text” in the United States, beating out Paul Krugman, who ranks 3rd.
59
This is named after Alfred Jevons, who in the 1800s observed that efficiency improvements in energy extraction
from coal coincided with greater absolute levels of coal extraction. A modern day example of the Jevons Paradox is
fuel efficiency. Greater fuel efficiency for automobile has not diminished the demand for gasoline. On the contrary,
people tend to drive their cars greater distances the more fuel efficient their cars are. In addition, more and more
cars are being produced and increasingly more drivers are on the road due to population and economic growth.
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increased energy expenditure (cf. McKillop 2005). Moreover, the costs of extraction are not
taken into account by national accounting statistics. These include, for example, the recent BP
oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.

What does GDP measure?
Growth is the desideratum of economic policy. What, however, does growth mean? What sort
of growth is desirable, and how should growth be measured? Herman Daly refers to
growthmania as the mindset which assumes that the answer to every problem is growth. The
costs of growth, however, are not measured, and can even be counted as benefits.
Aggregate economic growth is not something that can be observed directly as can say, the
growth of a population of fish, a crystal, or a pile of garbage. Economic growth can only be
inferred through the use of constructed indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the
standard indicator of economic growth for a country. There are numerous indicators of national
economic growth including Gross National Product (GNP), Net Domestic Product (NDP), Net
National Product (NNP), Gross National Income (GNI), and Gross Domestic Income (GDI),
among others. The GDP is calculated as the market value of all final goods and services made
within the borders of a country in a given year. GDP can be calculated according to final
products, expenditures, or income, all of which in theory should generate the same results. There
are therefore a number of ways the composite measure can be decomposed.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is often used as a proxy for prosperity. Raising the per capita
GDP has consequently been the focus and objective of developmental policies for virtually all
governments and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Using GDP as a measure of prosperity,
however, is misleading for several reasons. The economist Herman Daly (1973) refers to the
belief that economic growth is the panacea for all social problems as "growthmania," which he
compares to psychological delusion. First, average per capita GDP of a nation or region does not
measure the inequality of incomes within and between nations or regions. Using the arithmetic
mean of income is not a measure of the most common income level (measured by a mode or by a
harmonic mean) or how the income is distributed. A nation with a GDP of $100 and 10 people
where 1 person owns all of the wealth, has the same average per capita GDP as a nation where
10 people each possess $10. The per capita GDP is $10 in both cases. In addition, inequality
within a nation or area itself can cause a decline in overall social well-being. To measure
inequality, measurements of dispersion (e.g. the 'GINI' index, the Theil index, etc.) are more
useful.
According to Amartya Sen, moreover, whether and to what extent increases in per capita GDP,
relative either to the past or other regions, translates into more freedom and well-being is
influenced significantly by five distinct sources of variation including: a) personal factors such
as sickness and health; b) environmental factors such as climate, air and water pollution, natural
resources, etc.; c) social climates (e.g. friendly, corrupt, violent); d) inter-societal income
distribution; and e) inter-family income distribution (cf. Deb 2009: 78). Gross Domestic
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Product does not take into account unpaid services and activities, such as domestic labor.
Equally disturbing is the fact that natural and anthropogenic disasters can inflate the GDP.
Efforts to clean up pollution or to rebuild after a calamity of some kind are counted as part of a
country's expenditure and thus can raise the GDP, even when human well-being has clearly
declined. 60
Numerous cross national studies have also shown that, after about $30,000 or so, rising per
capita GDP does not significantly contribute to happiness and well-being. Nations with higher
average GDPs are relatively less happy than their less affluent counterparts. The last point I will
mention is that the relationship between GDP and prosperity has not remained constant across
time. Specifically, both the historic links between GDP growth and employment, and the link
between GDP growth and rising wages, have been broken (Ayres and Warr 2009; Rifkin 1995).
Because of these indexes other development indexes that have been devised. The United
Nation's Human Development Index (HDI) and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) are
examples.
The most important point for purposes of this paper, however, is that GDP is theoretically
incoherent. Herman Daly explains:
The problem of [GDP] is that it adds together three very unlikely categories: throughput,
additions to capital stock, and services rendered by the capital stock. Throughput (the
entropic depletion-pollution flow) is the ultimate physical cost. Services rendered by
physical and human capital represent a value estimate of the final benefit, or true psychic
income, resulting from economic activity. Additions to capital stock represent an
increased capacity for future service, the net cost of which (throughput) has been incurred
in the present, but the net benefits of which accrue only in the future. These three distinct
concepts should be kept in separate accounts. It makes no sense to add together costs,
benefits, and changes in capital stock. It is as if a firm were to add up its receipts, its
expenditures, and its change in net work. What sense could any accountant make of such
a sum? (1991: 30)
An increase in GDP represents an increase in the capacity for making payments and nothing
more. Moreover, the flow of economic activity is in part based upon the stocks of capital that
have accumulated in prior years. A factory does not have to be built from scratch every year.
Stocks can still generate a flow of goods that, if sold, can contribute to GDP. One should not
expect, therefore, a point by point correlation between changes in the flow of energy and the
flow of economic activity. Moreover, the accumulation of debt has mollified much of the
international competition that would have inflated the prices for scarce resources such as
petroleum even higher. The growth of finance has meant that the rate at which money is
accumulated by lending institutions exceeds the rate at which this money is lent. Instead of
using the money to make payments for productive resources, the money is instead stockpiled,
thereby postponing the exchange of money for goods and services, all of which depend on
energy extraction.
60

For example, both the production of asbestos and the subsequent medical care required by victims of asbestosis, a
lung disease resulting from asbestos exposure, positively affected GDP in the United States.
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Finally, rising scarcity of raw materials (partially) reflected in declining rates of energy output
and rising energy prices has engendered a process by which exchange in the economy is
increasingly constituted by the exchange of already extant stocks (e.g. real estate). Thus unique
historical dynamic has been translated into exploding debt, rising finance, and growing
inequality.
The economy is ultimately a social construct, inseparable from how we measure it. Accordingly,
GDP does not merely reflect an already existing economy, but steers policy decisions about how
best to manage it, and in this sense, in part performs and constitutes that which it measures. The
economy can be regarded as an operationally closed system in the sense that Norbert Weiner and
Niklas Luhman have used the term, that is, as closed to information but open to the matter and
energy. In this sense, it is not real, as are biophysical systems, but has presence only as codified
communications. Whether or to what extent economic growth reflects underlying material flows
and human welfare depends entirely upon how we measure and understand it. In short, the
economy exists in the medium of ideology, broadly understood . The ultimate ends of the
economy qua economic theory is provided a functional equivalent in the self-referencing
operation of its abstract means of self-measurement.

Entropy and the Economic Process
In 1971, Georgescu-Roegen published his seminal work The entropy law and the economic
process. This work represented a paradigm shift in thinking about economic processes and more
generally, about the interrelation between natural resources and social order. The basic gist of
his argument is that economic production obeys the Second Law of Thermodynamics, also
known as the Entropy Law. The First Law of thermodynamics, also known as the Conservation
Law, stipulates that the total quantity of matter and energy in the universe does not change, but
only changes form. The Second Law of thermodynamics, or the Entropy Law, states that the
reduction of entropy in one place is always accompanied by a greater magnitude of entropy in
the overall environment.
The term entropy was first coined in 1868 by the German physicist Rudolf Clausius. The
concept as used in thermodynamics can be understood in three ways: 1) as a transition from a
more concentrated to a less concentrated state; 2) as a transformation from available energy
(exergy) into unavailable energy; and 3) as a transition from order to disorder. In short, entropy
can be thought of as an inverse measure of order, concentration, or available energy. 61 Available
energy is also known as exergy.

61

The concept of entropy has also been employed and given a different but related meaning in probability terms by
Claude Shannon (1948) as a measure of information. Entropy is a measure of the likelihood or probability of a
“message” given a set of possible messages. In this theoretical context, entropy is identified as the inverse of
probability or certainty: the more surprising or unlikely something is, the greater its entropy, or information value.
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Economics has generally disregarded or ignored the profound implications of the Entropy Law
for economic growth and production. According to the Law of Entropy, all processes of
production create more disorder (waste) than they do order. The universe is therefore in a state of
continuous qualitative degradation (Rifkin 1980). Moreover, this process occurs automatically
by itself, regardless of whether mechanical work is consciously performed. Mechanical work,
however, does accelerate the entropy process. The more we produce, the faster the degradation.
Georgescu-Roegen notes that:
Economic processes materially consist of a transformation of low entropy into high
entropy, i.e. into waste… [W]aste is an inevitable result of that process and ceteris
paribus increases in greater proportion than the intensity of economic activity. (1972)
Herman Daly recapitulates this most fundamental point:
That low entropy is the common denominator of all useful things is evident from the
second law of thermodynamics. All states of matter and all forms of energy do not have
equal potential for use. Though we neither create not destroy matter-energy in
production and consumption, we do transform it. Specifically, we transform matter from
organized, structured, concentrated, low-entropy states (raw materials) into still more
highly structured commodities, and then through use into dispersed, randomized highentropy states (waste)…. All life processes and all technological processes work on an
entropy gradient. In all physical processes the matter-energy inputs in their totality are
always of lower entropy than the matter-energy outputs in their totality. Organisms canot
survive in a medium consisting of their own final outputs. Neither can economies.
(1991: 22)
A continuum of ends and means, adapted from Daly (1991: 19) is given below.
Physics

Technology
Economics
Ethics
Religion
(man and nature‟s)
<-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->
Ultimate Means
Intermediate Means
Intermediate Ends
(low-entropy matter-energy)
(artifacts, labor)
(health, comfort, etc.)
Ultimate Ends (?)

Economics is exclusively concerned with the relation between intermediate means and
intermediate ends, ignoring both ultimate means and ultimate ends. Daly argues that we will
eventually run out of a) “worthwhile ends whose satisfactions depend on further conversionof
ultimate into intermediate means”, that is, the increasing depletion of resources, and b) ultimate
means, or reach limits to the rate at which ultimate means can be used. Systems, including
economic systems and technologies, work by transforming available into unavailable energy,
thus accelerating the entropy process.

Information is the inverse of the probability: “the less probable a message is, the more meaning it carries” (Wiener
1950: 8 in Marcus 1997: 27)
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In the past 200 years, humanity has become increasingly dependent upon nonrenewable minerals
for its survival, including petroleum, coal, and other fossil fuels. Because these are
nonrenewable, humanity is increasingly relying on a phantom carrying capacity. Carrying
capacity refers to the population size of a species that the environment can sustain indefinitely.
Likewise, phantom carrying capacity is described by William Catton Jr. as:
Either the illusory or the extremely precarious capacity of an environment to support a
given life form of a given way of living. It can be quantitatively expressed as that portion
of a population that cannot be permanently supported when temporarily available
resources become unavailable (1980).
Low entropy energy constitutes the ultimate means and exists in two forms: a terrestrial stock
and a solar flow. Furthermore, the terrestrial stock takes two forms: “those renewable on a
human time scale and those renewable only over geologic time and which, for human purposes,
must be treated as nonrenewable” (Daly 1991: 21). Ultimately, the human economy is a
subsystem of the steady-state ecosystem. Accordingly, the human economy must become a
steady state either willingly or by extinction. Trends cannot continue indefinitely. A growing
system will always come up against internal or external barriers (Wallerstein 2004; Meadows
2008).

Empirical findings: Growth and Energy
Economic growth has always been coupled with growth in energy extraction, production, and
depletion. Figure 58 is a plot of US GDP (in constant dollars) against US energy use (kt oil
equivalent), from 1960 to 2009. World estimates are provided in Figure 59and exhibit the same
clearly identifiable relationship.
This relationship does not establish a causal relationship. 62 Growth and energy production are in
a sense two ways of measuring a common phenomenon. Growth entails energy use and viceversa. Neoclassical economics considers growth a cause of energy use. Certainly this is not
incorrect. Petroleum by itself does not cause its extraction and refinement, for example.
Neoclassical theory thus adopts the agency paradigm of causal attribution, regarding growth qua
human agency as the efficient cause of energy consumption.
Although human agency qua intention can be regarded as an efficient cause of energy
consumption, human agency cannot be regarded as a material cause. This is why the
“production” of energy is actually a misnomer. Humans do not produce energy, rather, humans,
using their endosomatic and exosomatic instruments, extract and deplete exergy.

62

It should be mentioned that determining a causal relationship between economic growth and energy use by
econometric means is not helpful. The two series vary concurrently. Granger tests are therefore not meaningful in
this case (Wooldridge 2006).
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Figure 58. Energy use vs GDP. United States. 1960-2009. Source: World Bank.
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Figure 59. World GDP vs. World Energy Use. 1971-2009. Source: World Bank.
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In addition, GDP and energy production are flow variables, as opposed to stock variables. To
regard the extraction of resources as entirely determined by human agency is to assume that there
are no exogenous constraints placed upon this agency and that there are no limits to growth.
That GDP is a flow variable is also important, because conceptually it means that a “growing
economy” only indirectly refers to the stocks that are accumulated and depleted via economic
activity.

Peak Oil
Oil contributes to about 40 percent of energy production and supplies 90 percent of all
transportation fuel (Korowicz 2010). It is therefore vitally important to the functioning of the
global economic system. For most of the 20th century, high quality petroleum could be
extracted at very little cost. A barrel of oil, which could be extracted for a dollar, would in turn
generate 25,000 hours of labor. One dollar equals 25,000 hours of labor. This is essentially free
energy, and it has fueled the economic growth of every nation on earth.
Up until the 1950s, the United States was the “Saudi Arabia of oil” in the sense that it was
world‟s largest exporter. Its production, however, peaked in 1970 at 10.2 million barrels a day
and subsequently declined. Ten years later, domestic oil production was still in decline, despite
the fact that ten times more oil wells had been drilled. Currently the United States uses 25
percent of the world‟s oil but possesses only 2 percent of the world‟s known reserves.
Today, there are about 50 countries that are producing less oil today than in the past. Ironically,
more efficient means of extraction petroleum has only expedited its depletion, acting as giant
“super straws” sucking the last easy oil out of the ground at faster and faster rates, but without
significantly increasing the amount of petroleum that would be produced from any given oil
field. The last great oil discoveries of the 20th century, which effectively postponed the point of
peak global production, were fields in Alaska, Siberia, and the North Sea, discovered in 1967,
1968, and 1969, respectively. Worldwide discovery of oil peaked in 1964.
Contrary to Mankiw‟s assertions, the price of crude oil is rising, not falling. Figure 60 is a time
series depicting world crude oil production, measured as millions of barrels per day, and average
oil prices for the US (measured as USD). Between 1960 and 1970 global petroleum production
increased 118.6 percent. By contrast, between 1971 and 2009, global petroleum production
increased only 52.1 percent.
Probably the most important fact, however, is that global petroleum production has remained
nearly flat since 2005. In this year the Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that
an average of 73.74 million barrels of oil was extracted daily. This declined slightly until 2008,
when it increased to 73.78 million barrels of oil per day, an increase of only .054 percent over
four years. The average annual percent change of production from 1960 to 1970 is 8.139
percent, whereas the average annual percent change of production from 1971 to 2009 is only
1.311 percent.
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The rate of global oil production is declining, but the price of oil is rising. From 1999 to 2008,
the average price for a barrel of oil in the US rose by a factor of 5, from $11.27 to $76.82. These
are annual averages. Oil prices reached a high of $145/barrel on July 3, 2008, only to be
followed by a dramatic decline. 63 A time-series of oil price data from 1960 to 2008 is depicted
in Figure 61. In the late 1970s a series of events in the Middle East sent the price of oil over
$40/barrel. By 1982, oil prices peaked at an annual average of $53.74. The two most important
events disrupting supply were the Iranian revolution in 1978 and Iraq‟s invasion of Iran in 1980.
In 1978, world oil production increased by 0.7 percent, a significant deceleration from its
previous 1977 growth rate of 4 percent. By 1980, however, global petroleum extraction declined
4 percent, and continued to decline another 5.8 percent and 4.6 percent in 1981 and 1982,
respectively.
Between 1960 and 1974, a stable relationship is exhibited between oil price and oil quantity. A
supply curve is given by plotting price (y) and oil produced (x). This is illustrated in Figure 62.
Notice the downward slope. As prices fall, so does the quantity of oil produced. This is in
contradistinction to the standard supply curve in economic theory. The price elasticity of supply
(PES) can also be inferred for this period. Calculating the percentage change in quantity over the
percentage change in price yields a negative slope of approximately 13. 64
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Figure 60. Global petroleum production 1960-2008. (Source: EIA)
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Note that these prices are in nominal dollars and do not take into account inflation.
I calculate this as follows: ((Q1974-Q1960)/Q1960)/((P1974-P1960)/P1960), where Q and P are quantity and
price, respectively, and where 1974 and 1960 numbers indicate the years.
64
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Figure 61. Oil price average USD 1960-2008. (Source: EIA)

According to the law of supply, supply curves should be positive, not negative. Note that this
could be explained as the result of the interaction of a shifting supply curve and a stable or
constant demand curve. In standard economic analysis, prices are at equilibrium, which is
defined as the point where the (falling) demand curve and the (rising) supply curve meet.
Assuming that prices are at equilibrium, this result can be obtained by assuming that technology
or other factors make petroleum significantly less expensive to produce. When this occurs under
conditions of relatively stable global demand, rising output can coincide with falling prices.
This relationship changes abruptly in the mid-1970s due to political events in the Mideast
discussed above. Abstracting away from these events, and tracing the relationship between
quantity supplied and prices for the years 1987 to 2008, yields the time series depicted in Figure
63. What is clear is that the relationship begins to break down, and the (linear) slope becomes
positive. The relationship also becomes curvilinear or exponential.
A divergence in the relationship between petroleum and GDP is also exhibited. Plotting the ratio
of oil price to oil quantity (P/Q) against real Gross Domestic Product for the period 1960 to 1974
yields the time series in Figure 64. The price of oil declines while total economic output rises.
This relationship clearly changes during the period of 1987 to 2008 as depicted in Figure 65.
Limits to growth are implied and the law of diminishing marginal returns is confirmed. As the
price of oil rises relative to its quantity, GDP rises but at a diminishing rate. A similar
relationship holds between petroleum price and production to world per capita GDP, as depicted
in Figures 66 and 67. The relationship dramatically changes during the period of 1987 to 2008.
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An important indicator of net energy production is a ratio known as Energy Returned on Energy
Invested (EROEI). Although difficult to measure precisely, it is widely acknowledged that the
EROEI is declining substantially for both gasoline and petroleum. In 1930, one barrel of oil was
needed to produce 100 barrels of oil output, that is, the EROEI was 100:1 (Hagens 2008). 65 By
1970, the EROEI for oil in the United States had declined to an estimated 30:1, and by 2000 the
EROEI for oil was estimated to be between 18:1 and 11:1.
Another important indicator is peak oil production per capita, which represents the largest
amount of oil that can be used by each person on the planet if equally distributed. This has been
in decline for the past half century, as indicated in the Figure 68.
Oil production for the United States peaked in 1970 and thereafter began its decline. For much
of the 20th century, the United States was the largest oil exporter in the world. Petroleum,
however, is a nonrenewable resource. The volume of petroleum that we are able to extract must
eventually decline. The production of oil over time tends to follow a logistic distribution curve,
first rising then peaking, and eventually declining. This has been the production pattern
exhibited for individual oil fields and for individual countries.
There are two reasons why oil production exhibits a logistic growth pattern over time. First,
global petroleum extraction tends to lag behind discoveries of oil reserves. M.K. Hubbert
correctly predicted the year that petroleum production would peak in the United States. Peak oil
production is therefore also known as Hubbert‟s peak.
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Figure 62. Oil Price and Quantity (1960-1974).
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Estimates available at http://www.theoildrum.com/node/3810
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Figure 63. Oil Price and Quantity (1987-2008)
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Figure 64. Oil Price-to-Quatity versus GDP (1960-1974)
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Figure 65. Oil Price-to-Quantity versus GDP (1987-2008)
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Figure 66. Oil price-to-quantity versus World per capita GDP (1960-1974)
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Figure 67. Oil price-to-quantity versus World per capita GDP (1987-2008)

Oil wells may still be being discovered, but their rate of discovery continues to decline. Second,
oil extraction follows the principle of the lowest hanging fruit. The cheapest, most energy dense
crude is extracted first, followed by oil that is increasingly less energy dense and more expensive
to extract.66 Moreover, the specific use-values of petroleum (from which plastics, fertilizers and
pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and over 90 percent of transportation fuel, are derived) are nonsubstitutable.
Stagnating supply coupled with increasing global energy demands has translated into rising
energy prices. Although US production peaked in 1970, world production continued to increase
in large part because of new oil field discoveries including the oil reserves in the North Sea and
Mexico‟s Cantarell Field, which was formerly the world‟s second largest producing field
(Hamilton 2009: 11).
Both of these, and many others, are today in decline. Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter and its
stagnation contributed greatly to global stagnation beginning in 2005. Figure 69 depicts quantity
of petroleum production for the United States and Saudi Arabia from 1960 to 2008.
66

Production of nonrenewable resources tends to follow more closely the cost of production curve depicted by
neoclassical economic theory than do normal commodities, which, contrary to neoclassical theory, tend to have flat
supply curves.
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Figure 68. World oil production per capita. 1960-2003. Source: Energy Energy Information
Administration (EIA). Population figures from Ecological Footprint Network.
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Figure 69. Oil Production for US and Saudi Arabia, 1960-2008. Source: Energy Information
Administration.
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Figure 70. Growth in per capita Energy Consumption. US, OECD, China. 1990-2006. Source: World
Bank.

The demand for oil has meanwhile accelerated. An important source of increased demand is
from China, which saw a 16 percent increase in its energy consumption in 2004. Although still
significantly smaller in terms of absolute numbers, its relative growth in oil consumption far
outpaces that of the United States and the rest of the OECD countries, as indicated in Figure 70.
In a thorough review of the data and available studies, Hamilton concludes that: “had there been
no oil shock, we would have described the U.S. economy in 2007:Q4-2008:Q3 as growing
slowly, but not in a recession” (2009: 40). The primary reason being that oil price hikes had a
significant impact on consumer spending.
Of course, that consumers are spending on something does mean that the money is going
somewhere, and that therefore demand should equal supply in the aggregate, according to Say‟s
Law. However, the problem is that much of this money ends up being invested in the capital
required to obtain increasingly scarce energy resources, and is consequently concentrated in the
hands of a few oil exporters, firms, and individuals.
Peak Coal
According to standard neoclassical theory, energy inputs are substitutable. Even if petroleum
production might be stagnating for geophysical reasons, and not entirely because of speculation
or political decisions on the part of OPEC, then some might conclude that other energy sources
should be able to meet increases in global energy demand. One likely candidate is coal.
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Today, the United States is the second largest producer of coal after China. However, because
coal is nonrenewable, it too will peak. Although estimates vary regarding when this coal
production will peak, the Energy Watch Group and the Uppsala Hydrocarbon Depletion Study
Group both predict that coal production will peak by 2020 or 2025.67 Moreover, the quality of
coal, like petroleum, has been in steady decline as measured by the EROEI. Consequently,
although coal production per weight has not yet peaked, the total amount of energy generated
from coal in the United States already peaked in 1998 (Heinberg 2009).
Historically, coal mines only extract about 50 percent of their economically viable coal
reserves.68 For surface mining, this figure is 85 percent (cf. Heinberg 2009). Of course,
economically viable reserves are tied to price and demand. Because of the inelasticity of energy
goods, prices will tend to rise making marginal quality coal more profitable, rather than making
it cost-prohibitive.
In addition, there are the unaccounted costs of coal extraction, including the costs to coal miners
and the ecological devastation wrought by strip mining, including “Mountain Top Removal.”
Coal is also the most carbon intensive and polluting energy source. At best therefore, coal will
remain a stop-gap measure to meet increased energy demands.
Energy and Income
Spending on fuel and other energy sources is primarily a function of income, not price. To see
this, examine Figure 71, which depicts personal spending on gasoline (and other energy
products) plotted against total income, from 1947-2009. Figure 71 is significant because it
shows that energy spending rises with income, irrespective of price. The (absolute value of)
price elasticity demand (PED) for petroleum is very low, or in other words, the demand for
petroleum is highly inelastic.69 Hamilton (2009) reports that the PED for oil is 0.07; the PED
for gasoline is much higher at 0.26.
Figure 72 shows energy spending as a percentage of both total spending and income for the
United States for the years 1947 to 2010. The price inelasticity of petroleum is significant
because it means that higher prices can lead to a significant decline in demand for other goods
with higher demand elasticities. Whereas in the late 1970s and 1980s, high energy prices can be
attributed to exogenous political disturbances, the same cannot be said for the most recent oil
price hike. As reported by Hamilton: “the big story has not been a dramatic reduction in supply
… but a failure of production to increase between 2005 and 2007” (2009: 9). The question is,
why has global oil production begun to stagnate?

67

Relevant reports are available at http://www.energywatchgroup.org/ and http://www.tsl.uu.se/uhdsg/
Reserves are not equal to resources. Resources refer to the total amount of coal present, whereas reserves refer to
the portion of the resource expected to be profitably extracted.
69
Price elasticity of demand (PED) is calculated as the ratio of the percentage change in quantity to the percentage
change in price: %∆Q/%∆P. A good is inelastic whenever its PED is below 1, which means that a 1 percent change
in price is accompanied by a smaller percentage change (<1%) in the quantity demanded.
68
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Figure 71. Energy spending vs. Income. Source: BEA NIPA tables 2.3.5 line 11 and Table 2.1 line 1.
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Figure 72. Energy spending as % of Income and Total Spending. Source: BEA NIPA Tables 2.3.5 and 2.1
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Limits to Growth
Few scholars have linked the current economic crisis to geophysical constraints on energy
production. One of the few is Ramon Lopez (2008), who attributes the financial crisis to three
interrelated structural factors:
i)
ii)
iii)

The incorporation of highly populated countries into growth process;
The increasing scarcity of natural resources; and
The unprecedented concentration of wealth and income in advanced
economies in past 3 decades

Since the industrial revolution, the global “North” (i.e. the developed/'First world' countries)
grew under conditions of constant or even declining commodity prices, including important raw
materials and natural resources. In the 1990s, however, this changed. The NIGs (new industrial
giants) including China, India, Russia, and Brazil experienced growth rates up to 3 times faster
than the advanced countries. In fact, a 1/3 of total annual world growth is attributed to the NIGs.
Because the NIGs represent over 50 percent of humanity, their industrialization has generated an
increased demand for energy, food, and other raw materials accelerating their physical depletion
and monetary inflation.
Although global crude oil production rates are nearly 4 times what they were a century ago,
increased global demand as well as deteriorating quality generates upward pressure on energy
prices. Although rising prices can make oil that is more difficult to extract profitable and hence
market viable, the extraction and production of energy requires energy. Once the EROEI for
petroleum reaches 1 (i.e. whenever it takes one barrel of oil to produce a barrel of oil), petroleum
will not be market viable, regardless of how expensive it becomes and regardless of how much
petroleum remains in the ground.
Energy “De-Linking”
One of the most frequently cited arguments regarding energy use and economic growth is that
economic growth relies increasingly less on energy consumption. The ratio of energy use to
GDP is called energy intensity, and it measures how much energy is required to generate 1 unit
of GDP. In Figure 73 I plot the inverse of this ratio, the GDP to Energy ratio, which measures
the amount of GDP generated from 1 unit of energy, for the years 1976 to 2008.
Because GDP is a flow variable that includes expenditures acquired from borrowed income, I
also include a measure of GDP that subtracts total dollars borrowed.70 The trends are essentially
the same. GDP per unit of energy steadily rises. In Figure 74, I control for both inflation and
population by comparing the growth of per capita real GDP and per capita energy consumption.

70

Gross domestic product data are in current (not constant) dollars. They represent total GDP rather than per capita
figures, which will be used below. Data are taken from NIPA Table 1.1.5. The second series is calculated as:
(GDP-Borrowing)/Energy. Borrowing data are collected from the Federal Reserve‟s Flow of Funds Accounts.
Energy data are acquired from the World Bank and are measured as kt of oil equivalent.
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Figure 73. Ratio of GDP to Energy. 1976-2008
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Figure 74. Per capita GDP and Energy Use. United States (1960-2008).71

71

Data are taken from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Gross Domestic Product
is measured at constant 2000 US dollars. Energy use is measured as kg of oil equivalent per capita. The WDI
database can be located online at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog
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Figure 75. Global per capita GDP and energy use (1971-2008)
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Figure 76. Energy/Borrowing to Fixed Assets. 1976-2008
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Beginning in the mid-1970s the clear growth rates of GDP and energy use per capita begin to
diverge. Indeed, the growth rate of use per capita seems to flat line. World per capita GDP and
Energy use are less striking, but still indicate that GDP growth is outpacing the growth of per
capita energy consumption, as depicted in Figure 75.
Finally, I use an unconventional measure, plotting the ratio of energy use to borrowing
(Energy/Borrowing) against the historical cost of net fixed private assets. Private “fixed assets”
is a stock variable that represents the accumulation of capital derived from investments. Because
this variable represents the sum total of historical capital accumulation less depreciation, it is
much larger than GDP. Figure 76 is intended to capture the relation between energy
consumption and capital stock growth, holding borrowing constant. Again, the data show a
declining amount of energy required to sustain a unit increase in fixed assets.
Efficiency improvements have undoubtedly contributed to the decoupling of economic growth
and energy consumption. According to figures calculated by Ayres and Warr (2009), the ratio of
useful to work to total exergy, or available energy, has risen from approximately 9 percent in
1960 to 13 percent by 2005. This represents an efficiency improvement of about 4 percent.
Although this is significant, it does not explain the apparent de-coupling of growth rates for GDP
and energy use per capita in the United States. In particular, after 2005, oil production is nearly
flat, but world GDP continues to grow at nearly 3.2 percent per year until 2008.
Two additional factors, in my view, explain the apparent decoupling of US GDP and energy:
imports and debt. First, the United States has not de-materialized its consumption. The United
States and, more generally, the global North, has become dependent on the global South for
commodities and manufactured goods. The growth of the North is therefore tied irrevocably to
the South, and vice-versa.
Lopez (2009) observes that whereas for many decades the North could grow with constant or
even declining commodity prices, this began to change in the 1970s. The growth of the new
industrial giants, such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil has generated increased demands for
energy, food and other raw materials, which has helped to inflate their respective prices. Offshoring to China, for instance, has generated high growth rates in turn generating greater calls on
global raw materials such as oil, cement, copper, steel, and petroleum (Schwartz 2009: 175).
Increased demand for raw materials has helped put an end to the global disinflation that helped
fuel the housing bubble during the “long 1990s”, lasting approximately from 1996 to 2005
(Schwartz 2009).
Global demand for raw materials and energy eventually put an end to the disinflationary climate
that prevailed from 1996 until 2005. Inflation provoked a tighter monetary policy, which in the
US began in the third quarter of 2004, triggering the end of the boom. Lopez argues that stricter
monetary policy reduces aggregate demand because of a highly concentrated income
distribution. Lopez concludes that: “"The emergence of the NIG has meant that world
economic growth has become more dependent on commodities at a time when commodity
supply has become less elastic" (16).
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Figure 78. Ratio of personal consumption expenditure to historical cost net private fixed assets. 1960-2008
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Because GDP is a flow variable in part dependent upon the accumulation of existing capital
stock, it is useful to examine the relationship over time between the size of the flow relative to
the capital stock that regulates it. Figures 77 and 78 present the ratios of US GDP and personal
consumption, respectively, to the estimated historical net cost of fixed private assets. Data are
estimated in billions of current dollars. Data for personal consumption are taken from NIPA
Table 1.1.5, and fixed assets from Fixed Asset table 2.3.
These time series show a clear pattern of diminishing returns to fixed capital, which closely
resembles the patterns for global oil production and the relationship between energy
consumption and GDP explicated above. If GDP were directly proportional to the stock of fixed
assets, it would exhibit a pattern of exponential growth. In the mid 1970s, however, this growth
halts relative to capital stocks, and begins to reverse. These data indicate that US growth since
the 1980s has depended upon a drawing down of resources and capital stocks and infrastructure
previously accumulated.

Conclusions
Can rising energy prices and/or peak petroleum production account for the global economic
downturn? The answer to this question depends on how the latter is defined. The major
stumbling block for those looking for a clear and direct link between energy production and
global economic growth is that economic growth has, to some extent, decoupled from energy
use. This does not mean that growth does not require energy, for it clearly does, just as
economic growth requires a suitable atmosphere to breath and solar radiation. A presupposition,
however, is not necessarily an element of a system. The economic system operates according to
the code: to pay or not to pay. This monetary code facilitates economic transactions and
distinguishes what is relevant and irrelevant for the economic system. A component of this decoupling comes from improvements in the energy efficiency of production, a de-materialization
of production in the United States, borrowing, and above all, a drawdown of existing capital
stocks.
The theoretically relevant comparison, moreover, is not between absolute levels of energy use,
but the relative rates of growth between energy use, energy efficiency, and total debt. Figure 79
is a time-series illustrating the relative growth rates between total debt, the ratio of GDP to
energy, and fixed assets. The data show that the growth rate of debt outpaced the growth of
energy efficiency. A higher rate of delinking or a greater quantity of energy production (at
prevailing prices) could have sustained this debt. An over-accumulation of debt is always
relative to rates of growth. In order to demonstrate how a debt-crisis occurs, it is necessary to
show both the run up of debt, representing anticipations of future growth, and also the factors
that contributed to the negation of these anticipations.
That the modern economic system (aka capitalism) requires no one-to-one correlation between
commodity production and material production can also be demonstrated with reference to its
history. Contrary to what is generally thought, the first commodities to supplant subsistence
activities were in fact services, not material goods.
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Figure 79. GDP/Energy, Fixed Assets, and Debt Growth (1976=1)

Ivan Illich details, for instance, the switch from un-taught vernacular languages to a single,
national „mother-tongue‟ in the late 15th century. According to Illich, “the switch from the
vernacular to an officially taught mother tongue is perhaps the most significant- and, therefore,
least researched- event in the coming of a commodity-intensive society [foreshadowing] the
switch from . . . production for use to production for market” (1981: 44). The explicit purpose of
this pedagogy, as detailed by the writings of Elio Antonio de Nebrija in Spain, was the creation
of a new type of dependence. Contrary to the belief that a unified national language is necessary
for literacy, the purpose of the proposed standardization of language, was instead to suppress
untaught vernacular reading (1981: 40). This, according to Illich, was the first shot fired in the
war against subsistence. 72
In my view, the differentiation of needs co-occurs but does not necessarily co-relate to the
differentiation of the codification of the means for distributing these needs. The monetary code,
regulating the distribution of the desires (i.e. the meanings) of the socius, must therefore be
analytically distinguished from the organizations that regulate and distribute its material and
energetic flows. The lack of a direct correspondence between economic growth and energy,
however, does not mean that there are no causal relations between them.

72

While militating against a productivist, orthodox reading of Marx, Illich‟s views, I think, are consonant with the
idea, that the process of commodification is one which “reproduces the needy individual” (Marx 1977: 719).
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PART II. SOCIOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON SYSTEMS, SOCIAL
ORDER, AND CRISIS
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I.

THE PROBLEMOF SOCIAL ORDER: THE SYSTEM
CONCEPT IN SOCIOLOGY

Introduction
The meaning of the concept of system varies both between disciplines and between authors
within disciplines. In some accounts, such as Giddens, system means a pattern generated by
organizing or self-organizing (i.e. unintended) dynamics. In other accounts, such as Bunge, it is
couched as a ontological worldview that is distinct from both methodological individual and
wholism (i.e. bottom-up and top-down approaches). For Luhmann, the unity of the system is
constituted as a unity of a distinction between system and environment.73 This section will
examine some key systems thinkers in sociology, paying attention to how the meaning of the
concept of system changes according to theoretical context and purpose. Specifically, I will
discuss Fararo‟s recent elaboration of the Parson‟s concept of the social action system; Mario
Bunge‟s CESM model of systems; Anthony Giddens‟ theory of structuration; and Niklas
Luhmann‟s concept of society as an autopoeitic communication system. I will also include a
discussion of Jürgen Habermas‟s objection to Luhmann and his alternative concept of
communication as developed in The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA ) volumes 1 and 2.

Agency and System: intended and unintended outcomes
Two important reference frames for categorizing and understanding social phenomena are what
I will provisionally call the perspectives of system and agency. By system, I basically mean
patterns that arise via unintended consequences of action, and by agency, I mean those social
outcomes that are intended. System and agency frames of reference correspond roughly to what
Merton calls latent and manifest functions (1968). By reference frame, I mean a way of coding
or categorizing observations so that they make sense. More formally, a frame of reference can
be regarded as a nested set of distinctions, or a typology, that specifies what is being compared. 74
These two perspectives are irreducible. The intentional frame of reference attributes social
outcomes to the intentions of individuals qua their capacity as agents. In this framework,
individuals are treated as causes or prime movers and individuals in their psychological
capacities as persons are treated as the central unit of analysis. Motives are regarded as selfactualizing (albeit within constraints), and social conditions and outcomes are the (ex post)

73

“Exaggerating slightly, we can even say that a system is its relation to its environment or that it is the difference
between system and environment” (Luhmann 1982: 257).
74

This bears some resemblance to various “standpoint” theories. The difference, as I see it, is that standpoint
theories, in practice if not in theory, ultimately end up reducing perspectives to the biological and personal histories
and experiences of the observer. In other words, the unit of reference is still an individual, with his or her own
idiosyncratic psychological experiences.
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consequence of (ex ante) intelligent design. Persons are subjects not objects, causes rather than
effects; individuals are controlling rather than controlled variables. 75
By contrast, the systems perspective reverses the causal arrow, treating individuals as the objects
of social circumstances and conditions. In sociological theory, this framework finds expression
early on in Durkheim‟s concept of society sui generis which imposes itself upon individuals, in
Marx‟s notion of the class-in-itself, and later in Parson‟s systems-theoretical analysis of actionsystems. Much of this theorizing has been rightly criticized for its obscurantism, its hierarchical
model of control, and the lack of serious attempts to specify the mechanisms by which social
order is maintained.
The question of which perspective to adopt is a chicken-egg dilemma: if an individual is a cause,
then who or what causes the cause? The two are conjointly or reciprocally influenced. Marx‟s
phrases it eloquently: circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances. The
system perspective can be formulated as a theory of emergent, unintended, self-organizing
outcomes.76 It treats agency as a dependent, rather than an independent variable (cf. Fuchs
2001).77 Specifying exactly how intended consequences can generate unintended, selforganizing results has been the focus of considerable theorizing (e.g. Giddens 1980l Leydesdorff
2003). In this sense, system is synonymous with self-organized, or unintended. There is free
will, but history is not determined by these freely willed intentions. The very term subject
reflects this duality since it has two meanings: subject as the subject of history, and 2) subject as
the subject of a king.
The idea that systems, rather than individual intentions, can generate social events and outcomes
is discussed by Max Weber in terms of social selection (auslese), in which types of social actions
are selected as better adapted to environmental conditions, but without anyone intending or
directing the selection process. In addition to intentionally successful action, there are also
actions that are successful (to the interests of those involved) because of pure luck or because of
routine (Schwartz 2009: 12). In the latter case, the habitual response is intentional but cannot be
regarded as truly strategic because no other alternatives were entertained. A system, in the sense
of structural and institutional influences upon action, can then be regarded as generating
successful or unsuccessful outcomes under determinate circumstances.
The system-intention distinction as I envision it can be understood as a continuum. At one end,
there is non-alienated, self-actualizing individual agency. This is the realm of Habermas‟s
counterfactual ideal-speech situation, or the lifeworld. In economic sociology, it is the society or
75

I use the term “control” here in the cybernetic sense, which refers to efforts to keep some perception near a
reference standard, or goal (cf. Fararo and McClelland 2006).
76
Methodological individualism, the rational actor model, and the field of micro-economics are not necessarily
agency theories. Insofar as they attribute outcomes to unintended consequences, they can be regarded as systems
theorists. According to my definition then, Adam Smith can be regarded as an early systems theorist.
77
In his (2001) article “Beyond Agency”, Stephan Fuchs advocates that sociologists adopt the perspective of a
second-order observer, that is, an observer who observers under what conditions others observe what they observe,
or more simply, how others observe as opposed to what they observe. The debate over free will/agency and
determinism, then, is not solvable as such, but can be evaluated from this second-order perspective, where agency
itself becomes an attribution that varies. Agency and determinism then are seen as items along a continuum and as
dependent variables and not as constants.
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culture in which the economic system is embedded. This dimension of social life can be
regarded as organized via human will and intention. Rather than viewing this perspective as the
property of an observed system, however, I intend to view it as a property of observing systems,
that is, as frameworks for making causal attributions.
At the other end of the spectrum belongs the notion of the system. In its colloquial usage, the
concept of system often describes those social patterns that are neither a) a result of a conspiracy,
nor b) the result of pure chance. Indeed, any attribution of causality, any attempt to explain a
phenomenon, rules out the possibility of randomness. System-attribution occurs when an
outcome is attributed to an agency that is regarded as non-local or distributed.
Although in many cases, the notion of system is personified,78 the notion of system as pursued
here is radically non-anthropomorphic. In a systems framework, the idea of unilateral control is
abandoned.79 Outcomes are thus unintended, or self-organized. The system is self-generative of
its own dynamics.
Finally, note that this distinction is orthogonal to the distinction of evitable or inevitable.
Charles Perrow (2010) has recently contrasted, for example, normal accident explanations with
agentic explanations. Perrow argues that normal accidents are more appropriately called system
accidents. System accidents occur “even where everyone tries as hard as they can to avoid
system failures. They are built into the system, and though generally rare, are inevitable” (2-3:
my emphasis). Perrow then goes on to argue that the financial crisis was caused by agents who
knew about and intended the damage they ultimately created.
From another point of view, however, this argument can be regarded as a contingent mode of
attribution, which can be contested. After all, did the CEO‟s of these companies intend to bring
about the financial panic which ensued after the collapse of the housing bubble in the US? The
fact that not all risks were avoided does not entail that the social outcomes were intended.
Indeed, it is impossible to avoid all risks. Moreover, scarcity of natural resources has played a
vital role in the global economic downturn, making recovery of the economic system, in its
currently specified structure, unlikely. The upshot is that intended actions generated unintended
outcomes.
Both Parsons and Luhmann can be regarded as systems theorists, primarily interested in systemic
integration as opposed to social integration. They therefore bracket out questions of human
agency, and limit the observation of actor relations to that of relations between social roles. I
discuss their understanding of the economy and its relation to the social system below. I then
examine how efforts to overcome this distinction (e.g. Giddens theory of structuration) either
reintroduce the distinction or end up giving lop-sided accounts, emphasizing one side or the
other. Lastly, I discuss how Luhmann and Habermas can be understood as complementary
perspectives, one emphasizing systemic integration, the other social integration.
78

An everyday example of system-attribution, is the concept of the “The Man.”
Luhmann (1995) writes, for instance that: “There may be hierarchies, asymmetries, or differences in influence,
but no part of the system can control others without itself being subject to control. Under such circumstances it is
possible … that any control must be exercised in anticipation of counter-control” (36).
79
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Meta-Theoretical Reflection on the System-Agency distinction
From a perspective of second-order observing, the system-agency distinction is but one
distinction among many, but one that has played a productive role within sociological theory.
The technique of second-order observing, or the observing of observing, means to distinguish
distinctions. Rather than observing what is observed, second-order observing entails observing
how systems observe by observing the distinctions they employ and under what conditions. The
concept of observation is taken from the logician George Spencer Brown, whose book The Laws
of Form, provides an account of observing as the drawing of a distinction. His calculus of
indications is used extensively by Niklas Luhmann in the latter half of his career. The concept of
second-order observing, or the observing of observing, is borrowed from his friend and
colleague, Heinz von Foerster, noted philosopher and cybernetician. An observation always
conveys as much information about the observer as it does that which is observed, where
“observer” here does not refer to a person, but to an observing system.
Distinctions establish a unity of a difference, or an identity. Observing presupposes that a
distinction is drawn, in order to indicate one side of the distinction. Luhmann‟s meta-theoretical
orientation is constructivist (Herting and Stein 2007). Distinctions do not belong to the world,
but are employed by the observer in order to observe the world. 80 If the distinction is no longer
drawn, the distinction becomes an extinction.
Moreover, the concept of observing is associated with an important epistemological insight that
Luhmann formulates in terms of blind spots: one cannot distinguish the distinction one makes at
the same time that one distinguishes. Or in other words, one cannot simultaneously observe how
one observes what one observes. The seeing-eye is unseen, for every distinction replaces, and
dis-places, another possible distinction, and hence retains the other possible distinction as a
necessary blind spot. This epistemological acknowledgement is expressed ontologically as the
distinction between system and environment. The unity of the world is necessarily the unity of a
difference constituted in observation.
From the point of view of second-order observing, the system-agency distinction occludes from
view other distinctions vital for understanding social reality. Most importantly, the concept of
“Nature” is entirely missing. The concept of Nature, however, presupposes its own distinction
(Nature-Society), which occludes other important insights drawn from other distinctions. The
fact that there are geophysical limits to growth, insofar as growth entails the increased
throughput of geophysical resources to increase the stock of exosomatic and endosomatic capital,
constitutes one of the most fundamental, but ignored, facts pertaining to both the economy and
more generally, society.

80

The “world” for Luhmann is the unity of the distinction between system and environment.
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Anthony Giddens: Structure and Function
Giddens and the (failed) attempt to transcend the agency-system distinction
There have been various attempts to “transcend” this distinction, the most famous of which has
been Giddens‟ theory of structuration. Giddens is interested in how social systems, defined as
reproduced relations between actors as organized social practices, are recursively reconstituted as
the interaction of intended and unintended consequences of action. Specifically, he notes how
the unintended consequences of action “may systematically feed back to be the unacknowledged
conditions of further acts” (1984: 8). Social systems are “both medium and outcome of the
practices they recursively organize” (25: my emphasis).
For Giddens, structures consist of “rules and resources” and exist outside of time and space and
are hence virtual. They exist rather as memory traces. Giddens writes that structure is not
external, but internal to individuals. Individuals are constrained and enabled in their actions, that
is to say, individuals have capacities to act but cannot act in any way they can imagine. Not
every action is possible. The repeated thesis of his structuration theory is that is not exclusively
constraining, as is implied by the dualism of society versus the individual. Instead, structure is
seen as a duality, which is both enabling and constraining. The duality of structure refers to the
mutual constitution of agents and structures:
The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of
phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of
structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the
practices they recursively organize. Structure is not 'external' to individuals: as memory
traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sense more 'internal' than
exterior to their activities in a Durkheimian sense. Structure is not to be equated with
constraint but is always both constraining and enabling. (1984: 25)
Whereas structures exist virtually, that is, are only implied (“implicated”), systems are the
patterned social practices of human agents distributed across space and time. From this
perspective, structures do not “structure” action in the sense of determining the pattern or the
system-ness that the system exhibits. Structure enables and constrains, but does not determine,
the system, understood as the aggregated outcomes of actions.81
Patterns of social interaction arise from micro-level agencies which are latent from the
perspective of the actors themselves. As Giddens observes: “human history is created by
intentional activities but is not an intended project; it persistently eludes efforts to bring it under
conscious direction” (1984: 279). The idea is similar to Marx's notion that: “Men make their own
history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances
81

Note: for Giddens "action" cannot be reduced to individual acts: "Action is not a combination of 'acts': acts are
constituted only by a discursive moment of attention to the duree of lived-through experience" (in Giddens Reader
1993: 90; from The Constitution of Society).
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chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from
the past.”
Giddens writes that social systems require human agency but that “it is not the case that actors
create social systems; they reproduce or transform them, remaking what is already made in
continuity of praxis” (1984: 171). Social systems do not arise ex nihilo, and so the question of
how it all began (i.e. the question of the diachronic emergence of social systems) is not
addressed. Aggregated actions constitute systems or patterns of interaction that are latent for the
individual actors themselves. These patterns should be seen as the interaction of both intended
and unintended consequences of actions.

Giddens claims that his theory overcomes subject-object dualism because for him, structure is
not external to the actor. Structure is both „medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively
organizes‟. As medium, structure furnishes rules and resources that enable and make social life
possible; as outcome, its reproduction result in the instantiation of rules in action and interaction
(i.e. system).
As Nicos Mouzelis (1995) observers, the duality-of-structure thesis implies a particular type of
subject-object relationship that subjects adopt towards rules and resources that can be
characterized as natural-performative. The natural-performative orientation to rules and
resources is a practical, natural, taken for granted attitude. However, this view omits another
orientation that can be described as strategic-monitoring of rules and resources . The same point
about social structure can be made with respect to the actual rules and resources instantiated by
actors, i.e. to social systems.
Table 6. Mouzelis and the points of view one can adopt towards rules and resources.

System (syntagmatic,
actor, actual)

Structure
(paradigmatic,
institutional, virtual)

Natural-performative
attitude
(rules and resources are
“inside” the individual)

Paradigmatic
duality;
POV of subordinates
in relations to rules
initiated from above.

Syntagmatic duality
POV of superiors in
relation to games
played at lower org.
levels.

Strategic-monitoring
attitude (individuals distance
themselves, and observe rules
and resources as a theme or
topic)

Paradigmatic
dualism
POV of superiors in
relation to rules at
lower org. levels.

Syntagmatic dualism;
POV of subordinates in
relation to games
played at higher org.
levels.
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This results in a fourfold typology specifying four broad perspectives or orientations can actors
can adopt vis-a-vis rules and resources, depicted in Table 6.
For Giddens, the agency-structure duality refers to cases in which structure is inside the
individual. However, for cases in which individuals belong to much larger, abstract systems in
which he/she only participates minimally, the concept of a dualism(which Giddens rejects) is
more appropriate. Mouzelis therefore distinguishes between a syntagmatic duality (ala Giddens)
and a syntagmatic dualism. The term syntagmatic refers to institutional, or structural (as
Giddens uses the term) rules and resources. The distinction bewteen dualism and duality is again
recapiulated at the level of historically instantiated systems. Mouzelis therefore distinguishes
between paradigmatic dualism and paradigmatic duality.
The point is that the distinction is just that, a distinction, which is more over useful for making
certain kinds of observations. The fact that it does not describe social reality in its totality, or
that it is not useful for all purposes, should not be surprising, since it is but one distinction among
many. Attempts to ignore or transcend this distinction end up reintroducing it covertly. One
must not transcend or replace distinctions, but rather, displace them, by means of other
distinctions. To distinguish, however, is inexorable.

Anti-Functionalism
Giddens has called his theory an “anti-functionalist manifesto. By “functionalism” he means the
tendency to explain social phenomena in terms of their functional consequences for the social
system. Giddens objects to the use of functionalist language because it confuses the effects of
such phenomena with their causes. Only actors have reasons and motives, not social systems as
aggregates of action. In the language of functionalism, however, the unintended consequences
generated by the intentional behavior of micro-level actors is explained instead as a result of the
system, as a macro-level agent.
Although it is worthwhile pointing out that a discrepancy can exist between what people intend
and what they achieve, the latter cannot, at the level of society, be a cause of itself. As
Rueschemeyer (1986) has argued, in order to be valid, functional explanations must show how
the effects of a system bring about their own conditions through recursive feedback
mechanisms.82 A social system cannot determine itself because it does not possess agency.
Structure, on the other hand, does possess some agency, but it can determine the range of
possibility given at any moment in time.

82

For example, in world systems analysis one might read that the semi-periphery exists because the world system
“needs” it in order to diffuse tensions between the periphery and the core. For WST, this raises the thorny issue of
whether the triadic structure is merely an epiphenomenon or contingent by-product resulting from the activities of
nation-states or whether the world-system acts as a supra-national agent in its own right to generate conditions that
further its own reproduction.
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Summary and Comments
For Giddens, a pattern of relations (i.e. a "system") can be reconstituted across time, but he
denies that the system itself does any constituting. At the same time, individuals interacting with
others do not create system(s), but can only reproduce and perhaps modify it to some extent.
Here is where I think Giddens‟ theory needs clarification. 1) First, the concept of system or
structure should not be reified. I understand Giddens as saying that there is a singular system
that exists, or perhaps a range of such systems. In contrast, I propose that social patterns are also
models or hypotheses of social patterns. They are not given, but require interpretation, or a
reference frame. The more reference frames available for the analysis, the more possible
systems there are. A macro, social-system, in other words, exists always as a micro, individual
expectation (mental map or model).
This may seem like a minor point, but confusing our hypotheses of the big picture or the
"totality" for the real "big picture" is a common mistake and grave error. In a (second-order)
model of models, which is capable of processing complexity (including mutually contradictory
frames of reference), "system" is always "structurally coupled" to mental maps, in that a mind
has to hypothesize a system. This requires that the model include some people, exclude others,
and consider some relations, while excluding others. Social boundaries, however, are not
physical boundaries, but boundaries of Meaning. Importantly, the concept of system as
unintended consequences of action, or macro-pattern, is not itself a system. At this level of
theorizing, moreover, social system is not specified.
Second, it is unclear how system reconstitutes itself across time. What needs to be explained is
how unintended consequences of people's actions "cause" or bring about actions that bring
about those same unintended consequences. Figure 80 is a model of Gidden‟s model of the
feedback relation between individually motivated actions (“actions”) and the unintended
aggregate pattern of action (“system”). Notice, however, that in Giddens model individually
motivated actions reproduce the same unintended, aggregate pattern of action. As a
consequence, this is a circle rather than a spiral. The time dimension is left out. The aggregate
pattern remains invariant and the actions variable.
Consider the example of the English language, which Giddens regards as the collective
byproduct of speaking English. Giddens does not specify, however, how can an outcome be a
medium, and vice-versa. A tidal wave does not create the medium of ocean water. In my
opinion, English is not an invariant system in reality, but an invariant system held constant for
analytical purposes by an observer. The effects and consequences of action have to be
theoretically specified.
Speaking can be specified in a number of different ways, and speaking can be classified
according to a specification (or deviate from that specification to variable degrees), but the
speaking does not generate the model according to which an observer classifies it.
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Figure 80. Giddens. Feedback between action and system.

Figure 81. Giddens Structuration theory.

Figure 82. Giddens dynamic depiction of structuration.
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To specify, consider the following schematic depiction of Giddens‟ structuration model and
compare it with a dynamic reinterpretation, both of which are reconstructed from Leydesdorff
(2003). Notice that Giddens neglects to specify the relation between system and structure. In the
dynamic version, structure is advanced ahead in the time axis to indicate that it is virtual and not
present. The static depiction of Giddens and the dynamic reformulation by Leydesdorff are
presented in Figures 81 and 82.
Third, enablement and constraint are better and more precisely formulated as variation and
selection. If structure is not identical to what actually happened (historical instantiations) but
remains broader, then the concept when theoretically specified would necessarily refer to
actions that were possible but nevertheless not actualized, i.e. to de-selected cases. The
"structure" then is better understood as a phase space of possibilities for action. The theoretical
problem, however, is when Giddens, rather than viewing systems and actors themselves as the
generators of the constraint part of the formula "enable and constrain" (that is, as the selectors
of possibilities), equates the social structure with forces of constraint as well, which means that
the structure is a subset of the phase space of possible actions, distinguished from other actions
that are both a) not instantiated and b) not possibly instantiated at time t. The difference is one
between actions that are actually possible and those that are only theoretically possible, or
perhaps, conceivable. How does one distinguish between the two? One then wonders, why not
just include in the phase space, only those actions that are actually possible? The model is
incoherent: structure refers to both a set of possible actions that is larger than those actions that
are historically actualized, and is at the same time a constraint, that is, a subset of some
unspecified superset of possible actions.
Fourth, Giddens implicitly equates "structure" with a range or distribution of possibilities, but
does not distinguish these distributions for individual actors as opposed to multiple actors, nor
does he explicitly acknowledge that structure can only be made theoretically meaningful in the
context of a theory (entertained by a theorist/analyst) that posits the distribution as a selection
from other possible distributions. A distribution is by definition a variation, but from another
perspective, we can compare distributions, and understand the distributions themselves as
selections. To be enabled means to have possibilities, or "choices", and to be constrained means
that these choices are not infinite, and probably unequally weighted in terms of their likelihood.
Because Giddens' "social structure" is both enabling and constraining, it is by definition a
distribution. The two properties of variation (enablement) and constraint (selection), moreover,
presuppose two alternative frames of reference: in the former, a comparison is made between
alternatives within the distribution, while in the latter a comparison is made between this
distribution and other possible distributions, outside of it.
For example, when I speak English, I am instantiating, or selecting from certain words, but also
producing a variation. This can be viewed as a selection from within the distribution, specified
for example by a dictionary, of all the possible English words constituting "English" (as
specified by a hyper-reflexive observer). Individual action, however, from this perspective, can
only be understood as selection, or constraint, a subset. It can be viewed as variation only from
the perspective of the individual words. In speaking English I am not reproducing the structure
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as set, but only the system as subset. The structure has still to be specified as the unselected (but
possible) cases.
Furthermore, the 'phase space of possibilities' for actors taken individually isn't the same for the
phase space of possibilities for systems of actors, taken as an aggregate. Giddens wants to say
that the actions of multiple individuals are structurated at the same time by the same structure,
but are the possibilities specified for systems the same possibilities specified for individuals
(subsets) of that system? If not, then the structures are not identical. In other words, they are
different to the extent that we expect them to be. There is no causal mechanism to explain the
simultaneous transmission, or 'action at a distance' between individuals. If the same structure
exists to some extent "inside" different individuals at different places, how does this happen? If
we observe similarity between individuals, then mustn't this be explained via causal
mechanisms? The notion of a singular virtual structure structurating the actions of different
individuals at the same time can only be done by an analyst who distinguishes his or her own
observing from that of those being observed, and hence, places himself outside of, and external
to the latent pattern manifested by those he observes.
How are these unselected, unrealized possibilities specified? One could make reference to
multiple systems across time, mining for historical examples in order to expand the range of the
possible, but in doing so, one has also specified an instantiated historical system, albeit one with
broader temporal parameters. I do not generate English. The "structure" or the expanded superset of English requires analytical specification, a gestalt-switch, between seeing a
communication as one thing (a subset) in comparison to other possible things, or many things
(the set): because meaning itself is the distinction between the actual and the possible, any
meaningful statement will always be considered as a subset of other possible meaningful
statements. To say that I reproduce English as the super-set is incorrect. It is to confuse the
historical instantiation (singular "action" or plural "system") with its meaning (i.e. with the
counter-factual hypotheses as to what could have occurred, but didn't).
In Giddens' model, system is the plural of action. To reformulate my original query, does


where Rt = "structure" and a, b, c designate motivated actions by different individuals? The
answer is NO, because structure refers to the possible acts, that is, those actions not chosen or
selected (i.e. not instantiated historically) as well as those that were and which can be
reproduced. Formalize this as:

where A, B, and C refer to the set of actual and possible actions. The problem can be clarified by
specifying a distinction between system and environment. Ultimately, there is no outside to this
model. Society is a closed “system” consisting of action, structure, and system.
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In my view, it is more productive to regard structure as a slowly changing parameter or
condition of social communication that either may or may not be included in society as
communication. Whether or not this is part of society depends on whether society
communicates about it. The two media of communication and the constraints themselves,
however, should be kept analytically distinct.
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Mario Bunge: Everything is either a system or a part of a system
Introduction
Mario Bunge is the foremost exponent of systemism. Systemism is the view that the world, or
reality, is neither an unrelated aggregate of things nor an amorphous, undifferentiated blob.
Systemism “is the view that every thing is a system or a component of one" (2003: 40). He
adds: "only the universe is not connected to anything else- but it is a system rather than a mere
aggregate" (2003: 40). We today speak of solar systems, cardiovascular systems, digestive
systems, tributary systems, ecosystems, as well as social systems, but not prior to the 17th
century were the components of these systems understood as relating to one another in a
systemic way, that is, as generating emergent properties. Bunge even suggests that the concept
of system marks the genesis of modern society.
System means emergence, and vice versa. I will therefore begin with an explication of the latter.
Bunge provides several definitions of emergence. Emergence occurs whenever qualitative
novelty appears, such as when a pattern arises out of a mosaic (2003: 9). Emergence refers to
the appearance of a qualitatively new whole (2003: 16). Bunge also states that emergence refers
to the creation of a new global property that the components do not possess. More specifically,
Bunge defines emergence in the following way: "To say that P is an emergent property of
systems of kind K is short for 'P is a global [or collective or non-distributive] property of a
system of kind K, none of whose components or precursors possess P'" (2003: 15). He further
clarifies his definition with the following explanation: "No things, no properties thereof. Hence,
to ask properly how properties emerge amounts to asking how things with emergent properties
arise. In turn, this question boils down to the problem of emergence of mechanisms...." (15: my
emphasis). By contrast, submergence refers to the process by which emergent properties are
lost.
The above definition makes use of the concept of system. Bunge subsequently defines "system"
as "an object with a bonding structure" (2003: 20). A structure in terms refers to the relations
among its components, which can be classified as either bonding or non-bonding, where bonding
refers to "relations that make a difference to the relata" (20). According to Bunge, "new systems
are characterized by new properties, [or] in other words, emergence indicates system…" (20).
Importantly, emergent properties are global and not distributive. This means that wholes
possess properties that their parts lack. The new property cannot be located within some parts or
regions of parts and not others. For instance, the validity of an argument is a property possessed
by the argument as a whole and is irreducible to its component parts.

Social Systems and the CESM Model
Bunge in a series of articles and books espouses a systemic view of society that combines micro
and macro approaches, analysis and synthesis. He states that those who claim to be microindividualists are rarely consistent with their ontological claims because they almost always have
to make reference to social systems as unanalyzed wholes. Such wholes include "the market",
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NGO's, the state, and so on. Bunge states that any system can be characterized according to the
following quadruple, which he calls the CESM model: s=<C, E, S, M>, where:
C = Composition: Collection of all the parts of s;
E = Environment: Collection of items, other than those in s, that act on or are acted upon
by some of all components of s;
S = Structure: Collection or relations, in particular bonds, among components of s or
among these and items in its environment E;
M = Mechanism: Collection of processes in s that make it behave the way it does. (35)
Bunge devises this model as an alternative to the three definitions of systems that he cites as
most prominent in the literature. These are:
1) A system is a set, or collection of items, that behaves as a whole
2) A system is a structured set or collection
3) A system is a binary relation on a set of items of some kind, such as the input-output
pairs in a black box
The first is deficient because it does not point to the emergent propreties that make the system
behave as a whole, and also because sets are not collections because the latter are concrete and
can change over time whereas sets are concepts whose composition is fixed. The second is
incomplete because it fails to specify the relations that hold the constituents together. The third
is incomplete in part because internal stimuli are as important as external stimuli with respect to
systemic changes. In practice, this model is unwieldy. Accordingly, it is usually sufficient to
explore these different components of the system at a single level.
Bunge understands systemism as an alternative to both organicism, or holism, and microreductionism, or individualism. Bunge states that:
Everything, save the universe, is connected to something else and embedded in
something else. However, not everything is tied to everything else, and not all bonds are
equally strong: this renders partial isolation possible, and enables us to study some
individual things without taking into consideration the rest of the universe. This
qualification distinguishes systemism from holism, or the block-universe doctrine (2003:
41).
It is not apparent, however, in what ways everything is a system or a component of one, since
one can imagine that a thing can be related to another thing in a way that makes no difference to
either, such as being related by physical proximity.
This view of reality is directly applicable to the study of society. Bunge sees his version of
systemism as a compromise between top-down approaches and bottom-up approaches, that is, as
a way of bridging the micro-macro divide. On the one hand, individualists hold that reference to
individual actions is sufficient for explaining macro-level patterns, while on the other hand,
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holists regard the pattern as primary and explain individual agency on the basis of an
internalization of these patterns via processes of socialization.
Bunge illustrates the kind of micro-macro analysis-synthesis he proposes in terms of what he
calls "Boudon-Coleman diagrams" such as the following:



Reference is made to both micro and macro phenomena, and of course, middle-range phenomena
in between these levels may also be included. In the above example, economic growth, a macrophenomenon, contributes directly both to old-age security as well as population stagnation. Oldage security, meanwhile, a micro-level phenomenon, contributes to a decline in fertility, which in
turn contributes to population stagnation. This constitutes a path model of direct and indirect
influences that are heterogenous in scale. In short, he advocates a multifactorial approach.

Specifying the concept of Emergence
Next, I will review in some detail Bunge‟s theoretical efforts to specify the concept of emergence
in an analytically rigorous manner. The comments that follow are not provided in any necessary
order. In addition, my comments regarding specific passages placed in brackets {} so that the
reader can more easily follow the logic of the overall exposition. Comments in brackets are
excursions.
First, there is a difference between ontological emergence and epistemological emergence.
Ontological emergence refers to the appearance of qualitative novelty (14), whereas
epistemological emergence refers to our inability to predict the emergence of higher order
novelty from lower levels. It is important not to confuse the two because the former need not
imply the latter. In many cases, we can explain precisely the mechanisms by which emergence
occurs; it need not be mysterious.
Second, there are no properties-in-themselves. Instead properties are all possessed by "some
individual or n-tuple of individuals" (14). Third, there are no negative or disjunctive properties,
such as saying that a person is not a smoker. Saying that someone possesses the property of
being a non-smoker is, according to Bunge, the equivalent of saying that a person possesses the
property of being a non-whale. Properties must be distinguished from predicates.
Fourth Bunge maintains that only events cause anything: "the relation of efficient causation
holds only among events" (2003: 14). Events are "changes of state" whereas processes are
"sequences of state" (2003: 27). Fifth, in addition, to objects or things, processes may also
emerge and submerge. Sixth, there is no emergence ex nihilo. Finally, evolutionary processes
are continuous in some respects and discontinuous in others, making gradualism and
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saltationism one-sided (2003: 18).
The part-whole relation between two objects can be clarified as a condition in which there exist
two objects, a and b, where a is a part if it "adds nothing to b" (2003: 10). For example, Bunge
remarks that the number 1 is a part of any number because 1*b=b. Also, he states that adding a
membrane to a cell (which already has a membrane) "results in the same cell" (2003: 10). 83
Moreover, Bunge distinguishes two ways in which objects may be "joined". These two means of
joining or relating objects and their characteristics are presented in Table 7.
Synonyms for association include aggregates, juxtaposition, concatentation, clumping, and
accretion (2003: 10). Associations are exemplified by crowds of people or the accretion of dust
particles. Objects joined together by association do not exhibit strong cohesion, and possess a
modular structure, as opposed to an integral structure. Furthermore, the relations they enter into
do not change the nature of their components.
Accordingly, combinations are said to differ from associations in at least three respects. First,
the original items are changed so that a distinction can be made between the original precursors
and the resultant constituents of the new whole. Second, these combinations are more cohesive

Table 7. Mario Bunge. Combination and Association.

Association

Combination

Mixture

Fusion

Modular (structure)

Integral (structure)

weak cohesion

stronger cohesion

Components unchanged
(precursors)

Components altered
(precursors --> new constituents)

less energy/time required

more energy/time required

more probable

less probable

Non-Bonding structure

Bonding structure

Non-System

System

Non-Emergence
combinatorial/quantitative novelty
*(over time may lead to qualitative novelty)

Emergence
qualitative novelty
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This explanation is somewhat questionable. For instance, we can add rather than multiply 1 to a number and it
will result in a new number. We would then need to distinguish what we mean by "adds something to b." For
instance, presumably adding a cell membrane to a cell would result in a cell with two cell membranes, a rather
radical emergence of novelty. Similarly, we can "add" one person to society, and we are of course adding one
person to the society, even though if we mean by "society" the "set of all persons" we are perhaps not altering its
definition.
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and therefore stable than mere aggregates. Third, combinations require more time and energy
and are therefore less probable than aggregates.
{{Bunge does not make explicit whether aggregation is synonymous with non-bonding
relations between relata, although I presume this is the case, since a non-bonding relation
is one that does not make a difference to the relata. This distinction is one between
relations that do not make a difference and relations that do make a difference. Who
decides, however, which relations do and do not make a difference? Presumably the
former means that the relata or constituents are themselves changed. This relies,
however, on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and also on the
distinction between properties and things.
For example, a cup that is "next to" a hat relates them in terms of spatial contiguity but
makes no (real) difference to either. Of course, we can say there is a difference between
a hat placed next to a cup and a hat placed next to a piano, but in this case, this would
presumably not be a "difference that makes a difference" (using Bateson's formula for
information) to the hat (or piano) itself. If this is the case, then aggregates are not
systems, because systems are objects structured by bonding relations.}}
Emergence can be distinguished in other ways such as absolute/relative and natural/artificial.
Absolute emergence refers to the first time a new emergent unity (with a global property) is
exhibited, whereas relative emergence refers to the reproduction of unities of the same kind.
Bunge gives the example of the invention of a car and its later manufacture by industry. The
car's invention would be its absolute emergence, whereas newly manufactured cars would be
considered relative emergents (13). In addition, artificial emergence is distinguished from
"natural" emergence or self-organization (autopoiesis). Artificial organization is man-made
emergence, or emergence by design. Natural and artificial processes of emergence can also
combine, as when a seed becomes a tree that is used to produce paper. We can add other
distinctions, such as the one between diachronic and synchronic emergence discussed by
Kontopoulos (2006).
Finally, Bunge alludes to a distinction between association and combinations as processes and as
(synchronic) relations, but he does not make this explicit. For instance, new "wholes" may come
into being by association, but they only generate novelty of the "combinatorial" type; that is, the
components are not themselves changed in the process, such as changing the location of the hat.
Another example is a crowd of people joined together because of some external event.
Associations or mixtures lack structure. Beyond certain thresholds, however, qualitative novelty
can emerge.84 Bunge gives the following example: Dust --> Pebbles --> Boulders -->
Planetesimals --> Planets (27).
{{First, Bunge does not render explicit how accretion changes the properties of the
components. For instance, does becoming part of a planet change the dust particle that
combined with other such particles to generate the planet? In what sense is this
qualitative as opposed to quantitative? Notice also that Bunge in his more formal
definition distinguishes properties from things, and defines emergence in terms of new
84

Engels referred to this as the "transformation of quantity into quality."
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properties, but seems at times to contravene this premise.
Bunge remarks that the process of accretion, for instance, can generate bonding structures
or at least make them possible, as when two people meet in this crowd and fall in love,
thereby "bonding." This presumably constitutes a new system in which each is
transformed over time. But note that the mere repetition of accretion does not in itself
generate a coupling or bonding relation. Placing two people in the same subway station
repeatedly, say over a million times, will in all likelihood fail to generate this coupling
relation, and might not generate any bonding relations whatsoever. It is therefore not
sufficient to say that accretion is an efficient cause of emergence. Even if we take
Bunge's admonition that only events (changes of states) cause anything, this amounts to
saying that differences (changes) co-relate with other differences (changes). Differences
are transported or trans-formed across media. The problem of infinite regress appears
here, but I merely want to point out the important difference between saying that
aggregation can cause emergence or make it possible, a difference that Bunge avoids
specifying.
This example is also instructive because Bunge himself uses it and because it implies that
relations or interactions between persons can generate new emergent properties, that is,
inter-personal systems. In what ways, do these types of relations change the persons
involved? What, exactly, is transformed? It is obvious that it isn't the body per se,
although there are certainly corporeal and emotional effects (e.g. the physiological
symptoms of a 'broken heart'). In addition, this new bonding isn't physical or material in
the sense of their being a permanent or enduring co-presence. Two persons in love need
not be physically interacting and certainly need not be physically interacting at all times.
The same can be said of any social relation. In other words, the social relation is
irreducible to biophysiology, (i.e. to the minds and brains of individuals) and need not
imply spatial contiguity.}
Bunge distinguishes between intrinsic (global) and relational (contextual) emergence. The
former refers to the global property of a new emergent unity, whereas the latter refers to the
relational properties that components receive when they enter a new unity, that is, when they
become components parts of an emergent unity. Examples of the latter include a person who
becomes a worker and therefore enters into an employer-employee relation. Bunge writes that
the relation is not intrinsic to the person because it is conceivable that he would maintain his
identity after extricating himself from the relation and losing that particular relational property.
This raises the question: what distinguishes an emergent complex unity from an emergent
property acquired by a simple unity through its relation to another unity? In other words, is there
a single criterion for distinguishing simple and complex unities? The distinction hinges on the
location of the emergent property.
Contra Bunge, individuals entering into bonding relations can generate both global and
relational emergent properties. They are global because they affect and make a difference to
both components and are relational because in other respects, they do not change or alter the
identity of these components. The most important ordering distinctions in this exposition appear
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to be the ones between properties of things and the things themselves (property/thing), and also
that between qualitative and quantitative appearances (qualitative/quantitative). These
distinctions, along with the numerous others just mentioned, could be further elaborated and
problematized but doing so would only reveal, to the extent than an inference can be secured
from habit, the contingency of distinctions. The contingency of distinctions means there are no
essential differences, at least not from the perspective of observing different differences. This in
turn implies that this observing is constituted by its own 'unity of a difference' that makes a
difference (i.e. which matters), and which remains constant, for the time being. Bunge has
offered the most comprehensive account of system and its relation to material emergence to date,
and his exposition of social scientific methods suitable for the study of social systems is clearly
insightful. It is my contention that his objectivist stance, however, overlooks the non-objectivist,
or imaginary, dimensions of social life that are derivative of meaning. His approach could
therefore be supplemented by a reading of Luhmann.
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Talcott Parsons’s theory of the social system
According to Fararo (1989), the systems idea became important to American theoretical
sociology primarily through the influence of Parsons, who began to develop systems theoretical
approaches to sociology in the early 1930s at Harvard.85 Parsons inherited the system concept
primarily through the influence of Wilfred Pareto.
Parsons states in The Social System (1951/1962) that the fundamental premise of his theory is
that it is possible to treat the interaction of individual actors as a system. Accordingly, a social
system is defined as:
the system generated by any process of interaction, on the socio-cultural level, between
two or more „actors.‟ The actor is either a concrete human individual (a person) or a
collectivity of which a plurality of persons are members. A person or a collectivity
participates in a given system of interaction not usually with its whole individual or
collective „nature‟ or set of motives or interests, but only with that sector relevant to this
specific interaction system. Sociologically we call such a sector a role (Parsons and
Smelser 1954: 8)86
The elementary unit of analysis in the theory of social systems as conceptualized by Parsons is
not the actor qua agent, but rather, actions. Fararo emphasizes that: "it is not enduring actors
that are the elementary units of the action frame of reference, but acts. The actor is treated as
one analytical aspect of the act, along with the end element" (2001: 88). Moreover, systems are
boundary-maintaining: "relative to its environment, that is, to fluctuations in the factors of the
environment, it maintains certain constancies of pattern, whether this constancy be static or
moving" (Parsons 1951: 482).
Importantly, however, action "does not consist only of ad hoc 'responses' to a particular
situational 'stimuli' but [rather] the actor develops a system of 'expectations' relative to the
various objects of the situation" (1951: 5). For this reason, Parsons speaks of an integration of
action expectations, or orientations. 87 Parsons distinguishes between passive expectations,
which he calls "anticipations", and expectations which are actively pursued, which he calls
"goals" (1951: 8). A system of orientations means that there is "selective ordering among the
possibilities of orientation" (Parsons 1951: 7; my emphasis). For instance, one does not orient

85

Also at Harvard during the 1930s, Homans devised alternative systems approaches via the influence of Henderson
and Whitehead.
86
That the entire personality is not incorporated into any given social role presages Niklas Luhmann‟s axiom that
individuals remain parts of society‟s environment.
87
Fararo retains this emphasis on the latent, unobservable states of mind in interaction, regarded as dynamically
changing propensities of action: "In sum , EST [E-state structuralism, or expectations state structuralism] focuses on
underlying or latent relational states that can be interpreted as relational orientations of actors in the sense of
Parsons (1951)" (326).
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oneself to one's boss in a work situation as one does to one's child in a domestic or family
situation. 88

Parsons model of functional differentiation
According to Parsons, any social system must solve or orient itself to four functional problems.
The thesis of functional differentiation states that systems tend toward structural differentiation
in accordance with these four functional problems. Parsons writes that: “our most general
proposition is that total societies tend to differentiate into sub-systems (social structures) which
are specialized in each of the four primary functions.” (1956: 47). These four functional
imperatives are:
G -goal-attainment, which “realizes the primary orientation of the system in question”;
A- adaptation; which “meets certain situational exigencies, either by adjusting in the face
of inflexible reality demands or actively transforming the environmental features in
question”;
I- integration; which “regulates the inter-relationships between the already-differentiated
adapative, goal-attainment and latency subsectors, mitigates the level of distinct
differentiation of each that obtains, and in general promotes harmonious interaction”; and
finally
L- latent pattern maintenance, which “renews the motivational and cultural patterns
integral to the interaction of the system as a whole” (1956: 197)
Parsons identifies each of these four functional imperatives with a sub-system of society. The
economy serves the adaptive function; the polity serves the goal-attainment function; an
integrative sub-system serves the integration function; and a cultural-motivational system serves
the function of latent pattern maintenance.
Importantly, these are analytical, rather than concrete distinctions. Parsons insists that “it is
incorrect, as we have pointed out repeatedly, to identify any concrete class of organizations or
their orientations exclusively with any one functionally differentiated sub-system” (Parsons and
Smelser 1956: 61). Table 8 is a matrix identifying these four functions and their corresponding
sub-systems, adapted from Parsons and Smelser (1956).
Whereas the meaning of these four system problems does not change across or within systems,
their content does. For instance, whether or not these functions are performed by a single,
concrete institution (or by a single role within an institution) or whether a single institution (or
role) performs several functions simultaneously depends on the historical and cultural
circumstances. This distinction is formulated as a distinction between analytical sub-systems, on
the one hand, and concrete structure, on the other (1954: 54).

88

Luhmann later picks up and amplifies this emphasis upon selection as the mechanism of complexity reduction that
constitutes a necessary precondition for the autopoiesis of systems as they distinguish themselves from their
environments.
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Table 8. Parson's AGIL schema.

A

G

Economy
L
Latent Pattern-maintenance and TensionManagement Sub-System
(Cultural-Motivational System)
(e.g. household)

Polity
I
Integrative Sub-system

In modern society, however, functional imperatives tend to be handled by separate institutions. I
will focus on the function performed by the polity and the economy, both of which have special
importance for developing a systems-theoretical understanding of the recent debt crisis. The
polity refers to the political sub-system in a broad sense. Parsons and Smelser label this
functional sub-system the polity because it is not coterminous with governmental structure
(1954: 47). Political goals and values, however, do tend to have “primacy over others in an
organ of government”, just as economic goals tend to have primacy in a business organization
(1954: 48).

Three criticisms of Parsonian structural-functionalism
I will address a few criticisms that pertain specifically to Parsons‟s structural-functionalism, but
which also pertain to Luhmann‟s theory as well. This list is not exhaustive. First, I will relay an
observation made by Alvin Gouldner on Parsons‟s style of writing. In The coming crisis of
Western sociology (1970), Gouldner argues that Parsons is above-all a metaphysician interested
in showing, through his conceptualizing drive and rhetorical style, an image of the one-ness of
the social world. He is therefore akin to Auguste Comte. Gouldner suggests that Parsons is
basically not interested in being understood, not even among his colleagues, and that his obscure
prose is more like a private memo than a publication. Gouldner argues the success of his obscure
style of prose can be explained sociologically from the prestige of his Harvard affiliation from a
break down in the social controls and norms within academia. Colleague's who don't understand
his work are more likely to blame themselves, simply because they know that they are reading
Parsons.
Second, Parsons conceptual schema is entirely formal (i.e. without content), and is laid out in
advance. They are, as he emphasizes, merely analytical constructs. Empirical phenomena do
not fit into mutually exclusive categories, nor does he adhere to standards of parsimony. Instead,
empirical phenomena fit into numerous "analytical" categories. His criterion for
conceptualization appears to be that empirical cases fit into at least one such analytical category.
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As Gouldner explains, however, just because a concept or distinction can apply to numerous
cases does not mean that it is useful or insightful. For example, one could say that people can be
divided into the categories of having red hair or not having red hair, and then discover that the
same category would apply to dogs or horses. Does this make it more meaningful or relevant,
than say, balding or not-balding? Ultimately, Gouldner argues that Parsons‟s categories have not
been demonstrated to be more suitable for explaining (the variation in) any empirical subject
area, than any other set of categories. As argued by Nicos Mouzelis (1995), Parsonian general
theory, like all general theory, runs the risk of being either trivial or wrong.
Third, in Parsons‟s model, the AGIL scheme recurs within each sub-system (and within each
sub-sub-system). Within the economy, for instance, the AGIL functions are identified as: Aa
investment subsystem; Ag production subsystem; AI organizational subsystem; and AL, the
economic commitments subsystem. Table 9 is a representation of this nested, recursive
structure of the AGIL schema within the economic sub-system, adapted from Parsons and
Smelser (1954: 196-204).
The fourfold AGIL schema is supposed to apply to both concrete groups/collectivities and
abstract institutional wholes (e.g. economy, polity, kinship, etc). This presents a problem, for
the economy is not in itself an actually existing collectivity, but rather, an analytical construct.
As pointed out by Mouzelis, however, only collectivities must meet the functional imperatives
described by the AGIL schema in order to survive. The mistake Parsons makes is then to move
from the AGIL schema to the agil schema, in which each sub-system, as an analytical category,
must meet the imperatives of reproduction. Mouzelis (1995) writes that the Achilles‟ heel of
Parsonian functionalism is the application of the AGIL logic to social wholes or subwholes that
are not collectivities” (89).
According to Mouzelis (1995):
[I]t is perfectly legitimate to say that a car factory, as a relatively self-contained
configuration of producers, has four basic reproduction requirements: AGIL. [But not an
imperative to reproduce! Perhaps it is only an accident that it does so!] It is equally
legitimate to conceptualize the factory‟s adaptation subsystem (A) as an analytic
category, grouping under its heading all institutionalized norms dealing with the factory‟s
resource-acquisition problem (norms about the recruitment of personnel, acquisition of
raw materials, of financial capital, etc). But when Parsons goes a step further and
subdivides the factory‟s adaptation subsystem into for sub-systems (A --> a, g, i, l), then
this is not acceptable. For the adaptation subsystem, in so far as it does not refer to
a concrete subcollectivity, is simply an analytic category, and as such has no
functional requirements that have to be met for it to survive.” (88).
In short, analytical systems do not possess requirements of survival because they exist only as
analytical, rather than real, systems. Accordingly, their “survival” depends only on having
imagined them into existence by a structural-functionalist.
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Mouzelis proposes instead that each sub-system of society representing the AGIL schema be
decomposed into three analytical sub-divided into the Marxian dimensions of technological
relations (“forces of production”), appropriative relations (“relations of production”) and
ideological justifications/representations of these relations. The concept of forces of production
refers to material tools, knowledge, “capital”, and the technical rather than political division of
labor. The concept of relations of production refers to appropriative, institutionalized rules that
regulate the ways in which technologies are controlled (e.g. private property, markets, etc.) And
ideology refers to normatively regulated processes which legitimate or distort the way this is
done.
A summary of the recommended revisions to Parsonian theory are provided in Table 10 and is
adapted from Mouzelis (1995). Mouzelis‟s view is useful because the technological component
can also include the physico-material components of production, including geophysical
limitations to material growth. This category can also accommodate the focus by Bruno Latour
and Actor Network Theory (ANT) on nonhuman agency, and the generic concept of actants.
Table 9. Internal Structure of the Economy.

A(a)
Investment-Capitalization Sub-System
a
*guarantee of
liquidity (e.g. stock
exchange)

g
prod. of prod.
capacity

l
*flow of credit and
capital

i
long-term vs shorterm balance

A(l)
Economic Commitments to…

A(g)
Production Sub-System
a
financing

g
marketing

l
technical prod.

i
prod. coordination

A(i)
Entrepreneurial Sub-System

a
long-term
productivity

g
productivity

a
financing of
innovation

g
new combinations of
factors of prod.

l
economic values
(economic
rationality)

i
planned allocation of
resources

l
flow of resources
(mobility, flexibility)

i
opportunity for
innovation
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Moreover, the ideological component need not refer exclusively to “false consciousness” but to
the“medium through which men make their history as conscious actors” (Therborn 1980: 3); or
“that aspect of the human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious
actors in a world that makes sense to them to varying degrees.(2)” Ideology is thus “the medium
through which this consciousness and meaningfulness operate” (Therborn 1980: 2). According
to this broad understanding then, Luhmann‟s analysis can be understood as occurring from
within the dimension of ideology, that is, of meaning. Keeping this in mind, I discuss
Luhmann‟s model of society as an autopoeitic system of communication below.
Table 10. Proposed revisions to Parsonian theory.

Parsonian theory

Propsed restructuring

1. AGIL subdivision applies to all social
systems (collectivities and not)
2. Each institutional sub-system (A,G,I,L) can
be further subdivided into four subsubsystems: A agil; G  agil, etc.

AGIL subdivision makes sense only when
applied to collectivities
Each institutional subsytem must be
conceptualized in terms of its technological,
appropriative, and ideological dimension: A 
t, a‟, i‟; G  t, a‟, i‟, etc.
... leads to strategic conduct analysis

3. Incompatibilities between a, g, i, l do not
lead to analysis in terms of „strategic conduct‟
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Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems
Whereas Parsons understands the social system as composed of actions, Luhmann regards social
systems as constituted by communications. Whereas for Parsons, sub-systems are regarded as
merely analytical constructs, for Luhmann they are real, albeit self-referential systems. Whereas
for Parsons the environment of social sub-systems refer to the other components of society, for
Luhmann the environment of a society, as the social system par excellence, is whatever is not
social, i.e. not communication.

Society as the autopoeitic communication of meaning
According to Luhmann‟s theory, social systems are constituted as autopoeitic communicative
events. Society, as the superset of all social systems (which include interactions, organizations,
and societal sub-systems such as the economy) is “everything that is communication” (1995:
408). Rather than thinking of communication as a kind of action that an individual may pursue,
Luhmann regards (social) action as an attribution performed by and within communication.
Accordingly, he defines the social system as “communications and their attributions as actions”
(1995: 174: my emphasis).
Persons are thus part of the environment of social systems. To put it succinctly, “society equally
excludes all people” (Lee and Brosziewski 2009: 53). That human minds are part of the
environment of society does not imply that there is no relation between them. Luhmann posits
that they are joined (“structurally coupled”) together because both psychic and social systems
process meaning. Both psychic systems and communications systems process meaning, but with
different aims. Following Husserl and the phenomenological tradition, Luhmann posits that
meaning is constituted through the distinction between actual and possible. 89
Both psychic and social systems process meaning through the use of symbolic generalizations.
Meaning is structurally determined and operationally closed. Any characterization or
description presupposes meaning. Meaning appears as a concept “devoid of difference” (1995:
60) because it cannot be negated. For example, the theme of “meaninglessness” is still
meaningful within meaning. This does not mean that meaning is all there is, but meaning always
processes the underlying reality according to its own internal structures.
Luhmann‟s theory specifies that social communication as autopoeitic. The term autopoiesis is
derived from the Argentinian biologist Humberto Maturana, who introduced the term in his 1970
book The Biology of Cognition. Autopoiesis literally means self-creation and is synonymous
with circularity, recursion, and self-referentiality (Luhmann 2000). Luhmann provides the
following definition:
[Autopoeisis] refers to (autopoietic) systems that reproduce all the elementary
components out of which they arise by means of a network of these elements themselves
89

Luhmann writes that Meaning “can be defined as a medium that is generated by a surplus of indications of others
options. In the final instance all meaning thus resides in the distinction of actuality versus potentiality” (Risk 2005:
17). Accordingly, I would argue that semantic meaning is a special case of meaning in general.
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and in this way distinguish themselves from an environment- whether this takes the form
of life, consciousness or (in the case of social systems) communication. Autopoiesis is
the mode of reproduction of these systems. (1989: 143)
Maturana and Varela (1980) introduced the concept of autopoiesis as a criterion for
distinguishing between life and non-life. Previous answers to this question included vitalism;
cybernetics and control theory, which posited that living systems exhibited goal-directed
behaviors via negative feedback; and classifications consisting of lists of necessary
characteristics. Vitalism was rejected because of its perceived mysticism; negative feedback
insufficiently distinguished life from machines; and finally, any list of essential characteristics
presumed that which needed to be explained.
Maturana and Varela proposed instead that individual autonomy is an essential feature of life.
Living systems are non-teleological, that is, they have as their purpose the creation and
maintenance of themselves, rather than the production of something else. Organisms are bounded
and self-defined. This focuses on living organisms, rather than say, the transmissions of genes.
Note that it is possible for a cell to survive denucleation whereas no living cell can survive
without its membrane, distinguishing its "self" from its surrounding environment.
Autopoietic systems are characterized by both structural determinism and organizational
closure. The former refers to the idea that changes within a system are ultimately determined by
the system itself, and not to external causes in its environment. Factors in the environment can
only act as triggers of system-generating events, but how the system responds is up to the system
alone. Mingers writes that, “What does or does not affect the organism and the nature of any
effect is determined by its structure” (31). Berries, for instance, may be poisonous to humans, but
they are not intrinsically poisonous. The concept of organizational closure means that all of the
activities of a system must generate further activity only within itself. Nervous systems, immune
systems, and social systems can be regarded as organizationally closed.
Organizationally closed systems can also be interactively open. For instance, a computer
program is a structure-determined system that is interactively open and organizationally closed.
The structure of the program determines the responses that it will generate, but these responses
are sensitive to variations in the triggering signal that it receives. Furthermore, the concept of
autopoiesis gives rise to a reformulation of the idea of adaptation, since the environment does not
specify the adaptive changes will occur. Instead of adaptation, Maturana and Varela posit
structural coupling, a term also borrowed by Luhmann. The concept of system employed by
Luhmann therefore does not refer to determinate systems such as machines. 90
In Figure 83 I present a useful typology of systems, derived from Mingers (1995: 13). For
Maturana and Varela, the concept of autopoeisis refers exclusively to living systems. Niklas
90

Luhmann writes that determinate systems (e.g. machines), “presuppose a unique environment which has been
tailored to them, and lends them necessary support… They cannot survive in an indifferent or hostile environment
(1982: 38). Elsewhere, Luhmann notes that the “minimal condition for communication (however poorly coded) to
come about is, of course, that the part of ego be played by a system that is not completely determined by its own past
and so can react to information as such” (1995: 143).
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Luhmann, however, extends the concept of autopoiesis to include meaning systems consisting of
nonphysical, temporal events such as communications and thoughts. Luhmann suggests that we
view life only as a special type of autopoiesis.91 Contra Maturana and Varela therefore,
Luhmann uses the concept of autopoiesis to describe not only physical systems, but also psychic
systems (qua thoughts) and social systems (qua communications). The elements of the social
systems are consequently communicative events. In contrast to living systems, social systems
“have to produce their own decay” (1990: 9). The basic elements of communication are events
that “vanish as soon as they appear…. Events cannot be accumulated” (1990: 9).
What consequences are there for the application of the concept of autopoiesis to
communications? The first immediate implication is that “society” as communication, cannot
consist of physical productions, but must instead refer to the production of communications by
means of communications. Autopoeitic systems are a subset of self-organizing systems. For
Luhmann, autopoeitic systems are so defined because they produce their own elements that
constitute them as distinct systems. Luhmann clarifies this point by saying that “everything that
is used as a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself” and that this applies to
elements, processes, structures, boundaries, and the system as a whole (1990: 3).

Structurally
Determined
Crystals, chloroplasts,
automobiles

Organizationally
Closed
Immune systems,
nervous systems

Autopoietic
Self-producing cells

Figure 83. Autopoeitic, organizationally closed, and structurally determined systems.
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To arrive at a general theory of autopoiesis that would apply to non-living autopoietic systems, Luhmann writes
that we would need to abstract from this special case and view autopoiesis as a general form “using self-referential
closure” (1990: 2).
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Autopoeitic systems are circular and self-referential. A part of a system is a part of a system
because it is so defined and constituted by the system that defines the part and itself.
Consequently, it is actually imprecise and misleading to say that Luhmann‟s theory is a theory of
autopoeitic systems, for his theory is a self-referential system, predicated on a dynamically
constituted distinction between itself and environment. His theory presupposes the existence of
self-referential systems. 92 It is not a description of autopoeisis, but rather, its self-inclusive
theoretical demonstration.93 A pictorial illustration of the concept can be found in M.C. Escher's
“Drawing Hands” (1948), depicted in Figure 84.
The “reproduction” of autopoeitic systems does not refer to the generation of copies or
offspring: an organism that cannot reproduce in this sense, such as a mule, is still alive. Rather,
autopoeitic systems are self-constituting in the sense that a biological cell consists of dynamic
processes that create both the cell and its component parts simultaneously via distinction and
selection. The function of an autopoieitic system is the production of the conditions for its own
reconstitution.94
Autopoeisis means both the autonomy of existence, (i.e. it has no other higher purpose than its
existence as a process of existing), and the existence of autonomy (by virtue of the fact that it
exists). Systems that are subordinated to something else are allopoeitic (Mingers 1995). For
example, biological life is auto-poeitic whereas a factory is allo-poeitic. One can imagine,
however, a factory operating as an autopoietic entity, if it were to continuously repair itself from
the damages incurred during its activity of self-reparation, and in addition, if this were its highest
purpose.

Figure 84. M.C. Escher's "Drawing Hands" as a depiction of Autopoeisis.

92

The opening line of Social Systems, chapter 1 reads: “The following considerations assume that there are systems”
(1995: 12); on the next page he adds: “Our thesis, namely, that there are systems, can now be narrowed down to:
there are self-referential systems” (13).
93
Moreover, Luhmann is well aware that, according to Kurt Gödel‟s incompleteness theorem, his own theory can be
either complete and inconsistent (paradoxical), or consistent and incomplete.
94
Luhmann has a similar, dynamic formulation: “the only function of the system's structure is to make the
perpetual changing and regaining of [selective] coordinations probable” (1995: 138).
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Luhmann‟s adoption of the concept of autopoeisis as a description of social systems, and not just
living systems, is controversial and raises a number of problems. Luhmann‟s theory is in many
ways a means of processing and solving these problems from within in a way that doesn‟t lead to
a theoretical dead end. The first obvious problem is addressing in what way society produces or
creates the elements which constitute it? This makes no sense if we regard society as people.
Society does not produce people in any more than a metaphorical sense. For Luhmann,
however, society consists of communications, or more precisely, communicative events that
vanish as soon as they appear. But if communications autopoeitically reproduce each other, it
ultimately means that humans don‟t communicate! On the contrary, “only communication can
communicate” (2002: 156). The mind only “participates in communication as structurally
determined system and as a medium” (2002: 176).95 Furthermore, if communication is
autopoeitic, it means that communication has no inherent telos, no goal, and no purpose, other
than to communicate, which it either accomplishes or fails to accomplish. Societal autopoeisis is
the “on-going self renewal” of social communication (1995: 434).
Communication is an emergent unity that arises, for Luhmann, as a synthesis of three selections:
information, utterance, and understanding (or misunderstanding). An exceptionally clear and
succinct summary of how communication emerges is provided by Luhmann (2002):
Like life and consciousness, communication is also an emergent reality, a self-generated
state of affairs. It comes about through the synthesis of three different selections,
namely, the selection of information, the selection of the utterance of this information,
and selective understanding or misunderstanding of this utterance and its information.
None of these components can appear on its own. Only together do they generate
communication. Only together: that means, only when their selectivity can be brought to
congruence. Communication therefore takes place only when a difference of utterance
and information is first understood. This distinguishes it from a mere perception of
others’ behavior. By understanding, communication grasps a difference between the
information value of its content and the reasons for which the content is being uttered
(157: my emphasis).
The use of the term “understanding” [verstehen] means that a communication is understood as a
communication, or in other words, that it is recognized as a communication. First, it must be
distinguished from other perceptions. It must be noticed. Second, what is noticed has to be
recognized as two concurrent selections: what the message is (information), and how this
message is expressed (utterance). Both are regarded as motivated selections that are necessarily
contingent, in the sense that they could have been otherwise. When we observe any
communication, we can choose to focus on or respond to, either the message itself or its means
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Consider for example how we choose to join in already ongoing conversations or discourses about already
established themes and topics, and how, moreover, once initiating, a conversation can seem to steer itself.

154

of expression. Consequently, communicating about something is always also a way of
communicating about oneself and about the others that one addresses 96.
The elementary unit of analysis, communication, is therefore inherently social, unlike action.
Luhmann compares the traditional view of the boundaries of social systems (e.g. Simmel) to a
game of tennis, where a line separates actors. In the view of social systems, however, different
boundaries emerge.
If expressions aren‟t observed as being motivated (i.e. selected), then they are not observed as
communications and hence, don‟t communicate. Luhmann thus underscores the importance of
the observer of communication. 97 Communication is therefore not a transmission of anything,
but an interpretation of a sequence of events.98 Communication does not occur except insofar as
it is observed, i.e. inferred to exist. It cannot be observed directly. Moreover, communication
occurs even when no communication is intended, or vice versa: communication is not
guaranteed even when it is attempted. Thus, whether or not communication happens or not is
achieved not by the intentions or actions of the sender of the communication, but is rather a
consequence of the inference made by an observer who is open to the possibility of
communicating.
For example, a cough, for instance, can signify ill health, and is therefore meaningful, but this is
not communication. A cough can become a communication, however, if it is interpreted as a
selected behavior that indicates a message, as for example a cough chosen to indicate annoyance
or one's physical presence. It can even be misread as a communication, when in fact it was not
intended as such, and even this misunderstanding might generate subsequent communication.
Once communication has been understood, moreover, even the attempt not to communicate can
be regarded as communication, so long as the one who initiated the communication expects a
response.99 Within the context of an interaction:
If alter perceives that alter is being perceived and that this perception of being perceived
is perceived, alter must assume that alter‟s behavior is interpreted as communication
whether this suits alter or not, and this forces alter to control the behavior as
communication. Even the communication of not wanting to communicate is
communication…. In practice, one cannot not communicate in an interaction system; one
must withdraw if one wants to avoid communication (1995: 413).
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This theme is developed by Bateson (1972) who distinguishes between information and meta-information. The
latter is roughly synonymous with “utterance” in Luhmann‟s theory. Meta-information is the information about the
relationship that one is attempting to establish with the audience while communication. This takes the form of an
implied command. For interactions involving physical co-presence, much of this information is conveyed via body
language. See also Watzlawick (et al. 1967), who formulates this distinction as one between digital and analogic
communication.
97
Luhmann states that “communication emerges only to the extent that this suggestion is picked up, that its
stimulation is processed” (1995: 139).
98
Heinz von Foerster defines communication between persons as "an (internal) representation of a relation between
(an internal representation of) oneself with somebody else” (1984[2003]: 268). Communication must therefore be
posited, or inferred, and from the standpoint of an observer. Von Foerster's rendering of the concept of
communication bears a striking resemblance to Luhmann's later formulation.
99
This paradox is discussed at length in Watzlawick (et al. 1967).
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Communication is an emergent unity. 100 It is constituted as the unity of three selections,
information, utterance, and the selection of the distinction of unity/utterance (i.e. understanding).
All communication furthermore presupposes the possibility of negation. Otherwise
communication has not taken place. Negation is a presupposition of communication, and carries
a high probability as discussed below.
Luhmann writes that the emergent social order arises out of the experience of double
contingency and the perception of being perceived. 101 Perception becomes social “when one
perceives that one is perceived” (1995: 412). Explicit communication can then link up to this
reflexive perceiving, which is the experience of double contingency.
Below is a Venn-diagram depiction of Luhmann‟s metaphor of communication as a synthesis of
three selections. Rather than a transmission from person A to person B, communication is an
emergent phenomenon that occurs whenever the distinction between information and utterance is
selected, or “understood.” In Figure 85, communication is located at the interface of all three
circles. It is possible, moreover, to select (i.e. understand) information by itself, or utterance by
itself, but these do not constitute communication. In my view, the overlap between utterance and
information represents attempted but failed communication, which can of course only be
hypothesized.
Unfortunately, the Venn diagram depicts communication as a static object rather than as a
dynamic process. Viewed dynamically, Luhmann contends that the “unity of an individual
communication is merely its connectivity” (1995: 148). The communication must become a
unity so that it can again become difference in another form, namely that between acceptance
and rejection. Luhmann identifies acceptance as a fourth selection, which is necessary for social
functioning but is nevertheless inherently improbable: “the possibility of rejection is
necessarily built into the communication process” (1995: 154). That communications, once
perceived as a unity, must be accepted or rejected, also implies that the elementary unit of
communication is the smallest unit that can be negated (1995: 154).
Specifically, acceptance of communication means that one accepts it as the premise for one's
own behavior. This is unlikely. Specifically, Luhmann mentions three “threshold of
discouragement” (1995: 158), which I will discuss in the next section. In order for
communication and to succeed, therefore, techniques must be invented in order to overcome
these barriers to acceptance.

100

Luhmann writes: "We don't have to analyze the causes of this circle any further: what comes into being is
always new and always the same, namely, a circularly closed unity. In this unity the determination of every element
depends on that of another, and the unity consists precisely in this" (1995: 117)
101
Luhmann notes: "Whatever contributes to solving the problem of double contingency belongs in the system"
(1995: 126). Luhmann contrasts the meta-perspective compelled by this experience to that of “autistic behavior.”
Stephan Fuchs (2001) states that social encounters are often just the perception of being perceived, and the
difference this makes is the encounter.
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Luhmann’s metaphor of
communication
Understanding

Information

Utterance

Figure 85. Luhmann. Communication as 3 selections.

Without acceptance of communication, social order within interactions, organizations, and
society at large would be become impossible. That social order exists is a testament to the
existence of these techniques for overcoming the improbability of successful communication.
Below I discuss these techniques, which Luhmann refers to as success media in more detail.
Before concluding this section, I will mention two points. First, communication is not
coterminous with language. For example, laughing can occur in the form of communication, as
can gestures and facial expressions.102 Other examples include gun shots and physical violence.
The concept of communication thus does not imply invariance with respect to moral connotation,
and does not imply that communication is inherently cooperative as opposed to conflictual. For
Luhmann, language enables the differentiation of communication out of a perceptual context
(1995: 152). The evolutionary achievement of language helps facilitate communication by
distinguishing communication from perception, and it does this by attracting perception, that is,
by being noticeable.
Finally, because communication is not something given, it can, in my view, be modeled as an
expectation. The unity of the communication is not given, but observed indirectly or inferred.
Communication can therefore be modeled as a Venn Diagram with a hole in the middle. The
unity of the communication is given only an expectation, which is represented by Figure 86.

102

These may fall under the category of analogical communication, or body language, which I discuss in more
detail below.
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Hyper-cycle of communication
Unity is established
as an expectation at
time (t+1)

Figure 86. Communication as emergent hyper-cycle.

Media of communication
The success of communication is unlikely for at least three reasons. Luhmann refers to these as
thresholds of discouragement. First, it is improbable that ego “understands” what alter means;
second, it is improbable that a message reaches more persons than are physically present; and
third, it is unlikely that the communication will be accepted. These barriers to communication
are overcome via symbolically generalized media.
Parsons first coined the term symbolically generalized media to refer to the use of shared
symbols to overcome the basal problem of double contingency. He writes:
Because of this double contingency, communication, which is the precondition of cultural
patterns, could not exist without both generalization from the particularity of the specific
situations (which are never identical for ego and alter) and stability of meaning which are
can only be assured by “conventions” observed by both parties. (1951: 16)
Symbolically generalized media (including love, money, truth, and power) are cultural
conventions that are used to overcome contingency by focusing expectations onto a limited range
of alternatives while eliminating all other possibilities. Because symbolically generalized media
improve the odds that communication can succeed, they are also referred to as success media.
Success, however, does not refer to whether or not individuals attain their stated goals. Instead,
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it refers exclusively to the success that communication has been understood or recognized as
communication.
Luhmann calls media “the evolutionary achievements that … serve in a functionally adequate
way to transform what is improbable into what is probable” (1995: 160). Three media can be
identified that correspond to the three thresholds of discouragement mentioned above.
Language helps overcome the barrier that a communication will be understood (i.e. noticed or
recognized as communication); media of dissemination, such as writing, “overcome the
improbability that information will reach an audience” (Lee and Brosziewski 2009: 129); 103 and
success media improve the odds that a communication will be accepted as the premise for
another‟s subsequent behavior.
These are not media, however, in the sense that they mediate symbols and reality or because they
mediate between individuals in communication. Luhmann‟s notion of media refers to the works
of Fritz Heider (1926) who posits the conditions of possibility of perception as distance, or a
medium-form distinction. The medium/form distinction is grounded in the distinction between
loose/tight coupling. Luhmann (2006) refers to media as “loosely coupled substrates” and forms
as “strictly coupled substrates.” Media are loosely coupled and forms are tight couplings of a
given medium. For example, air is the medium for sound, and when walking on a beach, the
sand is the medium for the footprints.
To formulate it differently, media constitute a field of possibilities within which contingent
actualizations (tight couplings) occur. Recall that meaning occurs as the distinction between that
which is possible and that which is actual such that every actualization connects to a new horizon
of virtual possibilities. Success media therefore work by relating a plurality of contingent forms
to a common background medium. Lee and Brosziewski (2009) explain the performance of
success media as follows:
Alter and ego know that any given strict coupling could have been different. The price of
a new pair of shoes could be higher or lower than what the price tag declares. The
awareness that every form is a contingency is why alter and ego can both understand that
it is meaningful when one form of a medium appears rather than another. Forms are
selective arrangements of elements, tight couplings, that refer observers to other
observers who make conditioned decisions about actualizing a medium‟s possibilities.
(131).
How do success media work, when they work, with respect to human communication? Success
media increase the odds that a communication will be accepted (i.e. taken as the premise for
further communication), by rendering the motivation of communication intelligible. A motive
refers to an attribution of causality pertaining to persons. As opposed to things, persons do not
act because they are manipulated externally, or at least this is not how social systems describe
actions. Persons act on the basis of motivations. Notice, however, that this presupposes that

103

Writing and printing have, moreover, reinforced the difference between information and utterance, making
possible the dissemination and suspicion of “ideology” or ideological observation (cf. Gouldner 1976; Fuchs 2001).
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“communication has already raised reciprocal expectations of personhood” (Lee and Brosziewski
2009: 136).
Thus, success media have evolved that link certain forms of communication (i.e. specific,
contingent actualizations of communication) to the reasons for why the communication was
uttered. Note that this is not already presupposed in the elementary, reduced concept of
communication as the synthesis of three selections: information, utterance, and understanding.
One can, for example, understand that information has been uttered without having any idea
why! The fact that motivated communication is the norm presupposes the existence of success
media.
The four most prominent success media of communication are truth, love, money, and power.
Love and truth select experiences, whereas money and power select out actions (Luhmann 1982).
Actions refer to selections attributed to systems, whereas experiences refer to selections
attributed to the environment of systems. Later, Luhmann creates a matrix depicting how
success media “causally connect the experience or behavior of one person (ego) with the
experience or behavior of another person (alter): an experience causes behavior, behavior causes
an experience, an experience causes an experience, or a behavior causes a behavior” (Lee and
Brosziewski 2009: 135). Table 11, adapted from Lee and Brosziewski (2009: 135), depicts
these causal relationships between experience and behavior (i.e. action).
It is useful to remember that for Luhmann, ego refers to the observer of communication and alter
to the initiator, although this distinction is expected to oscillate back and forth. In the context of
truth, an experience is communicated in such a way that it elicits when successful, an experience
that something is true or is not true. Power motivates actions. Experience is irrelevant. In
relations of power, one is not interested in what one believes, but in what one says, not in what
one thinks, but in what one does. Truth selects experiences, rather than actions, because truth is
attributed to the world rather than the communicators. The communication of love, if believed,
motivates behavior on the part of ego to validate and prove that alter is in fact the beloved.
Finally, money elicits the experience of ego with respect to alter‟s behavior. What does this
mean? In Luhmann‟s theory, one necessary condition for the exchanges involving money is that
third parties, outside of the exchange, not intervene. What is most significant about money, then,
from this point of view, is not that money is a store of value or that it more easily facilitates
exchange than barter, but rather, that “under the condition of scarcity, those who do not
participate in the exchange accept the fact that they do not receive the goods or services
exchanged” (Luhmann 1995: 422).
This list is not exhaustive. Luhmann identifies other media such as law, politics, and art.
Success media can also become differentiated and thus self-referential: love refers to love, and
power to power. One can read a communication differently and interpret a gesture of love as one
motivated by interests of power, and vice-versa, but this only indicates that one is distinguishing
from within the self-referential medium of power, which is irreducible and orthogonal to the
reference frame of love. A full elaboration, or defense, of this conceptual schema need not be
undertaken here. Below I discuss in more detail the relation between success media and
functional differentiation with respect to the economy.
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Table 11. Matrix of causal relationships between experience and behavior within success media.

Ego
Experience
Alter
Behavior

Experience
Alter‟s experience motivates
Ego‟s experience

Behavior
Alter‟s experience motivates Ego‟s
behavior

Truth
Alter‟s behavior motivates
Ego‟s experience

Love
Alter‟s behavior motivates Ego‟s
behavior

Money

Power

Sub-systems, Codes, and Programs
Success media render more probable the acceptance of communication by making intelligible the
motives for communication. In the transition from a stratified to a functionally differentiated
society, Luhmann proposes that these media attach themselves to functional subsystems of
society that operate according to binary distinctions or codes. The medium of money attaches
itself to the functional subsystem of economy. A few remarks concerning functional
differentiation and binary coding is warranted.
Sub-systems of society, also known as societal systems, can be regarded as channels of societal
communication. These subsystems, or channels, operate at the level of society, and are thus not
confined to organizations or interactions. Functional subsystems operate by means of binary
coding. Table 12 is a short list of societal systems identifying the success media they articulate
and their corresponding functional codes and possible programs (adapted from Lee and
Brosziewski 2009: 147). Functional differentiation entails decomposing society‟s systemenvironment distinction of communication vs. non-communication into a more specific
distinction. One can say that the subsystem observes the entirety of society through the lens of
its own distinction for which it claims universality and exclusivity.
Luhmann writes:
Every function system, together with its environment, reconstructs society. There, every
function system can plausibly presume to be society for itself, if and insofar as it is open
to its own environment. (1989: 107)
The functional subsystem is and is not society at the same time. Codes are totalizing
constructions, but are only valid insofar as communication chooses its domain of application.
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Table 12. Subsystems, codes, and programs.

Societal System

Success Medium

Politics

Power

Economy

Property/Money

Science
Religion

Truth
Faith

Protest

Anxiety, Discontent

Functional Distinction
or Code
In Power/ In Opposition

Conditioning
Programs
Democracy,
Monarchy, Political
Party
Payment/No Payment
Budgets, Investment,
Plans
True/Not True
Theories, Methods
Transcendence/Immanent Judaism, Islam,
Christianity
Protest/Acceptance
Feminism,
Environmentalism,
“Tea Parties”

Luhmann writes, that “after all, not every situation is a matter of truth or justice or property”
(1989: 38). They are totalizing in the sense that everything can be observed through the lens of
the binary distinction, but they are exclusive because all other possible distinctions are latent.
For example, science may observe according to the distinction between true and false, but not
according to the distinction between beautiful and ugly (Luhmann 1989: 45).
Codes do not serve as the criteria of selection. The latter are facilitated by programs104.
Programs, moreover, are implemented exclusively by organizations, not societal systems. For
example, the distinction payment/non-payment does not in itself indicate how payments are
made, or with respect to what goal (e.g. for profit, for charity, for consumption). Observing the
distinction between truth and non-truth does not indicate what is true or false, or the methods by
which this distinction should be employed. Applying the code recursively to itself, moreover,
can generate paradoxes. Is the distinction between true and false itself true? On what basis is
the legal system legal? The differentiation of the code and the criteria of selection is one way of
avoiding, or concealing, these types of paradoxes or contradictions which would interrupt the
systems functioning.
Functional differentiation does not refer to separation or segregation of society, but entails an
increasing interdependence between societal systems, because each has to presume that other
societal systems are performing their necessary functions elsewhere. Luhmann writes that:
Operations can therefore switch from the legal to the political or from the scientific to the
economic code. This possibility does not deny system differentiation. Instead it is
attainable only on the basis of it. (1989: 43)

104

The concept of “program” is preferable to the older (Hegelian) term, “logic.” Whereas a program emphasizes its
contingency, the term logic, as used in Marxist circles for instance, lends itself more easily to reification.
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It is important to emphasize that these are semantic codes. They do not exist out there, but as
expectations, or as hypotheses about how society processes and organizes its various
communications. These codes should therefore not be reified. Moreover, Luhmann
acknowledges that societal self-descriptions do not necessarily refer to observed realities:
Of course, the market is not a real one (as it could be seen to be from the cousin‟s corner
window) and democracy no longer means that the people rule. This is a matter of a
semantic coding of an ultimately paradoxical state of affairs. It explains the meaning and
the illusionary components of these concepts, explains the weakness of the corresponding
theories and explains why, since the beginning of the eighteenth century, a kind of selfcritique has accompanied this. (1989: 108; my emphasis)
In my view, this discrepancy is a result of triple (or higher-order) contingencies arising
concurrently with the emergence of the public, a concomitant to functional differentiation.

Critiques of Luhmann
Habermas has criticized Luhmann for not being sufficiently critical. In Habermas‟s view,
Luhmann provides no perspective from which the whole can be accurately observed (1987:
374). Habermas has thus referred to Luhmann‟s approach as a move from meta-physics to metabiology. Consequently, Habemas argues we "are without any point of reference for a critique of
modernity" (1987: 374). Habermas argue that the public sphere is where this critique could take
place in which a "consciousness of the total society can be articulated" (1987: 376) over and
above the subsystems. In the public sphere, society can gain a critical distance from itself and
therefore conceive of the whole, or totality, and construct a rational identity that can perceive
systemic crises.
Other critics have made similar points. For example, Østerberg (2000) argues that for Durkheim
and Parsons, the concept of differentiation is always tied up with integration, as in calculus.
Differentiation requires the subordination or coordination of all the parts to a whole through such
mechanisms as socialization processes that internalize dominant values. Weber rarely talks
about his competing value spheres in terms of differentiation.
In fact, Østerberg points out that Habermas first mistakenly imputed this notion to Weber, and
that Luhmann makes the same mistake. For Østerberg, differentiation and autonomization
should be considered as opposite, where autonomization lacks any counteracting integrating
force. Luhmann conflates the two, sometimes using differentiation in a traditional Parsonian
way, and other times using it in a way that is synomous with autonomization. Østerberg adds
that, contra Luhmann: the world is not acentric, it has one or more centers; world society does
not become increasingly differentiated functionally and that, for example, the world economy is
not autonomous or 'autopoeitic' as a subsystem; class distinctions are not replaced by more
important distinctions of inclusion and exclusion; and that the notion of progress is not obsolete.
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The famous debates that occurred between Luhmann and Habermas during the 1970s, very little
of which is available in English, cannot be recounted here. Prior to his death, however,
Luhmann write eloquently and derisively about Habermas and critical theory, in a short piece
entitled “Not in Frankfurt.” Luhmann recapitulates his argument that unity cannot be anything
but the unity of a difference, and that therefore, the complexity of the social system could not be
comprehended, steered or guided, from within the social system. The key difference between a
theory of self-referential, autopoeitic systems and critical theory is that the former is selfinclusive: it sees that it cannot see what it cannot see. Luhmann protests the inability of the
“Marx/Freud-syndrome” to “endure this insight into its own blindness” (2002: 190). Below are
his closing remarks:
[Critical] theory sides with the human to join the latter in battle against enemy forces.
But isn‟t this human merely an invention of this theory, merely a veiling of this theory‟s
self-reference? If he or she were meant as an empirical object (with the name of subject),
the theory would have to declare who, then, is meant, for obviously it cannot send five
billion humans, who at the same time are living and acting, on a discursive search for
good grounds. Not only the length of this process of searching, and the conditions of
„bounded rationality,‟ but already the sheer simultaneity of behavior would doom such a
project. One cannot idealize sociality without taking account of time.
These are rough arguments whose details certainly need fine-tuning. But a rough survey
of the possible positions suffices if one is interested in the question of whether, and how,
modern society at the end of this century can achieve a representation of itself in itself
(where else?). And, all things considered, my verdict is: not in Frankfurt” (2002: 193)
Evincing eloquently a mood of resignation, Luhmann further propounds:
The distinction, above all, between affirmative and critical, a distinction so beloved in
Frankfurt, misses the connection to what offers itself to observation. It is a specific case
of blindness, for it excludes the possibility that what has become realized as society gives
cause for the worst fears, but cannot be rejected…. (2002: 193).
That Luhmann occludes from his analysis normative judgment and moral exhortation does not
oblige the reader of Luhmann to do so. These criticisms illuminate potential blind spots in
systems perspectives, but do not invalidate it. I propose here that the concept of system be
regarded as a perspective, or hypothesis, that one holds open and regards as a matter of degree.
In many ways, the concepts of media and communication as employed by both Habermas and
Luhmann are similar, particularly with regard to their concept of money. Habermas, however,
intends to hold open the possibility that functional sub-systems could be normatively regulated
via free and unfettered communication. Whether or to what extent collective normative control
can actually be accomplished, or even whether this accomplishment is a historical possibility,
also depends, however, upon factual and systemic conditions.
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Habermas and the Agentic Understanding of Communication
The primary difference between a Luhmannian and Habermasian understanding of
communication is that for Habermas, the essence of the meaning of communication is the
(circular) intention of understanding intent. For Luhmann, on the other hand, communication is
theorized exclusively with regard to its unintended consequences or “latent functions” (Merton
1968). Luhmann therefore abdicates any responsibility for evaluating the validity claims
ostensibly implied in any and all communications.
For Habermas, there are also 3 dimensions or functions of signs. Following Karl Bühler‟s
“organon model”, Habermas distinguishes:

1) cognitive function- of representing a state of affairs
2) expressive function- of making known experiences of the speaker
3) appellative function- of directing requests to addressees
These correspond to the three distinct worlds or spheres of experience:
o
o
o

 Truth
 Sincerity
 Rightness (morality)

Objective; The external world
Subjective; The internal world
Normative; The social world

In The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), Habermas attempts to generalize the concept of
truth, which only pertains to the first dimension, that of representing a state of objective affairs.
The concept of validity refers to this more general notion of truth, which also pertains to the
internal and social worlds. For Habermas, every communication implies a claim to validity in
these three dimensions: truth, sincerity, and rightness. All statements are embedded in these
three dimensions simultaneously. The problem is how does one derive criteria for determining
whether or not something is valid? Habermas attempts to ground universal rules of validity in
what he calls a universal pragmatics. 105 The three dimensions are depicted in Table 13.

Table 13. Habermas. Types of Action.
Action Orientation 
Oriented to Success
Action Situation

Oriented to Reaching
Understanding

Nonsocial

Instrumental action

--

Social

Strategic action

Communicative Action

105

Habermas writes that his theory “Seeks to generalize the concept of validity beyond the truth of propositions
and identify validity conditions... [also] on the pragmatic level of utterances (277); and that his “reflections on
universal pragmatics, intends to systematically ground both the appellative and expressive functions of
language...” (TCA 1: 277).
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For Habermas, all actions can be categorized as those actions that either oriented to success, or
oriented to reaching understanding.
But what does “reaching understanding” mean? As stated above, Habermas regards it as the
inherent goal built in to all of our efforts to communicate. This seems on the face of it to be
counter-factual rather than empirical. Habermas is not explicit about the criterion of validity for
this statement. Habermas specifies what he means by “reaching understanding” stating that
reaching understanding is a process of reaching agreement, but, that it is not equivalent to a
collective like-mindedness, or de facto accord (1984: 286). Habermas writes:
Coming to an understanding [Verständigung] means that participants in communication
reach an agreement [Einigung] concerning the validity of an utterance; agreement
[Einverständnis] is the intersubjective recognition of the validity claim the speaker
raises for it (TCA 2: 120).

Furthermore, any understanding presupposes some shared definition or a situation, or context of
relevance. He defines communicative action, the goal of which is to reach understanding as
action in which “participants pursue their plans cooperatively on the basis of a shared definition
of the situation" (TCA 2: 126).
Habermas then, in order to devise a universal criterion of validity for all three spheres of
communication, argues that reaching understanding is the primary and original mode of
language use from which the other modes (instrumental and strategic uses) are derived.
Habermas makes this point clearly:
[T]he use of language with an orientation to reaching understanding is the original
mode of language use, upon which indirect understanding, giving something to
understand or letting something be understood, and the instrumental use of
language in general, are parasitic (288)
Furthermore, Habermas claims he can prove that this is true, by examining Austin‟s well-known
typology of speech acts into locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary kinds:
1) locutionary- expresses states of affairs
2) illocutionary speech-acts- performs an action in saying something (promises,
commands, avowals)
3) perlocutionary- speaker produces an effect upon the hearer
a. Perlocutionary effects in a trivial sense = unintended side-effects
b. Perlocutionary effects in a non-trivial sense = occurs when speakers
instrumentalize speech acts.
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In a move that isn‟t entirely explicit, Habermas equates the intention to “reach understanding” as
belonging to the illocutionary dimension of communication. 106 He then goes on to give an
exhaustive account of why the perlocutionary and illocutionary can be rigorously distinguished.
In addition, he distinguishes two subsets of perlocutionary speech which he calls trivial and nontrivial. Trivial perlocutionary effects are unintended side-effects of consequences of speech,
whereas non-trivial perlocutionary effects occur when speakers use language as a way of getting
something they want (i.e. they use language as an “instrument” or tool).
Importantly, Habermas de-emphasizes the unintended consequences of communication, calling
them “trivial.” Yet, this is precisely the dimension which I am calling the systems frame of
reference, which can be operationalized as the simultaneous interaction effects between actors in
communication. Because these interaction effects are simultaneous, they can only be partially
recovered ex post. The upshot of this idea is that the society can be regarded as self-organizing.
Habermas‟s key argument is that whenever someone instrumentalizes language, they presuppose
using language in a way that the person they are instrumentalizing understands. He writes:
Naturally, speech acts can serve this nonillocutionary aim of influencing hearers only if
they are suited to achieve illocutionary aims. If the hearer failed to understand what the
speaker was saying, a strategically acting speaker would not be able to bring the hearer,
by means of communicative acts, to behave in the desired way. To this extent, what we
initially designated as "the use of language with an orientation to consequences," is not
an original use of language but the subsumption of speech acts that serve
illocutionary aims under conditions of action oriented to success. (293)
Communicative action means using language to reach understanding; understanding means an
effort to reach an agreement; and any other intention of language presupposes an intention to
reach understanding. Communicative action is: “interaction in which all participants
harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue their illocutionary
aims without reservation 'communicative action'" (TCA 1: 294).
Furthermore, Habermas argues that to understand a speech-act means to understand its grounds
of validity, that is, to be able to make an argument for or against it (i.e. to either affirm or negate
it). He writes: we understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable (297), and
also that: "To understand an assertion is to know when a speaker has good grounds to
undertake a warrant that the conditions for the truth of the asserted sentences are
satisfied" (318).
In summary, Habermas argues that all language use is oriented towards understanding, which
means that communicative action oriented towards an ideal speech situation is presupposed in all
forms of instrumental and strategic action as well. Understanding a speech act means knowing

106

Habermas writes: "Thus I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions in which all
participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with their mediating acts of communication"
(TCA 1: 295).
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its conditions of validity, or being able to argue or give reasons for or against it regarding its
truth, rightness, or sincerity.
The proof for a concept of universal validity is now complete:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Communication has three dimensions
All communication implies an effort at understanding, or reaching an agreement
Understanding means understanding the reasons for or against the validity of a statement
Therefore, all dimensions of communication can be evaluated as to its validity

It is is difficult to discern the validity of Habermas‟s claim that understanding is more central or
important than misunderstanding; he merely asserts it. The fact that one must be “understood” in
order to use language in a manipulative way seems to presuppose a definition of understanding
that renders mis-understanding impossible. Furthermore, why does understanding imply an
agreement, and is it not possible to communicate openly without having to decide beforehand
that an agreement must be reached?107 From a sociological point of view, however, what is more
interesting is whether or to what extent social conditions facilitate or hinder the realization of the
possibility of open communication and consensual steering ostensibly inherent in every
communicative act. To understand this, it is necessary to examine Habermas‟s notion of media
and communicative relief.

Habermas’s Concept of Steering Media and Communicative Relief
In Luhmann‟s model of communication, only communication communicates and communication
has no goal (telos) other than communication. This is in contrast to Habermas, for whom
“Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech (TCA vol. 1- Section 3; 1984:
287). For Luhmann, the acceptance of communication is facilitated entirely by symbolically
generalized media (aka success media), which ostensibly expedite the process of linking
communication to motives. Luhmann does introduce the concept as a substitute for this process,
but this only foregrounds the disembodied style of his writing.
Conspicuously absent are the means of determining which messages should be accepted. There
is no mention of the process of evaluation according to which actual people can and should
assess the validity claims implied in any communication. Indeed, there is no mention of actors at
all. Communication is depicted as a selection process devoid of actors. In many ways,
Luhmann‟s theory is the obverse side of the agentic view depicted by Habermas as the lifeworld.
Habermas recognizes that communication oriented towards mutual understanding and agreement
through the discussion of validity claims imposes severe burdens on the task of coordinating
social actions. Modern society cannot exist exclusively on the basis of rational discussion. 108
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The physicist David Bohm (2003) has proposed a concept of “dialogue”, the point of which is not to reach
consensus but dialogue itself.
108
Imagine, for instance, a super-market in which the prices of each commodity are deliberately negotiated by all
participants in the global production chain, and each potential customer, for every possible exchange.
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Specifically, Habermas identifies two risks of communicative action: communication failure,
which occurs when communication blocks the achievement of social action, and
misunderstanding, which occurs whenever communication exacerbates disagreements (Hove
2009).
To explain how modern society overcomes the formidable barriers to social coordination
presented by communicative action, Habermas introduces the concept of communication relief,
which occurs whenever social coordination of action occurs by means other than linguistic
agreement achieved by means of rational discourse. In communication relief, people are relieved
of the demands of linguistically achieved agreement. For Habermas, communication relief takes
two forms: steering media and generalized communications. In both cases, social action is
uncoupled from consensus formation.
Following Parsons (1951), media for Habermas are means of coordinating social actions.
Habermas distinguishes basic media forms: 1) communicative actions that strive to facilitate
agreement based on understanding achieved via open discussion of validity claims; 2) steering
media such as money and power which bypass communication, motivating and coordinating
actions on the basis of rewards and punishments; and 3) generalized communications, which do
not bypass communications, but instead reference validity claims, without actually engaging in a
rational discourse about them. Instead, in generalized communications, people trust that the
(cognitive or normative) claims being made are valid based on the authority of the persons
making them. They are often facilitated by trust in authority. Examples of such authority
include experts in relation to lay persons, churches, the legal system, public interest groups and
moral leaders.
Whereas steering media promote system integration and are associated with the rise of functional
subsystems of economy, politics, law, and so on, communicative actions and generalized
communications facilitate social integration, identified with the lifeworld. As pointed out by
Hove (2009), in his later works Habermas does not regard the steering media of money and
power as exclusively colonizing forces, but also attempts to describe how, in modern society, the
efficient coordination of social actions via steering media are necessary and can even promote
conditions for communicative understanding. Steering media are therefore inherently
ambivalent with respect to social coordination, for it is possible that they can be put to
communicative uses.
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Fararo’s Synthesis of Parsons, Control Theory, and State-Space Modeling
One of the most important theorists in the sociological tradition is certainly Talcott Parsons.
Regarded as one of the “grand theorists” of the 20th century, his efforts to devise a general
conceptual vocabulary for linking together and synthesizing insights drawn from the fractured
discipline of sociology and other social sciences has not always been appreciated or made clear.
His works today are not widely read. Recently, Thomas Fararo has attempted to synthesize
Parsons insights about social systems with the mathematical concept of dynamical systems and
the cybernetic concept of control.
What follows is a brief sketch of Parson‟s vision of society as an action system; an explication of
the state space (or "phase space") approach to dynamical systems modeling as spelled out by
Fararo (1992) and its application to the four types of theorems derivable from this approach; and
the efforts by Fararo to combine these theories with the insights drawn from control theory and
cybernetics. Later, I will offer some comments on Fararo‟s project.

State-Space Modeling
Fararo's abiding concern is with developing general theoretical models, and seeks to develop
dynamic state space models of action systems. Fararo organizes action systems into the
following typology (1989: 155):
I. Unit Act
A. Individual Actor
B. Collective Actor
II. Action System
A. Single-actor model
1. Individual actor
2. Collective actor
B. Interaction model: at least two distinct actors
1. Multiple individual actors
2. Multiple collective actors
3. Individual actors and collective actors
Central to Fararo's approach is the action frame of reference centered and the concept of
voluntarism. In his view, and in the view of Parsons, social systems are systems of human
action. Because human beings are creative, active, and evaluating organisms, Parsons contends
that social systems cannot be understood apart from the concept of human agency. Human
behavior is a process in which the actor's intentions or expectations regarding future states of
affairs make some difference to the future.
Fararo attempts to elaborate Parsons‟s theory by translating it into the mathematical technique of
state-space modeling, also known as phase-space modeling. The object that is modeled in a
state-space model is called the behavior manifold, a system of interrelated components. The
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components and/or relations between them are potentially in different states over time. In the
state space approach, we are interested in the “generic set of states and corresponding variables
that are utilized to describe the dynamics of any such system” (1989: 70). The variables are
called state variables, each of which possesses a range of possible values. In addition, we can
combine these state variables, “treating them symbolically in terms of vector notation in which
one boldface letter stands for a whole list of entities” (70). The state vector refers to the
composite list of state variables. All of the possible values of all of the variables used to describe
the system is called the state space, “the set of possible values of the state vector” (70).
Geometrically, each variable constitutes a separate dimension of the state space. The state vector
defines a single point in the state space, whose Cartesian coordinates depicts its actual states in
each of the specified dimensions (variables). The number of state variables, or dimensions, of the
state space specifies its degrees of freedom. For instance, consider the simple case of a
pendulum, or a swing. Abstracting somewhat, we can consider a swing in terms of its position
(e.g. height) and acceleration. Assuming the position can be depicted as a single number, we
would then have a simple two dimensional state space. In dynamical systems modeling, we are
interested in how state vectors change over time. This can be accomplished by simply tracing
the points defining state vectors as they move across time. This “motion” or tracing of the state
vectors is called a trajectory.
Importantly, a state space depicting the possible states of a system, usually presupposes some
condition that remains constant. These conditions may include presuppositions. Nevertheless,
the conditions might have been different, and we could have studied another system with the
same state space under these different conditions. It is also possible that these underlying
conditions can change over time. Using the same method outlined above for state variables, a
number of variables can be included in the model (the behavior manifold) that depicts aspects of
the environment of the system as depicted by the state space. Each variable is called a
parameter, the composite variable representing the values of the set of these parameters the
parameter vector, and the set of all possible values of the parameter vector the parameter space.
Fararo explains that:
[T]he parameter space represents the various conditions of the system, either the same
concrete system or different concrete systems considered to be in the same category for
theoretical purposes. A particular value of the parameter vector defines a point in
parameter space. It is important to note that the conditions may shift or change smoothly
in the referent concrete system, so that parameter change is not ruled out in the study of
dynamics by means of this model object. But at least in the initial study of a family of
theoretical models, the parameter vector may be treated as fixed while the vector in state
space traces out a trajectory. Then, at another phase in the analysis of the model, the
element of parameter change is treated” (1989: 71).
In summary:
a space is a set of possibilities for a system. Two spaces have been defined: the state
space and the parameter space. The two taken together (formally, their Cartesian product)
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is called the behavior manifold. The basic model object of dynamical systems theory is
the behavior manifold together with some representation of time in terms of some
discrete or continuous space of possible time” (1989: 71)....
Importantly, for Fararo, the purpose of theory is to explain the trajectories exhibited over
time by concrete systems by means of equations that generate the observed trajectories, as
a function of the initial state (the starting point representing the state vector) and the
parameters. For Fararo, the “explanation” is the equation that generates the trajectories. A
single trajectory should be derivable for each combination of initial conditions and parameter
conditions. Fararo contends that “the appropriate mathematical form is a difference equation or
system of such equations if the state space is multidimensional” (72).
A theoretical model, given this model object, consists in some postulated or derived
generator of changes of state. If the trajectories are considered as simply “given,” we
have no theoretical model. They must be derived (1989: 71).
For example, consider a dynamical ecological system such as a predator-prey relationship, taken
in conceptual isolation from other interactions the two predators and prey entertain with other
species. The states to be considered are their population sizes, which vary dynamically with
each other. This system has been represented in the following form:

where x is the population size of the prey, and y is the population size of the predator. If y = 0,
then the population of prey would grow exponentially with the "growth rate per individual given
by parameter a" (73). The term xy represents the total possible interactions between the two
species and the coefficient b represents the probability of a kill. These kills subtract from the
prey population, represented in the first equation. If, on the other hand, there are no prey the
predator population (y) would die out. The four parameters (a, b, c, p) "'condition' or 'control' the
dynamics of the interdependent population changes" (73). They can be regarded as either
constant or time-varying. The system of differential equations represents the mutual
dependency of the two species. The vector notations can be written as follows. The state vector
can be indicated by writing x = (x,y), and the parameter vector by c = (a, b, c, p). In general, for
any behavior manifold, a dynamical system may be represented in the form (74):

where dx/dt is the derivative, or rate of change, of the state vector. In general, there are as many
functions as there are components of the state vector. In the ecological example above, for
instance, there are two functions, given by the two equations. Importantly, the equation, when
combined with an initial state, or initial condition, of the system is said to generate the system's
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trajectory. Since the trajectory depends on the initial state, the specific trajectory or behavior of
a system can be written as:

where x0 is the initial condition of the state vector. Importantly, this system exhibits recursive
generativity, in the sense that the previous state of the system goes into the next state. The entire
trajectory therefore depends on the initial conditions and the parameter values. This will become
important later. This can be illustrated more clearly using a discrete time version of the equation
above (cite). So for instance, the next two states of the system can be depicted as:

and so on.
Consider also a system in which the rate of change is zero. This would mean that the generator
would satisfy the equation:

Fararo calls this the equilibrium state of the dynamical system. It is important to emphasize,
however, that in the state space approach to dynamical modeling, equilibrium does not
necessarily mean no change. It depends on the meaning of the state variables. For instance, the
state variables could be defined as growth rates. In the ecological system of equations above, the
equilibrium state of the system would then refer to invariant rates of growth. In addition, the
equilibrium state depends on the parametric conditions. If the these conditions change, so will
the equilibrium states. Fararo prefers to interpret the equilibrium state as an "adjustment of
the state variables to each other and to the parametric conditions" (77). Finally, the
discovery of an equilibrium state via state space modeling does not mean that the system will
actually exhibit an equilibrium state. Instead, the existence of an equilibrium state means that
"if the system is ever in a particular equilibrium condition, then it will remain in that state
under the given conditions (value of c)" (77). Accordingly, equilibria can either be stable or
unstable. The former are called attractors. This means that if the state of the system is near the
equilibrium condition, it will remain close to it. Unstable equilibria are called repellors.
Systems whose vector states are a small distance away from the repellor will move increasingly
farther away from the repellor over time. Fararo recapitulates this distinction in relation to the
concept of equilibrium state: "To reiterate ... the term equilibirum does not mean 'no
process'; rather, it means an attractor of process in the case of a stable equilibrium and a
repellor of process in the case of unstable equilibrium" (85).
Using the dynamical systems approach, Fararo suggests that four core sets of problems emerge
for general theoretical sociology: theories regarding the emergence, maintenance, comparison
and transformation of social structure (94). More specifically, he argues that this approach
points to a logic of investigation in which "operationally meaningful theorems" (87) can be
deduced from the premises of the model. These theorems regard:
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1) the conditions under which equilibrium states exist;
2) the classification of these equilibrium states as repellors or attractors (i.e. their
stability);
3) how the equilibrium states vary with changes in the underlying parameters; and
4) the way that system trajectories can feedback upon the parametric conditions.
The last theorem-type is sometimes called catastrophe analysis. It investigates how the
parametric conditions themselves can change over time, and how the system states can cause
slower changes in its parametric conditions. The crucial difference between the state vector and
the parameter vector then becomes the rate at which they change, with the parameter vector
changing slowly. If a feedback link is posited between the state space and the parameters, then
the system can change its own conditions. In other words, the trajectory of the system across
time can cause slow changes in the parametric conditions. If a certain threshold is crossed, the
changes in the parametric conditions can generate radical transformations in the behavior of the
system, such as generating new equilibrium states.

Control Theory
The most important aspect of action is what Fararo refers to as the "control principle of action"
(1989: 159), where "control" is used in the cybernetic sense and which means to keep some
perceptual input near some reference value. Formally, Fararo defines the control principle of
action in the following way: "The actor in a situation is a negative-feedback system, and a unit
act is an episode of negative-feedback control" (1989: 166). Action is the control of perception
(Powers 1973). Cybernetics is the study of goal-seeking systems that operate via negative
feedback. The control principle of action states that actors act so as to minimize the difference
between their perceptions (input) and their internal reference standards ("goals"). The negative
feedback process can be analytically decomposed into three sub-processes:
1. A perception function (detection, input)
2. A comparison function (compares the perception to a reference standard)
3. A behavior function (output)
The ideas of values and norms are particular instantiations of the general idea of a reference
standard. Notice also that no anthropomorphism is intended. Machines such as the heating a
cooling system controlled by a thermostat operates according to the control principle of action.
According to Fararo, the control principle of action is essential in giving any realistic account of
how social order emerges. Cybernetic control also foregrounds the problem of social order as a
central problem for general theoretical sociology, because competing control systems suggest
that disorder and conflict, rather than order and cooperation, are to be expected (1989: 177).
Fararo seeks to answer the general question: how is social order really possible? How are
shared goals, expectations, and orientations accomplished so as to coordinate actions? Can it be
derived from the control principle of action at the micro-individual level?
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Fararo regards the classical tradition (Marx, Mead, Durkheim, and Weber) as in large part
presupposing a given social order. This orientation is shared by Parsons, who regards a common
moral value system as the precondition of social order. Fararo treats Parsons as a cybernetic
theorist. Parsons (1951) develops a model of society in terms of a cybernetic control hierarchy,
but largely restricts his analysis to the problem of institutional pattern maintenance, rather than
to generative/causal mechanisms of pattern maintenance. 109 Consequently, Fararo writes that his
theory fails to “show how, in detail, the human organism was „under control‟ in the sense of a
hierarchy of feedback mechanisms that included such entities as values, norms, and roles”
(2006: 5).
Although the actions of individual humans can be regarded as cybernetic control mechanisms,
the same attribute cannot simply be imputed to supra-individual actors. Instead, Fararo's
ultimate ambition is to logically derive collective control processes from the (horizontal)
coupling of individual (hierarchical) control systems (i.e. individual agents). Social order then
entails control systems attempting to control each other. Unlike machines or individual
organisms, then, social cybernetic control mechanisms are not hard-wired, but rather distributed,
and thus uncertain and unstable. Fararo acknowledges that the sheer complexity of interactions,
even in the simplest case of a triadic actor network, renders this potentially impossible.
Following Parsons, Fararo selects four variables to define the state space of social relations,
considered generally. These correspond to the AGIL schema. According to Fararo, four
problems are said to confront any social group: "adapation (A) to the environment, group goal
attainment (G), social integration (I) of the participants, and latent pattern maintenance (L), a
fusion of cultural and motivational problems of group process" (179). The generic formula for
the state space interpretation of this model of human interaction can be written as:

where s = (L, I, G, A). This formula can also be elaborated in terms of a system of four
interdependent equations. Fararo also decomposes the AGIL relational categories. Fararo
(1992: 181) decomposes the AGIL dimensions further into the following sub-states, where
indenting indicates levels in the hierarchy, where lower levels are constrained by higher levels:
L: action pattern maintenance = cultural dimension
LI: cultural integration = value dimension
LII: value integration = moral value dimension
I: action integration = social dimension
IL: social pattern maintenance = fiduciary dimension
II: social integration = communal dimension
IG: social goal attainment = political dimension
IA: social adaptation = economic dimension
109

According to Parsons, the shared norms underlying institutional patterns must satisfy two conditions: 1) the
norm must be widely shared and considered desirable, and 2) the norm must not be considered utopian, that is,
ordinary people expect themselves and others to be able to live up to it. An institutionally-integrated social system
integrates moral sentiments and self-interest sentiments.
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G: action goal attainment = motivational dimension
GI: motivational integration = conscience dimension
A: action adaptation = cognitive dimension
AI: cognitive integration = mental model dimension
The obvious question is then in what way are the AGIL scheme and the control principle of
action related? The immediate answer is that there is no direct relation. Fararo does, however,
suggest a partial, indirect linkage, specifying that:
dimensional states of the AGIL scheme can each be interpreted as lists of pairs of states:
(actual, ideal). Also, the ideal term can be in a latent state, saved in memory, or in the
active state, retrieved from memory..... The general correspondence that is suggested,
then, is that a state variable in the AGIL scheme describes the state of a normative
control mechanism with all its component cybernetic functions of input, output,
comparison, and memory (1989: 185).
Fararo interprets the AGIL dimensions as components of a cybernetic control hierarchy. Parsons
hierarchy runs from values to norms to goals to operations. How do these map on to the AGIL
scheme? Fararo interprets the four dimensions of AGIL as a hieararchy rather than a heterarchy.
Fararo suggests that moral values might be identified with LII. The next level down, norms,
would correspond with I, "involving control of social expectations through norms" (185), and
functionally differentiated norms corresponding to the four sub-states of I. Fararo identifies the
goal level with GI, and finally, the lowest operative level with AI.
The details of this are a little unclear, perhaps because of its sheer complexity. Each dimension
is interpreted as a kind of relation, or role. Individuals thus inhabit four generic role types, that
can be switched on or off. Importantly, Fararo interprets the AGIL dimensions, originally
conceived of as a four preconditions for social integration, as a four level control hierarchy
characterizing the individual. Below is an adaptation of Fararo's visual depiction of a horizontal
coupling of individuals as cybernetic control systems:



 



The arrows indicate top-down control, and the backward, bottom-up arrows are omitted for
simplicity. In this model, the interface between the two individuals occurs at the bottom-level of
action. Values constrain norms, which constrain goals, which constrain actions. Actions can be
regarded as the output of the control system. In this depiction of horizontal coupling, the output
of another individual becomes part of the input of another. In other words, they mutually disturb
one another, activating further control efforts. Exactly how this occurs, however, is not
explained. If action is the control of perceptions, then one's actions, as well as other noncontrollable environmental disturbances, such as another's actions, will influence the perceptual
input, and therefore the subsequent behavioral output, in an ongoing feedback loop. The kind of
interaction is left unspecified. For instance, are the two actors mutually observing one another,
or mutually aware that they are mutually observing one another, or engaging in a common
activity, or observing the same perceptual object, or observing different perceptual objects but
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interacting nevertheless in other dimensions via their perceiving, or attempting to manipulate
common or related objects in the environment, or attempting to manipulate each other?
Fararo interprets this general schema in terms of networks of actors relating to each other via
various roles. The categories of AGIL represent then, situations, or relational types, or roles that
can switch on and off. For instance, a married couple who also entertain a professional, working
relationship can be said to entertain a multiplex tie. Given two individuals in interaction, the
model specifies that they will relate to one another in four dimensions, or in four relational (or
"tie") types. The relation itself can be modeled as an input-output matrix. Each person then,
insofar as they relate to another in each of the four dimensions, will be simultaneously
controlling four different reference signals, and generating four different types of output, and the
outputs of one actor will become part of the input of the other actor. Processes of collective
control are multi-dimensional.

Comments on Fararo’s project
It is possible that a person may enter into both cooperative and conflictual relations with another
or within himself at the same time. Society then consists of a four dimensional space,
representing the AGIL functions, and a set of points or locations in this space representing the
individual actors in relation to one another, at a given moment in time? One would expect that
these would constitute different sorts of processes. Furthermore, it isn't clear how this describes
collective control processes. In this depiction, all that necessarily happens is that each actor in
some way perturbs some aspect of the environment of the other, which ostensibly, should enter
into the other's (conscious or unconscious) perceptions. The problem is that a pebble on the
ground would do the same thing, meaning that the model is too broad to depict any kind of
structural, or as Leydesdorff (2003) prefers, "operational coupling.” This is complicated enough,
but also, people relate to representations of actors directly, in terms of their perceptions of the
other four levels. This is especially the case when dealing with impersonal, public, anonymous,
or otherwise non-intimate relationships. This suggests that we are affected not only by the
actions of others, but also by what these others and their actions, mean.
Fararo, committed to the idea of a modeling social relation as networks, tries to synthesize the
state space approach with the network approach in terms of cybernetic control theory. This
model is already exceedingly complex and unwieldy in conceptual design. It is difficult to
comprehend the interaction of two actors, much less larger aggregates of actors and/or collective
actors. Numerous questions arise. What is the relationship between the four components A, G,
I, and L? Within the individual, do they constitute a hierarchy or a heterarchy? Might the
importance attached to each component vary according to time and interaction setting? Are the
behavioral outputs of individuals classifiable into these relational types, or is there a single
output, that can be regarded from the reference frame specified by these dimensions? Moreover,
how is collective control actually engendered?
Whereas Parsons conceives of the AGIL scheme as a description of society, Fararo internalizes
this schema in the individual. The former aggregate pattern, however, cannot be deduced from
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the latter, unless commonality of reference signals (in each of the dimensions) is presupposed.110
In other words, social order can only be explained by reference to social order and to the extent
that social order is already presupposed or given factually as the correspondence of reference
signals. In what way, then, can this model become a generator of social order, in the sense
specified by Fararo?
I do not think that these questions have apodictic answers. The theoretical thrust of Fararo's
version of general theoretical sociology is the derivation of theorems by logical deduction, given
the premises of the model. I would counter that the interpretation of such logical derivations
(the rules of which strictly speaking refer to abstract symbols) cannot be deduced. This does not
mean, in my opinion, that the state space framework cannot be a useful way of looking at social
phenomena, but this framework simply cannot attain the level of "scientific" rigor to which it
aspires. In particular, the contingency of the approach with respect to its model specification and
interpretation introduce irreducible uncertainty into the analysis, even if confined to the "general"
case.
Fararo conceptualizes the integration of "society" and its functional sub-systems as the interrelation of individual actors. To the extent that individuals interact, they can constitute a social
structure, or fail to. The differentiation of society, on the other hand, is conceptualized as the
proliferation of roles that one may adopt vis-a-vis another. In this model, then, the index of
social (dis)integration consists in the number of ways a person can relate to another. On the
other hand, adopting the situation, rather than the individual, as the unit of analysis, social
(dis)integration can be measured by the number and similarity of types of situation in the social
universe, or some subset, however defined or demarcated.
The economy, for instance, can be regarded as a kind of relational tie, among many, in a vast
web of multiplex relations, or as a kind of subset of general role orientations specifying a
generalized expectation or comportment towards a generalized other. In this way, the economy
can be regarded as being "embedded" (cf. Granovetter 1985) in a larger social context.
The unity of society is provided by the similarity of the highest normative principles governing
the cybernetic control hierarchies within each individual. Society, then, is in the individual.
This can be understood as the result of an ongoing process of the internalization of societal
norms and values. For society, in general, to be possible, there must be an overlapping between
individuals of their highest, most general, normative references, as in a Venn Diagram. The
boundaries of society would then be coterminous with the shared norms (conceived of as the
mutual information or coupling of the actors). This level of generality, however, really does not
get us very far. For instance, what distinguishes societies integrated by means of mechanical or
organic solidarity in the Durkheimian sense, or societies characterized as segmented, stratified,
110

It might be possible, however, to generate social patterns as the unintended outcome of cooperative-conflictual
efforts to control some common object in a shared perceptual environment. It may even be possible to generate
unintended interaction effects via the externalities generated by means of the control strategies of individuals aimed
at controlling separate objects in a common environment. Furthermore, what is the object corresponding to the
perceptual object of control? Is it another person, an inanimate object? Powers (1998) warns that efforts to control
other control systems are bound to fail, by their very nature. None of this is discussed or elaborated.
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or functionally differentiated, in the Luhmannian sense? How does it become possible that an
actor coordinates with another at a far greater level of specificity so as to make increasing
societal complexity and differentiation possible? This highest, most abstract principle is
precisely the one that holds society together, which implies an attenuation of social bonds,
generally speaking, but which does not preclude the possibility that tighter couplings can be
generated via "involutions" in the network (cf. Fuchs 2001).
This cannot be broached by a theory which takes as its starting point, the actor, qua
consciousness or even one delimited by the principle of cybernetic control. The problem is not
only that Fararo seeks to bridge the micro-macro divide (cf. Alexander 1987). The problem
Fararo sets out to solve is even more intractable: the problem of linking in a systematic way
mind and society, via the concept of control. The coordination or lack thereof between control
mechanisms remains to be specified. At most, shared norms, taken as a cultural given (which
unlike biological parameters would then have to be explained via generators represented by
systems of differential equations), might prevent such things as conflict, but this isn't necessarily
the case.
The problem, as I see it, is that the stability and endurance of social structures, which exhibit
collective control, cannot be grasped analytically by following the individual actors. In other
words, in order to derive analytically and then measure the relative endurance of a network
structure, one must specify first the network structure itself, and then determine what individuals
and to what extent participate in the maintenance of this network structure identified as pattern.
In network theory, this has been referred to by the terms regular equivalence. Two different
bullies can be identified as such by their common relations with the bullied, even when those
who are bullied are not the same persons. The pattern of relations remains analytically
independent of the persons occupying the positions specified by the relational structure.
Although networks presuppose actors, structure and agency can be regarded as coupled yet
analytically distinct.
The problem lies in the irreducible gap between the incomprehensible complexity of the system
of possible relational ties and the complexity of the theoretical system of ties conceivable by
psychological theory. The theory of rational choice, and the commitment to methodological
individualism, is both too narrow and too general for purposes of analyzing distributed control,
that is, society as a self-organizing system. To posit as a presupposition of theory that "change
of action is in the direction of increasing utility" (222) is too broad in the sense that such a
principle can specify neither the means nor the ends of action, and is too narrow because as
Luhmann has written, it is certainly not a general case that action seeks to maximize utility,
unless utility is taken in the very broad sense of corresponding to any and all control efforts
(constituting a decline in the discrepancy of perceptions and internal references, provided that
control efforts are relatively successful). The difficulty lies not in the state space approach per
se, which is especially useful for conceptualizing possibilities, but rather, the range of the theory
is delimited by the action interpretation ascribed to it. What from inside the theory is an
enabling space or horizon can be seen from without as a constraining limitation. The capacity of
reflexive consciousness ensures that these perspectives will oscillate.
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Although social structure can be regarded as the results of unintended consequences of rationally
adaptive action, the former cannot be substantively theorized from the perspective of the latter.
In other words, from the perspective of the individual actor, shit happens. Collectively generated
consequences can be regarded by an individual in so many ways (i.e. be provided with various
meanings, from karma, to personal failings, to more sociologically imaginative understandings),
but they are all basically residue, or noise, or a stochastic error term, from the perspective of
individual actors. Using the language of statistics, it is the latent patterns in the error terms that
generate the manifest patterns of unintended consequences. Using the language of cybernetics,
the stochastic noise of a control system are those environmental disturbances that make control
efforts necessary by placing perceptions in flux.
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II.

MARKET ORDER, DISORDER, AND EMBEDDEDNESS

How do we define an economy, and how might economic processes relate to non-economic
processes, i.e. the rest of society? How is market order engendered? Granovetter uses the spatial
metaphor of an economy being 'embedded' within society; Parsons and other systems theorists
also use analytical distinctions to write about the economy as if it were a part of a larger whole,
using the language of sub-systems and systems. What if, however, the economy is not a thing at
all but an expectation, differentiated from other expectations with the aid of codified
communication? What if the economy did not consist of parts and relations, but instead was
composed of temporalized events that either happen or don't? Moreover, how would such a
system relate to other societal systems? Below I first discuss the empirical data regarding the
recent financial panic of 2007-8, including empirical indicators of market uncertainty. Next, I
discuss sociological approaches to the problem of how market order is facilitated or not.
Specifically, I discuss Granovetter and the concept of embeddedness, Parson‟s theory of the
unstructured situation, and Luhmann‟s account of the economy as a system of autopoietic
payments.

Economic Sociology and the Problem of Embeddedness
Economic sociology can be defined as the field of inquiry pertaining to the social or noneconomic conditions of the economy, encompassing economic processes and actions within their
social setting (Zafirovski and Levine 1997). Economic sociology connects the economy with
society as a whole, examining the social construction of the economy and its embeddedness in
non-economic social relations. From the perspective of economists, economic sociologists study
influences and preconditions that are exogenous to their model of markets. These exogenous
factors include: technological changes, the determination of desires and preferences, the family
and other socializing institutions that provide labor for the labor market, trust and other
mechanisms of social cohesion that are necessary for market coordination and cohesion, and so
on.
Economic theory begins with the premises of individual utility maximization and rational choice
in order to explain how markets generate Pareto-optimal results, that is, the best of all possible
worlds, or the most efficient allocation of resources. Economic sociology (e.g. Beckert 2006)
has shown, however, that there are circumstances in which Pareto-optimum results cannot even
be logically deduced from the premises of the rational actor model and utility maximization,
much less empirically warranted. More specifically, the model of homo oeconomicus cannot
explain the emergence of the shared norms that are required for cooperation to take place,
which presents a fundamental limitation of economic theory to the extent that such cooperation is
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necessary for production and exchange to occur at all. In short, nonmarket mechanisms of
coordination have to be invoked to explain how markets work.
Jens Beckert (2002) provides a comprehensive overview of the contributions that classical
sociological theorists (Durkheim, Marx, Weber) and modern theorists (e.g. Parsons, Luhmann) to
the field of economic sociology, and its relation to economic theory. Beckert carefully
formulates an internal criticism of economic theory that does not begin by examining
empirically-observed discrepancies, but rather shows, “why the normative claims of the theory
are untenable” (2002: 9), given its own premises. In other words, Beckert intends to show that if
the core axioms of economic theory are taken for granted, they do not, by themselves, generate
the kinds of efficiency outcomes that are frequently attributed to them and that provide
justification for markets.
What are the axioms of economic theory, what Beckert also refers to as the rational-actor
model? He identifies two:
1) Actors maximize their utility; and
2) decentralized processes exist (or strive towards) an equilibrium in which actors can
achieve an optimum realization of their plans.
The second axiom is said to derive from the first. If actors are free to maximize their individual
utilities, they will generate Pareto-optimal outcomes, in which no actor can be made better off
without making at least one other actor worse off. It follows that the best of all possible worlds
is achieved in a perfectly free market. The rational-actor model thus recapitulates
mathematically Adam Smith's well known theorem of an invisible hand.
Rational-actor theory has often been subjected to two kinds of criticisms, both of which Beckert
contends are misplaced. First, economic theory assumes that preferences are given and does not
examine how they emerge as does, for example, Parsons (1951 chapter 3). Beckert argues,
however, that this does not indicate that economic theory is wrong, only that it is incomplete.
The second criticism is that actors are not empirically rational. But if actors do not follow
rational calculations for making decisions, how are decisions made, and how can rationality be
distinguished from irrationality?
Robert Frank (1988) distinguishes between irrationality with regret and irrationality without
regret. The former occurs whenever an actor makes a suboptimum decision and when provided
with a superior alternative revises his previous decision, whereas in irrationality without regret he
does not. Beckert argues that irrationality with regret demonstrates that economic theory does
not represent “the empirical diversity of economic action” (12), since actors, because of a lack of
information or other reasons, often fail to adopt the strategies of action prescribed/predicted by
economic theory. This may be so, but Beckert points out that this hardly affects economic theory
because economic theory doesn‟t claim that the model of homo oeconomicus describes the actual
behavior of actors. Instead, the presumption of rational action can be defended as a heuristic
apparatus.
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The question then arises: what justifies this concept of rationality, and not some other? Three
answers can be provided:
1. Businesses require optimization decisions under conditions of competition
2. “efficient use of resources is one of the most basic conditions of fulfillment of adaptive
functions in all societies” (2002: 14)
3. In modern societies, action geared towards self-interest is legitimized in market contexts
In short, there is a justification for emphasizing the role of “purposive rationality” in analyses of
economic processes. Furthermore, deviations from this standard of rationality in the form of
irrationality with regret indicates, from the perspective of economic theory that actors should be
made more aware of their action alternatives. Economic theory is normative, its function
consisting of “informing actors about optimal strategies” (2002: 14). For these reasons, pointing
out the discrepancies between the predictions of economic theory and the empirical existence of
irrational behavior with regret is not an adequate “starting point for a sociological criticism of
economic theory” (2002: 14).
But what about irrationality without regret? Do action strategies that deliberately and knowingly
lead to suboptimal results provide a sufficient starting point for a critique of economic theory?
Certain examples of this sort of behavior include altruistic acts such as returning a wallet or
leaving a tip at a restaurant that you do not plan on visiting again. One way of addressing the
problem of altruism has been to expand the concept of rationality so as to include the utility
derived from pursuing morally right actions. It is therefore possible to act in one‟s own best
interest while pursuing altruistic acts because of the utility or satisfaction obtained from acting
altruistically, which would outweigh its costs. So long as the preferences are consistent, a
Pareto-optimal equilibrium arising from individual utility maximization can still be deduced.
Altruistic acts can be considered as selfish acts, and vice-versa. As Beckert notes, however, this
makes the concept of rationality a tautology and merely “defines the problem away” (2002: 16).
Beckert maintains that pointing out the existence of irrationality without regret is not an
adequate starting point for a sociological critique of economic theory. He provides two reasons.
First, business decisions, even if they are not determined by the market, are never intentionally
irrational or altruistic. Even when their decisions do not lead to an optimal maximization of
profits, they regret having made these bad decisions in hindsight. Second, empirically it can be
shown or at least argued that actors in economic contexts are almost always “oriented toward
their own self-interest” (2002: 16). In short, irrational behavior with regret is a marginal
phenomenon within economic contexts, and therefore a sociological critique of economic theory
based solely on these exceptions would limit itself to so-called deviant cases (2002: 17).
Instead Beckert proposes that economic sociology should begin "not in a criticism of the action
model of homo oeconomicus per se but rather in the critical question behind both assumptions of
economic theory- that, by action following the premises of the theory, actors, can, in principle,
achieve efficient equilibria; and that, even in extremely contingent action situations, actors can
derive optimizing decisions from their preference order” (2002: 17). Irrational action, he
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argues, can sometimes be regarded as a means of solving these problems, and also points to the
“embeddedness of economic action as a foundation of economic efficiency" (2002: 18: my
emphasis).
Beckert's main point is that efficiency cannot always be generated from the premises of the
rational-actor model. Rather than criticizing the theory on the grounds that the premises are
empirically invalid, Beckert takes them for granted, but argues that, by themselves, they are
insufficient conditions for demonstrating that markets generates Pareto-optimum outcomes. To
secure theoretically optimal outcomes, rational actor theory must be supplemented with
additional insights imported from economic sociology.
As he phrases it, sociology is needed to explain why market failure does not occur. The
problem, however, is that his use of the term “market failure” exhibits a tendentious ambiguity.
If by market failure he simply means that markets do not reach some theoretical optimum, than it
is by no means certain that the markets ever avoids “market failure” in this restricted sense.
Moreover, in light of recent events, the orientation of this research agenda seems grossly out of
synch with market realities.
Beckert's research agenda, in my opinion, is oriented towards proving what economics already
presumes: the efficiency of markets. Economic sociology points out that economic theory has
not proven markets are optimal means of allocating goods and services, but takes for granted that
they are, in fact, optimal means of allocating goods and services. The purpose of economic
sociology, according to Beckert, is ultimately to provide the argumentative resources necessary
to render even more convincing the economic justification for markets. Sociology becomes the
handmaiden of economics, safeguarding for it the claim that rational actions are the road that
leads to the best of all possible worlds.

Political and Economic Order: Granovetter and Embedded Markets
In a review of the field of economic sociology, a useful place to begin is Granovetter's 1985
article "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness", which
according to Fligstein and Dauter (2007) is the most cited paper in sociology in the postwar
period. As Jens Beckert (2002) notes, the term embededdness because of its "illusiveness" does
not directly lead to an operationalization of the research process. Sociologists since Karl Polanyi
have used the term to mean different things, but in general, what the term embeddedness
denotes is the idea that in order to understand individual economic action, it is necessary to
investigate the social context in which this action takes place.
Granovetter's main concern is in finding a way of talking about the economy and economic
action in a way that does justice to the problems of social order, namely, to develop an
approach that would provide an adequate account of how social order is possible both within and
between macro-actors such as firms that compete in a market. He argues that most accounts of
economic actions are either under-socialized or over-socialized, and that both rely on a view of
atomized actors. Under-socialized accounts conceive of economic actors as atomized, utility
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maximizers without morals, relationships, feelings, or any of the other recognizable features that
make us human, apart from those that can be modeled by differential optimization problems.
This approach is characteristic of micro-economics and rational choice theory. On the other
hand, over-socialized accounts treat behavioral patterns as the result of unproblematic
socialization processes in which individuals unquestionably internalize the values and norms
bequeathed to them by society at large. This approach is characteristic of Durkheimian
sociology and Parson's structural-functionalism.
Granovetter writes that in the over-socialized accounts:
Social influence ... is an external force that, like the deists‟ God, sets things in motion and
has no further effects- a force that insinuates itself into the minds and bodies of
individuals (as in the movie Invasion of the Body Snatchers), altering their way of
making decisions. Once we know in just what way an individual has been affected,
ongoing social relations and structures are irrelevant. Social influences are all contained
inside an individual‟s head, so, in actual decision situations, he or she can be atomized as
any Homo economicus, though perhaps with different rules for decisions.” (486)
The behavior of individuals, in other words, is the determined outcome of social role positions
that are already established ex ante. The socialization process, often not well defined, is no
longer in process. Social relations are frozen, so that agency becomes a mere epiphenomenon of
a hypostasized social structure. Economic actors are atomized because their actions are
functions of a previous process of socialization that is uninfluenced by extant relationships and
social contexts. The process of decision making is still determined and contained within an
individual, only the algorithm that determines the decisions has changed.
One issue that has been addressed within economic sociology primarily from under and oversocialized perspectives has been that of trust in economic relationships. Thomas Hobbes had
pointed out that there is nothing in the notion of self-interest that excludes force or fraud. If
economic actors are really individual utility-maximizers without regard for others, then what
prevents them from reneging on their contractual obligations or from stealing? In other words,
under the restrictive assumptions of the relentless pursuit of personal pleasure, is a market even
possible?
A contemporary under-socialized account, the new institutional economics, which seeks to
explain social institutions from a neoclassical economics perspective, argues that institutional
arrangements avert anti-social behavior by making it too costly for the individual actors to
engage in it. This retains the premises of atomized individualism, while obviating the barriers to
trust that such premises engender, by positing functional substitutes for it. Granovetter argues
that such accounts ignore the obligations inherent in concrete personal relations (489).
Furthermore, dismissing the reality of personal obligations by substituting organizational
sanctions against anti-social behavior results in a "Hobbesian situation, in which any rational
individual would be motivated to develop clever ways to evade them; it is then hard to imagine
that everyday economic life would not be poisoned by ever more ingenious attempts at deceit”
(489). The "problem" of trust, which is a precondition for the possibility of markets, cannot be
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solved with this approach.
For Hobbes the guarantor of order is the state. Durkheim posited the existence of a precontractual solidarity that acts as a kind of social glue, binding people together in a moral
community. This pre-contractual solidarity had its basis in shared experiences and feelings of
belonging or togetherness, primarily generated through participatory rituals and other symbolic
acts. The problem, for Granovetter, of explaining trust on the basis of some generalized morality
is that it has "the oversocialized characteristic of calling on a generalized and automatic
response, even though moral action in economic life is hardly automatic or universal..." (489).
Moreover, he points out that a generalized morality, is only applicable to specific and marginal
cases, such as when an economist tips at a restaurant that (s)he is unlike to visit again in the
future (489). Granovetter contests the explanatory power of a general morality that is
internalized within economic actors. In short, Granovetter argues that "social relations, rather
than institutional arrangements or generalized morality, are mainly responsible for the production
of trust in economic life" (491).
To avoid the perceived risk of being overly "optimistic" (491) about securing a harmonious
social order (an accusation frequently directed towards Parsons), Granovetter suggests two
caveats. First, he points out that embededdness is a matter of degree, and does not totally
remove instances of distrust and disorder. Second, he insists that social relations are necessary
but insufficient for eliminating malfeasance. He notes that trust between actors itself presents
"enhanced opportunities for malfeasance" (492); that force and fraud can be carried out by
cooperative teams; and finally, that the extent of disorder resulting from fraud or force varies
according to the structure of network relations.
Disorder, in other words, is not necessarily coterminous with violations of trust, and there is no
point-for-point correspondence between them. For example, a large scale war actually
presupposes networks of social relations, because otherwise conflicts are merely episodic and
transient.111 To illustrate how his approach differs from previous attempts to understand the
relationship between markets and social relations, Granovetter engages in a detailed critique
Oliver Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies (1975).
Williamson's study addresses the differences between economic activities within and between
hierarchical firms. Williamson posits a co-relation of disorder between firms and an alternative
co-relation of order within firms, and attributes the states of disorder and order to the absence or
presence of structures of governance, respectively, which serves as a substitute for trust.
Granovetter calls this a Hobbesian argument that exaggerates the efficacy of firms to generate
internal order, while under playing the social order between firms generated by social relations.
Granovetter argues that the first account of order within firms is over-socialized, and the second
account of order between firms is under-socialized.112 Granovetter specifically takes issue with
111

Note, however, that Granovetter equates war with disorder, and then says that they depend on a kind of "order".
He does not adequately distinguish disorder from violations of trust. In my view, violations of trust are orthogonal
to the issue of order.
112
In brief, Williamson argues that transactions that are uncertain in outcome and recur frequently are internalized
within firms because the authority structures of firms are more efficient at taming the enhanced risks of opportunism
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Williamson's assertions that "complex market transactions approximate a Hobbesian state of
nature that can only be resolved by internalization within a hierarchical structure” (495).
It is important to note that Granovetter is not disputing the claim that transactions within firms
might be denser or endure longer than relations between firms. He is only pointing out that
transactions across firms and organizations are also embedded in social relations, and that these
relations exhibit order to a degree unexpected in Williamson's theory. Granovetter mentions the
existence of interlocking directorates and subcontracting as examples of the overlap between
business and social relations that exist between firms in the market, suggesting that these social
relations develop because of the benefits associated with them.
Granovetter's explication here is unconvincing. It is unclear whether he is providing a refutation
based on the premises of the theory he claims to be criticizing, or providing a criticism of those
premises. Here, he appears to be doing the former: explaining why it is rational for individuals
to generate social relations. Another problem is that he never clearly distinguishes social from
business or economic relations. Can we really consider sub-contracting a social relation and not
a business relation?
Specifically, he argues contra Williamson that hierarchies do not emerge to solve the problem of
order, because "long-term relations of contractors and subcontractors, as well as the
embeddedness of those relations in a community of construction personnel, generate standards of
expected behavior that not only obviate the need for but are superior to pure authority relations
in discouraging malfeasance.” (498: my emphasis). Williamson argues that hierarchies solve
information and communication problems particularly for labor markets where firms can rely on
internal promotions, but Granovetter counters this by arguing that information about employees
also spans across firms and that social networks link actors within different firms.
Summary
Granovetter rejects the assumptions that order reigns within firms, and Hobbesian disorder reigns
between firms, arguing that disorder can be found within firms and order between them. On the
one hand, power relations within firms are far less successful in quelling conflict than empirical
studies indicate. On the other hand, asymmetrical power relations between firms often quell
potential conflicts, since weaker firms are "apt to capitulate early so as to cut its losses" (502).
Granovetter proposes that levels of order and disorder have less to do with organizational form
than Williamson expects, and "more to do with structures of [social] relations" (503).
Granovetter fails, however, to explain the difference between social relations and organizational
form. By "structure" of social relations, does he mean "organizational form" of social relations,
as opposed to "organizational form" of economic relations?
and other disorderly acts that arise in these situations. It presupposes that there are "sets" of transactions that exist
prior to being located within or between firms. He argues that transactions that are uncertain in outcome and
frequent, become internalized, as if external relations between individuals were an a priori condition, and that
internalization is a process of controlling these contingencies, or of reducing complexity. If this is true, however,
then these sets of transactions cease to be uncertain in outcome, which renders the argument a hypothetical
reconstruction of what these sets of transactions must have been before being internalized, that is, as different kinds
of transactions altogether!
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Granovetter offers a twofold hypothesis: that we should expect a) the absence personal or social
relationships between transacting firms to occur under conditions in which social relations result
in conflict and disorder (a tautology), and/or b) the absence of such personal relations to
generate pressures towards vertical integration, or internalization of transactions within firms.
As he puts it:
Other things being equal, for example, we should expect pressure toward vertical
integration in a market where transacting firms lack a network of personal relations that
connects them or where such a network eventuates in conflict, disorder, opportunism, or
malfeasance. On the other hand, where a stable network of relations mediates complex
transactions and generates standards of behavior between firms, such pressures should be
absent (503: my emphasis).
His hypothesis as formulated gives equal weight to the probability of social relations generating
either order or disorder, which appears to contravene his earlier argument that social relations
generate order more efficiently than relations of authority, which marks a distinction between
social and authoritative relationships. He also reintroduces here the distinction between order
and conflict, whereas earlier in this article he stated explicitly that sustained conflict presupposes
order. Putting these objections aside, Granovetter seems to imply functionally equivalent
solutions to the problem of social order in markets: social or personal relationships can provide
functional equivalents to codified relations of authority. Where the former are lacking, there
exist pressures for the emergence of the latter.
Comments
There are a number of theoretical problems with this formulation. For one, it is merely assumed
and stipulated that there are pressures toward order rather than entropy. Second, the hypothesis
should also run the other way: if there are functionally equivalent solutions with equal
probability of success, then assuming pressures toward order, a lack of organizational forms of
authority within firms should result in pressures toward appropriately friendly social relations
between firms. When formulated this way, however, the idea that there are such "pressures"
appears implausible. The theory leaves unspecified the initial pressures that determine the
presence or absence of these order-generating mechanisms, and why a lack of one such
mechanism should result in a higher probability of the other such order-generating mechanism
from emerging. This emergence is especially implausible given that order, when distinguished
from either entropy or noise, is by definition more improbable.
Stated more simply, Granovetter's hypothesis boils down to the claim that both the absence of
order-securing social relations and the presence of order-disturbing social relations, result in
alternative relations that secure order. Heads: the presence of order; tails: the absence of
disorder. Despite his own acknowledgement of the risks of being too "optimistic" regarding the
probability of social order, his theoretically derived hypothesis is blind to the likelihood of
disorder, or alternatively, fails to specify means by which inherently improbable outcomes of
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order are rendered probable.
The central problem with Granovetter's formulation, as I see it, is his failure to distinguish
clearly his main concept of social relations. I can discern the following alternative sets of
distinctions that provide alternative meanings to this concept: social as personal relationships,
distinguished from impersonal ones; social as distinct from economic transactions; and social as
distinct from relations of authority or governance. It is clear that the social is not distinct from
either order or malfeasance, since social relations can generate trust or distrust, order or
disorder. If the social is associated with personal, and non-social with impersonal, then only one
side of the distinction is marked, to use the terminology of G. Spencer Brown. In other words,
the social marks the "personal" sphere, but the non-personal sphere is undefined. What counts as
non-personal? Does this distinction cut across other system categories such as law and politics?
If the social is also distinct from economic relations, does the economy fall into the category of
the impersonal? Furthermore, why are authorial or economic relations necessarily impersonal?
Finally, the notion of embeddedness, as Beckert (2002) points out, is also not well defined. The
metaphor of embeddedness implies a relation of enclosure which can be depicted as two
concentric circles with different radii. This entails both the primacy of society in relation to the
economy and the primacy of the distinction between economy and society. Neither society nor
the economy, however, is systematically defined in relation to the other. One receives the
impression that society refers to the lifeworld, or to a sphere of communication that is more
personal and/or amenable to direct human communication than is the economy, which is
subordinated to these social imperatives. This assumption, however, is unwarranted without
empirical corroboration. Without further clarity of semantics, Granovetter's main concepts of
embeddedness and social relations generate a degree of conceptual noise than might be useful for
further theoretical development.
As we shall see in the case of the global debt crisis, what might be construed as social
imperatives, guided by the visible hand of communication free from domination (cf. Habermas
1987), are increasingly steered according to codified economic media of money and debt.
Furthermore, the concept of the economy should not be conflated with that of the market. By
implicitly counter posing markets and society, Grannovetter and other economic sociologists
have neglected the fact that most aspects of the economic sub-system bear little or no
resemblance to markets as understood by classical and neoclassical economics.
In my view, alternatives to the metaphor of embeddedness can be formulated using concepts
derived from systems theories, especially those of Parsons and Luhmann, to be discussed below.
More recently, Leydesdorff has proposed the triple-helix model , depicted in figure 87, as a
heuristic visual device for understanding the complex dynamics generated by three (or more)
relating sub-systems. Leydesdorff (2006) has also, however, has also used this metaphor as a
heuristic for empirical research, and has used non-parametric entropy statistics as a way of
devising and testing hypotheses regarding the system-ness of three or more hypothesized subsystems (e.g. government, industry, and university relations). The dynamics represented by the
triple helix can also be a useful way to understand the asynchronous interactions between other
types of systems (e.g. interactions, organizations, and societal systems). Although it is outside
189

Figure 87. Triple Helix depiction of interacting sub-dynamics.

the scope of this essay to review these developments here, in my view, the triple helix model is
one example of how systems theories can be used to develop an alternative to the static metaphor
of embededdness.
In summary, Granovetter‟s theory of embeddedness can be understood as an attempt to address
the issue of the primacy of politics (via power) or economics (via money), broadly understood.
Granovetter formulates the issue of market order, however, as a distinction between order within
and between firms, focalizes only the power side of the distinction. The type of order he refers
to implicitly refers only to power, a concept moreover that is under-specified. He thus ignores
the role that money plays in the facilitation of market order, either in lieu of, or with the
presumption of, political power. More importantly, he neglects the specific ecological
conditions that either facilitate or deteriorate the trust necessary for successful economic
communications.

Parsons’ Economic System
As depicted by Parsons, action systems consist of finite, means-ends chains, linking ultimate
means with empirical ends (although there are also non-empirical ends that serve as motivations
for actions, such as going to Heaven). Each act can serve as a means to several different ends,
and conversely, different acts can be used to reach a given end. The theory of action systems
proposes a three-level cybernetic control hierarchy:
1) the realm of ultimate values (sociology);
2) the realm of intermediate means-ends (politics and economics); and
3) the realm of ultimate means and conditions.
Corresponding to the first two levels of action are three analytically distinct theories of action:
1) Sociological theory, pertaining to the emergent property of common-value integration in the
sphere of ultimate values/ends; 2) Political theory, pertaining to the emergent property of
coercive rationality in the sphere of intermediate means; 3) and economic theory, pertaining to
the emergent property of economic rationality also in the intermediate sphere.
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Non-rational actions refer to the actions oriented towards the ultimate ends and values that are
not means to other ends. Non-rational actions are governed by values, and society at some level
of abstraction constitutes a common value system. This is roughly synonymous with Durkheim‟s
notion of the collective conscience. 113 For Parsons, some degree of commonness of values is a
necessary precondition for the existence of social order.114
For Parsons, the economy is a sub-system of society but does is a collectivity, in the Parsonian
sense, that is, the economy is not capable of “action in concert” (Parsons and Smelser 1954: 15).
This action in concert entails: “the mobilization of the collectivity‟s resources to attain specific
and usually explicit goals” and the formalization of a decision-making process for the
collectivity as a whole (Parsons and Smelser 1954: 15). As Parsons suggests, no economic
system is a collectivity in this regard. Imporantly, whereas a collectivity is always
multifunctional (i.e. it can accomplish many tasks while retaining its unity as collectivity), an
economic sub-system is always unifunctional.
That the economy is not a self-regulating, autonomous system has been generally acknowledged
(cf. Beckert 2006; Granovetter 1985; Polanyi 1944). If the economy is neither an exhaustive
description of social reality nor self-sustaining, then how should economic relations be related to
the society as a whole? According to Parsons, economic theory pertains to a special case of
social systems, which is empirically conceivable as a sub-system within a more comprehensive
social system, or society (1954: 7). Parsons theory of social systems aims to accomplish the
following: 1) to establish the relationships between the economic and the non-economic aspects
or dimensions of society; 2) to show how economic theory can be derived from the general
theory of action systems; 3) to show how economic theory is a special case of this general
theory; 4) and finally, how identifying the relations between the economy and society illuminate
the boundaries of the former (Parsons and Smelser 1954: 7).
Parsons regards the distinction between supply and demand as a special case of the distinction
between performance and sanction. A performance is an act observed with respect to its
contribution to system maintenance, as in a role-performance; whereas a sanction is an act
observed with respect to its effect on the state of the actor. This is an analytical distinction.
Parsons insists that every concrete act contains both aspects. The basic logic of performances
and sanctions is that of rewards: “the amount of performance contribution is a function of the
expectation (and in the long run, receipt) of sanction” (1954: 10). Likewise, in economics, a
supply curve slops upward indicating that a greater market performance by suppliers requires a
greater possibility of sanction (i.e. reward) in the form of higher prices.
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Fararo (1998) suggests that common value system might be better labeled a commonness of values variable.
Fararo labels this thesis the sociologistic theorem: "A necessary condition for social order is that the ultimate
ends of action of the various actors form, to some degree, a common value system" (1998: 97). He cites two
interpretations of this theorem: 1) a derived threshold theorem which states that social order requires the existence
of at least one attractor in social state space (which would require a specification of the state variables that
constitute the state space and the specification of parameters that define the parameter space); and 2) rational choice
theory, game theory, and economic theory, which define social order as an equilibrium condition in which no actor
has an incentive to change action given the actions of all others
114
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In Parsons‟ theory, the goal of the economy is the maximization of production of income or
wealth. 115 A goal is defined as a “satisfactory relation between the state of a system and relevant
objects in an external situation” (Parsons and Smelser 1954: 20). The goal of the economy,
understood from a systems-theoretical point of view, is not to maximize the utility of individuals,
for the goals of economic output are defined as socially structured goals.
The goal of the polity, meanwhile, is to “maximize the capacity of the society to attain system
goals, i.e. collective goals” (1954: 48; my emphasis). They define this “capacity” as power,
which they define as “the generalized capacity to mobilize the resources of the society, including
wealth and other ingredients … to attain particular and more or less immediate collective goals
of the system” (1954: 49).
The polity is said to produce power as an output for the rest of society. The polity itself is not
powerful; rather, society is powerful or not as a result of the power produced by the polity.
Likewise, the economy produces wealth for society, but is not itself wealthy or poor. Instead, the
economy can be more accurately described as productive or non-productive. The environment or
situation of each subsystem consists of the other three. The economy, for instance, is embedded
in a context (or “primary social situation”) consisting of the polity, the integrative system, and
the pattern-maintenance system (1954: 52). Moreover, the boundaries of these sub-systems can
be thought of as input-output relations, in which each sub-system provides a necessary input for
other sub-systems. Parsons and Smelser argue that these inputs are specialized inputs originating
from specific sub-systems.
For instance, the economy provides a specific input to the pattern-maintenance sub-system (e.g.
the household), namely, income for consumers; whereas the household provides to the economy
necessary training and institutionalization of economic values (e.g. the Protestant work ethic). 116
I will discuss below in more detail the boundary relation between the economy and polity, which
Parsons suggests is the creation of credit. As a general rule, a sub-system interchanges with
another “primarily at one boundary only” (1954: 206).
The Creation of Credit
Following Parsons, credit creation is primarily a political operation which distributes a power
relation. Money does not primarily facilitate exchange but confers power. The power of the
monetary code is power in the sense that both Foucault and Parsons use the term: power as
capacity. The state, qua its political function, should not be confused with the “government”,
which refers to specific organizational forms. Governments are organizations that regulate the

115

Wealth is the aggregate stock of economic value of commodities at any given time, whereas income is the flow
of “command over such values per unit of time” (Parsons and Smelser 1954: 21; my emphasis). That income is a
flow of command should be emphasized since the accumulation of money generates the capacity to spend.
116
This bears some resemblance to the well-known circular flow diagram in economics, in which households
provide to firms capital and labor, and firms provide to household income.
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societal, and hence global, system of economic communications. 117 Importantly, social
communication does not terminate at the border. The polity is instead made up of what we might
call an ecology or constellation of organizations.
The political input into the economy is the creation of credit. Parsons and Smelser write:
In our technical sense, the creation of credit is primarily an exercise of power in that
facilities necessary for the pursuit of goals are restricted by mean of the imposition of
situational controls over the access to these facilities. The decision to create credit is in
the first instance a decision to make available facilities for the pursuit of economic goals;
the decision not to create credit (or to reduce the volume outstanding) is a decision to
restrict these facilities by direct control of the situation. Hence generalizing purchasing
power, introduced into the economy as capital through credit, is a form of power in our
technical sense. (1954: 57)
The power to create credit is, in this sense, analogous to the power to tax. The power to create
credit is a political function, even though in our society it is most commonly associated with
banks, which are thought to reside in the economic, rather than political, sphere. Again, the
distinction Parsons and Smelser draw is analytical rather than concrete, but I think it is
particularly useful for understanding the recent credit crisis.
Within the investment-capitalism sub-system of the economy, the adaptation and latent-pattern
maintenance sectors are especially relevant with respect to credit. Parsons and Smelser write
that the most salient mechanism by which the “adaptive function of the investment-capitalization
sub-system is maximized” is the “guarantee of the liquidity of securities” (1954: 202). This
enables adaptation in the sense that businesses can re-allocate funds to various firms, drop or
adopt new investment commitments, and so on.
Credit works by supplying a “level of rewards associated with a higher level of goal-attainment
than is in fact being realized at the time the credit is extended” (1954: 63). This temporary
guarantee of income (reward), however, is always conditional on repayment. Default occurs
whenever expectations of growth are not obtained. This becomes a societal wide disturbance,
however, when it involves societal sub-systems. Parsons and Smelser provide an example of the
relationship between the adaptive sub-system of the economy (Aa), the goal of which is to
increase productivity, and the relevant latency sub-system of the (Lg) , the goal of which is to
maintain or enhance a style of life in accordance with increasing income. Parsons and Smelser
observe that:
[T]he greater the amount of credit creation, the higher the rate of growth of capital
productivity required to meet the expected goal. If this requisite rate is not met, either
because of the limitations of the investment process itself or because of higher
requirements demanded by the relevant political authority, then the familiar
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That the monetary system is global implies a global sub-system of political power. This sub-system of political
power, however, is latent, and is not codified in organizational form. This hypothesis is elaborated by Deleuze and
Guattari (1987) and later by Hardt and Negri (2000).
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consequences of economic disturbance appear: inflation, withdrawal of funds, business
failure, hoarding, speculation, etc. (1954: 64)
An examination of the systems theories and anthropological literature suggests that monetary
power presupposes and is derived from state power, specifically, the power to tax. 118 The
economy, in its most elementary forms,, is thus a derivation of taxation. Both are the index of
expression of a more fundamental process. The money form is therefore a precondition of the
economic code, and not a consequence. Some nexus of communication, which constitutes the
universal equivalent form of money, must be presupposed in order for individuals to enter into
commodity production.119
Deleuze and Guattari explain the political derivation of money in the Greek city of Corinth:
In effect, money is a correlate of the stock; it is a subset of the stock in that it can be
constituted by any object that can be preserved over the long term. In the case of
Corinth, metal money was first distributed to the „poor‟ (in their capacity as producers)
who used it to by [sic] land rights; it thus passed into the hands of the „rich‟, on the
condition that it not stop there, that everyone, rich and poor, pay a tax, the poor in goods
or services, the rich in money, such that an equivalence money-goods and services was
established…
[M]oney is always distributed by an apparatus of power under conditions of conservation,
circulation, and turnover, so that an equivalence goods-services-money can be
established. We therefore do not believe in a succession according to which labor rent
would come first, followed by rent in kind, followed by money rent. It is directly in
taxation that the equivalence and simultaneity of the three develop. As a general rule, it
is taxation that monetarizes [sic] the economy; it is taxation that creates money… (1987:
443).
The creation of money is an effect of what Deleuze and Guattari call an apparatus of capture,
which they identify with the state as an emergent abstract machine (1987). Their thesis is that an
apparatus of capture constitutes that which it captures. For example, legal violence presupposes
and constitutes the object of illegality. Likewise, money is constituted at the same time that it is
appropriated. This is why the state appears pre-accomplished, as presupposing itself.
The apparatus of capture is therefore a mechanism of time-binding. Liquidity is introduced as
debt, so that generalized purchasing power is not dissipated outward indefinitely, but periodically
returned to its originator. The originator in this case is analytically distinguished by Parsons as
the polity, which is moreover concretely instantiated in a system of public and private lending
118

Moreover, this concept of money as debt traces a direct line of continuity between non-modern and modern
forms of social mediation, enabling us to draw more insightful comparisons and historical delineations.
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Nor should the distinction of organization and interaction be conflated with the distinction of macro and micro.
A single individual can participate in organizational communication to the extent that the communication is
processed as a decision within organized networks. Nicos P. Mouzelis (1968) points out that, macro-interactions
can occur between individuals, such as the communications that occur between CEOs representing corporations, or
heads of state representing nations.
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institutions, most notably central and private banks. These institutions constitute organizations,
in Luhmann‟s sense.
The apparatus of capture (i.e. the state) is an emergent tendency. Whenever it is not historically
actualized, it is warded off by anticipation-prevention mechanisms. The emergent process of
state coexists alongside processes of non-state and anti-state mechanisms. There is the cyclical,
ritualized “primitive” violence operating according to the limit, in the form of gang violence
which concurs with state violence in the form of the police, just as money-taxation concurs
alongside the flows that escape economic codification. In Luhmann‟s terms, we might say that
there exists noise that both escapes and makes possible the code of the economic system. This
apparatus establishes the code of equivalence that makes possible the abstract, circular flow that
it appropriates. This flow is emergent: it does not exist prior to being appropriated, and exists
only as a global property of a system (Bunge 2003). The societal subsystem of economy is a
code of social mediation that is seemingly pre-accomplished and everywhere simultaneously.
An important distinction from Latour will clarify the non-local, emergent property of the
economic subsystem. Latour (1988) distinguishes between relativism, which posits that there is
no independent observer, and relativity, which posits that there is no privileged point of view.
Latour writes:
[I]f relativism is right, each one of [the perspectives] will benefit as much as any other. If
relativity is right, only one of them (that is, the enunciator, Einstein or some other
physicist) will be able to accumulate in one place (his laboratory, his office) the
documents, reports and measurements sent back by all his delegates (23).
Latour points out, however, that “it is not his privileged point of view that gives a centre a
superiority over other locations, but its rejection of any privilege to any local point of view
including its own, thus permitting the gathering in one point of all the super-imposable traces”
(23-4). The quantitative comparison of commodities facilitates the capacity for generalized
exchange and appropriation, engendering an emergent power or “privileged point of view” of the
economy (qua subsystem) by denying any privilege to local points of view. It operates nonlocally. All economic communications occur as (necessarily) collective payments that
presuppose anticipations of future repayment elsewhere; each economic communication
presupposes and anticipates a circular flow and thus operates non-locally (in time and space).
The creation of money via debt illustrates this concept.
Parsons on Investment and the unstructured situation
In Parsons‟s theory of the social system, the primary relationship between the capitalization subsystem and the production sub-system within the economy is the flow of investment, whose
sanctions are “primarily dividends or interest payments on securities” (1954: 210). Parsons and
Smelser define investment as the “intra-economic allocation of already-earmarked monetary
facilities to already-demanded production” (1954: 212).
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Table 14. Investment as Boundary Relation within and between Economic sub-system.

Polity
Ga

Economy
[A(a)a – A(g)a] 

Culture
Lg

Investment is internal to the economy, yet it also coordinates the boundary interchanges between
the economy and two other societal sub-systems. Parsons and Smelser write that investment “is
the adaptive cross-tie within the economy which articulates the sets of decisions occurring at the
Ag-Lg and Aa-Ga boundaries” (1954: 234). This is depicted in Table 14.
Because of its unique tripartite boundary position, Parsons and Smelser suggest that the
investment process “should be the locus of an elaborate system of signs concerning the condition
and success of the economy‟s functioning,” and that therefore, “risk and uncertainty” should be
“most extensively institutionalized in the investment market” (1954: 134; my emphasis).
Furthermore, the investment situation is one which can be characterized as unstructured. All
situations can be characterized along a continuum of structured-unstructured. In a highly
structured situation, “there are a minimum of possible responses other than the ones required by
the norms of the situation; adaptation is carefully defined: and usually the situation is not very
confusing psychologically” (1954: 236). Parsons and Smelser continue to write that:
The investment market fails to adhere to any of these characteristics of a structured
situation: the range of adaptive responses (i.e. speculation) is not limited in a formal
sense; there is a great deal of maneuver, as the daily quotations on the stock market show;
and the loose definition of the appropriate adaptations (i.e .moves all made on the basis of
„hunches‟, „tips‟, „shrewdness‟, etc.) produces a great deal of psychological confusion
and strain. The investment market is a prototype of the unstructured situation. It thereby
allows for the wide and rapid fluctuation of the investment function. (1954: 136)

Luhmann and the economy as autopoieisis of payments
Luhmann disregards two prior approaches to the economy:
1. Natural law theory, which views the economy as a practical or moral institution required
for the satisfaction of human needs; and
2. Materialist theory, which relates the economy to material fundamental needs, which
deduce “from their natural primacy over other needs the social primacy of the economy”
(1982: 193).
Luhmann defines the economy as operationally-closed communication system whose elements
consist of payments, or transactions. The economy is an autopoietic and self-referential societal
system of monetary communicative events, which is continually reconstituted via the repeated
deployment of its genetic distinction (pay/not-pay), to the exclusion of other possible
distinctions. Luhmann writes:
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By the economy we mean all those operations transacted through the payment of money.
Whenever money is involved, directly or indirectly, the economy is involved regardless
of who makes the payment and whose needs are affected. This occurs, for example, in
the collection of taxes or government expenditure for public goods. (1989: 51).
Originally, the economy was coded through the code of property, to own or not to own.
Importantly, the distinction of owning/not-owning primarily excludes others from using a good
or service. This provided a basis of private property. This pre-monetary code was insufficient
for the functional differentiation of the economy as occurs in modern society. In Luhmann's
terminology, money and credit introduce a "technically superior secondary coding" of
payment/non-payment that replaces, within the context of the economy, the property code of
having/non-having property (1989: 64). Money facilitates the emergence of a new, selfconsistent field of generalized exchange, which results from the projection of a "new, more
abstract sort of tie" (White 2008: 76).
For Luhmann, the function of the economy is to preserve a sufficiently generalized capacity (i.e.
liquidity) to extend the temporal horizon of need satisfaction (i.e. to a guarantee satisfaction of
future needs). The economy thus enables society to gain time by enabling participants to
postpone decisions. Luhmann posits that: “we can specify needs and the means for satisfying
them only to the extent that we can defer some of these needs and guarantee their satisfaction in
the future” (1982: 194). In short, the economy enables society to defer decisions.
The primary function of the economy is therefore not the allocation of resources, efficiently or
otherwise, or the abolition of scarcity, because to understand a resource as scarce implies:
“an abstract point of comparison whereby needs can be treated independently of
situations. By means of the idea of scarcity, needs can remain expressed over time, and
by reference to the mechanism of money equivalences are set up among them. Money is
chronically scarce, and thus it is appropriate as a continuous expression of the abstract
necessity of guaranteeing in the present the satisfaction of future needs” (1982: 195).
Importantly, the economic system is not coterminous with a “market.” Regarding markets,
Luhmann writes that:
I have not been able to understand and to translate into a sociological language what
economists understand by the „market.‟ The crucial systems-theoretical insight is that the
market is not a „subsystem‟ of the economic system but its system-internal environment
or section of this environment viewed from the perspective of the individual subsystems.
(1989: 163fn.)
He continues:
An adequate market theory does not exist, even in economics. What is noticeable is a
great amount of differentiation among contexts of competition, exchange and cooperation. (1989: 54)
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The code of the economic sub-system, the primary distinction that distinguishes the monetary
medium from other media, is the binary distinction: paying/not-paying. This code, however,
does not specify any concrete instructions or criteria to determine whether payment or nonpayment is selected. In addition to codes, there are programs that function to overcome the
meaning emptiness of codes, that is, to specify criteria and preferences, and to indicate reasons
for making payments. This requires introjecting into this operationally closed system values and
norms and so on from the environment of the system (Beckert 2006).120
Summary and Evaluation of Parsons and Luhmann
The approaches adopted by both Luhmann and Parsons to understand the economic system have
considerable advantages over traditional economic theory. First, and most importantly, they do
not conflate the economy with markets. In Parsons‟s model, the economy serves the purpose of
maximizing wealth for society through processes of production. In Luhmann‟s account, the
differentiated economy primarily defers decisions, thus enabling other sorts of communications
to occur in the meantime. For Luhmann, any monetary transaction is economic, regardless of the
motive or effect. At this level of generality, the economy does not necessarily refer to any
particular economic model. Luhmann even regards market equilibrium as unlikely. These
theories are especially fruitful for understanding systemic crises, such as the global debt crisis,
which in my view cannot be understood primarily as a market phenomenon.
The primary difference between the two theories lies in their respective understanding of the
concept of system and sub-system. Each perspective illuminates some features of society while
overlooking others. For example, Parsons emphasizes the linkages between different subsystems within society, including the linkages between various sectors and sub-sectors between
these sub-systems. Parsons, however, has no concept of system environment. The social system
is entirely self-contained, and society as a whole constitutes the environments for each of its
parts. From this point of view, there are no blind spots, nothing that isn‟t taken into account.
This is in stark contrast to Luhmann‟s model.
Luhmann‟s account of society‟s sub-systems, on the other hand, seems to make communication
between society‟s sub-systems impossible. Rather than a series of interconnected parts, a better
metaphor for Luhmannian systems would be that of a field of simultaneously transmitting
communications. The sub-systems of society are less like organic parts than channels of
communication, which can only be detected (or not) with a suitable transmitter. In his systemenvironment schema, the societal sub-systems all constitute the environments for the others, but
this is not the same meaning of environment as discussed by Parsons. In Luhmann‟s theory,
societal sub-systems are autopoeitic and operationally closed. Consequently, societal sub-
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Morever, Beckert argues that this does not violate the premise of operational closure, however, because this only
pertains to codes, not programs, and in addition, these programs still have to be translated into monetary terms.
Morality and politics can still influence the economy, but the economy still must "formulate the conditions for their
articulation" if they are to be translated into something other than noise for the economy (2006: 235).
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systems are not subordinate systems as they are for Parsons. For Luhmann, these systems are
not embedded. They tend to operate autonomously. It is as if by an accident of history and
evolution that society is capable of continuing in this manner and to process this much
complexity.
How, if at all, do these societal systems interact? Luhmann introduces the concept of resonance
to describe the relationship between a system and its environment. Although societal subsystems such as the economy are closed, they do expose themselves to their environments in
exceptional cases. A useful analogy helps describe what he means:
One can imagine a dictionary that would define nearly all the concepts that it uses by
referring to other definitions and would allow reference to undefined concepts only in
exceptional cases. An editorial committee could then be formed which would supervise
whether language changes the meaning of those undefined concepts or, through the
formation of new ones, disturbs the closure of the lexical universe without determining
how changes in the entries are to be handled when this disturbance occurs. The richer the
dictionary, the more it is kept going by the development of language, i.e., the more
resonance it will be able to produce. (1989: 15)
Another important question concerns how these sub-systems relate to the social systems of
interactions and organizations, respectively. How does money, for instance, condition the
decision-making procedures of organized communication? How do the programs decided upon
by organizations impact the self-organizing dynamics of the economic system? One important
link is that money is distributed through the channels of organizations, which are necessarily
exclusive of the broader public. In order to generate linear, historical time, moreover,
organizations are necessary.
The concept of the competitive market describes one possible (and often counterfactual)
environmental condition as seen from the perspective of the individual firms. The economy
exceeds markets to the extent that the steering media of money, which both motivates according
to rewards and punishments and makes this motivation intelligible, operates in non-market
settings. A clear example of non-market economic communication is the regulation of
performances that occurs within firms via the anticipated sanction of monetary reward (cf.
Granovetter 1985). Moreover, money has no reserve to back it, other than the anticipation of
future repayment.121 Without this collective faith, individual decisions regarding the satisfaction
of needs could not be deferred into the future, and the time-binding function of abstract value
could not be secured. Society would have to reinvent itself from one momentary interaction to
the next.
Synthesizing Parsons and Luhmann: Money-Credit-Money’
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The existence of commodity money, or money that is backed by some commodity such as gold, does not change
this fundamental condition, for gold is itself, qua currency, is valuable primarily as a means for future exchange.
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Synthesizing the analytical distinctions utilized by Parsons with the self-referential systems of
Luhmann can prove fruitful to an analysis of the current global debt crisis. Specifically, the
function of the economy, delineated analytically, according to Parsons is the production of
material wealth. Strictly speaking, the production of material wealth does not require monetary
codes, taxation, or the differentiation of an economic sub-system. Moreover, according to
Parsons it is the polity that provides the economic sub-system with credit, to better facilitate its
adaptive function of producing wealth. For Luhmann, on the other hand, the code of monetary
payment communicates meaning (i.e. the distinction of what is possible from what is actual) so
as to secure the future satisfaction of needs, or to put it another way, to mollify present anxiety
regarding the security of future purchasing power. Payments are temporalized events whose
connectivity is contained within each payment as the anticipation of future repayment. The
threshold of this anticipation is the horizon beyond which payments are no longer obligatory as
debt repayment.122
It is clear then, that the function that the polity introduces to the economy as a system of
payments is a third-order coding of the distinction between paying now and paying later. In
Luhmannian terms, credit is the program introduced by the polity in order to facilitate the
autopoeisis of anticipated future payments. Recall that adaptation to circumstances can occur
either by changing expectations to meet circumstances or by actively trying to change the
circumstances themselves to meet expectations.
The expectation (or “goal”) of modern (global) society has been, since the industrial age, that the
future would be better than the present. This belief has been socially codified as the imperative
of economic growth, which is built into the economic infrastructure as interest. More
specifically, this refers to the components of the interest rate that can be analytically
distinguished as the compensation for expected inflation, and the discount rate. This socially
codified expectation of future growth has, moreover, coincided with an epochal reversal of social
values in the most industrialized countries: rather than sacrificing the future (described by
Weber as the Protestant Ethic), individuals increasingly sacrifice the future for the present. This
sacrifice is not necessarily consciously understood, in large part because the belief in the
automaticity of future growth renders sacrifice in this sense impossible. After all, if growth is
automatic, why save? Savings, however, according to conventional theory, are the requisites of
growth. The belief that past trends will continue indefinitely into the future thus facilitates social
conditions that renders this expectation increasingly unlikely.
Because money is chronically scarce (i.e. the aggregate purchasing power is zero sum at any
given moment), the application of interest generates a temporal condition akin to that of the
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An important distinction can be made between thresholds and limits. A limit marks the end point after which an
operation repeats itself. For example, an alcoholic reaches the limit of the last drink, after which one can go to
sleep, and repeat the process in the morning. Another example is the last word in a domestic squabble. A threshold
on the other hand marks the establishment of a different order, or a new assemblage. This occurs when the
alcoholic, for example, takes one drink too many, and ends up dead or in a hospital. A limit wards off the crossing
of its threshold; it is a mechanism of anticipation-prevention. Regarding exchange, the stockpile begins only after
the threshold of exchange has been crossed. Deleuze and Guattari convincingly argue that stockpiling begins only
after an exchange ceases and an independent interest in stockpiling has developed, which takes precedence over the
interest in drawing down these stocks, such as in potlatch ceremonies (1987: 442-7).
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game of musical chairs. As the former CEO of Citigroup, Chuck Prince, famously observed in
the summer of 2007:
When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as
the music is playing, you‟ve got to get up and dance. We‟re still dancing.
Debt-plus-interest at the same moment presupposes growth to secure repayment, and serves as a
means of adaptation to secure growth. It is this latter condition that I regard as historically novel.
A fundamental break has thus occurred reversing the direction of dependency between the
autopoeisis of payment via credit and the facilitation of the social imperative of growth: instead
of growth facilitating credit, credit now facilitates growth. In addition, the introduction of
credit-plus-interest as the primary means of growth, at the aggregate level makes growth
necessary and impossible, since all growth that occurs via debt is inherently unsustainable. The
current economic system is like that of a snake eating its own tail. Marx‟s circuit of capital can
now be reformulated as: Money-Credit-Money‟.
The introduction of credit-plus-interest has been the primary means of economic adaptation to
the growth imperative, in response to the progressive decoupling of economic growth from the
production of material wealth. As stated earlier, monetary flows (representing the future success
of present economic communications) do not necessarily have any one-to-one correspondence
with the flows of energy and material wealth. In fact, the increasing scarcity of the latter has
made decoupling of economy and energy necessary adaptations of the economy, insofar as these
adaptations are possible. The program of credit is introduced by the polity (i.e. the “state”) into
the economy as a means of adapting to the growth imperative while simultaneously reinforcing
and exacerbating this imperative.
The crisis that occurs in the financial sector necessarily affects and influences all other sectors or
subsystems of society. It is not, however, primarily a crisis of finance. In other words, the crisis
of solvency affecting our financial organizations (institutions) conceals the more fundamental
crisis that is occurring between the growth, increasingly facilitated by debt, and the growthimperative, increasingly facilitated by debt. Yet, this crisis is not directly attributable to the
depletion of natural resources. Instead, the more fundamental contradiction arises as a result of
the continued coupling of purchasing power to the expenditure of labor time.
For Marx, a precondition of commodity production is the separation of the workers from the
“means of production.” This fact is widely acknowledged and treated at length in Part Eight of
Marx‟s Capital entitled “So-called Primitive Accumulation.” Translated into Luhmannian terms,
the autopoeisis of (the anticipation of) payments is accomplished in modern society as the
coupling of purchasing power (income) to participation within organizations qua labor-time, (and
potentially as a career). The performances of worker are necessarily organizational
performances, contributing to the autopoeisis of organizational decisions regarding membership,
programs, and channels of communication. The dependence of workers facilitated by the
coupling of income and the expenditure of labor-time regulated within and between
organizations generates the conditions necessary for the capture of monetary surplus facilitated
by the generalized quantitative comparison of the monetary code.
201

In my view, Deleuze and Guattari‟s concept of an apparatus of capture refers to the material (i.e.
real, rather than merely analytical) distinctions facilitating comparisons that irrevocably bind the
indicated side of the distinction to the form of the distinction, that is, to its other side. This
entails a twofold process of comparison and appropriation. For example, labor, as the
quantitative comparison of activity, is distinguished from surplus-labor, but exists only in
relation to it. Without the process of distinction (in Spencer-Brown‟s sense) that makes possible
this comparison, exploitable labor in the Marxian sense could not exist. Likewise, the unmarked
space of the distinction labor/surplus-labor is activity “in continuous variation” (1987: 442),
which is bound and subordinated to the temporal rhythm of the work day once the former
distinction is socially codified. The important point, however, is that this binding effect does not
occur as a result of a distinction between labor and activity, but occurs surreptitiously, as the
blind spot of the observation which is accomplished in the distinction between labor and surpluslabor.
The obligation to labor that is reconstituted despite and in conjunction with productivity
increases is but one manifestation of the apparatus of capture. A society in which work is
collectively voluntary is unthinkable, and would negate the anticipations required for the
autopoeisis of the economic subsystem, in its current form. In Postone‟s (1992) account,
capitalism is dominating ostensibly because its endogenously generated productivity gains are
not translated into more free time, a concern shared by more mainstream sociologists as well (cf.
Schor 1992). Importantly, this domination is not domination of labor, but domination through
labor.123 It is imperative, from a social systems-theoretical point of view, to indicate the
mechanisms by which this “domination” is maintained, i.e. the means through which societal
complexity is both processed and abated through the dynamic and asynchronous interactions of
social systems, which secure the promise, if not the guarantee, that social order in its present
specificity, will continue.
Summary and Conclusions
Whereas for Luhmann, the economy constitutes an expectation, for Parsons, the economy
constitutes a machine producing material wealth. Luhmann and Parsons view the economy from
the twin perspectives of exchange value and material wealth, respectively, in many ways
analogous to the perspectives of neoclassical and Sraffian theory within economics. The task is
to relate these perspectives in a systemic, or dialectical, manner. Moreover, they both constitute
systemic perspectives, and therefore downplay or totally ignore (in the case of Luhmann) agentic
explanations for social outcomes.
With respect to the possibility of market failures, Parson emphasizes that acute market failure
can result from a lack of normative control, or more specifically, from an absence of adequately
specified norms. Luhmann, on the other hand, conceptualizes the monetary medium as
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Postone‟s account is convincing in its own right, but unfortunately Postone makes the argument not as an
original theory, but as a reinterpretation of Marx‟s work. This has the disadvantage of turning away both those not
already interested in Marx and those readers who disagree with the book for exegetical reasons.
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autopoeitic communications that work to the extent that they secure anticipations of subsequent
(communications of) payment. Luhmann‟s theory thus implies that market failures can occur
when the expectation of future communications are not secured, that is, when there is a break
down in trust. What needs to be addressed, however, in an empirical analysis is under what
conditions trust is secured and under what conditions is it not.
I argue that in the present crisis, trust was secured via the habitual expectation of future growth,
facilitated primarily by an accelerating material-energetic throughput. The expectation of future
payment could no longer be secured when the expectation of future income growth became
untenable. The underlying ecological conditions effecting this outcome, however, remain
peripheral to economic theorizing. As Luhmann puts it (1989), only society (qua
communication) can expose itself to ecological dangers. Thematizing these conditions is
increasingly improbable. One reason is that the system-agency distinction foregrounds social
outcomes that arise from decisions, or actions. The distinction then divides all social outcomes
arising from decisions as either intended or unintended. In the language of Luhmann, risk is
emphasized over dangers. This is the primary concern of Giddens in his critique of
functionalism, for example. Adopting a second-order, meta-theoretical perspective, enables us to
conclude that one of the blind spots of this mode of theorizing are all of those conditions that are
not directly attributable to decisions, of either individuals or organizations.
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III.

ANTICIPATORY SYSTEMS, RISK, AND SELFREFERENCE

A typology of Systems: Reflection, Representation, and Anticipation
A useful typology of systems is provided by Fenzl and Hofkirchner (1997). They distinguish
three points of reference for the analysis of any system, each of which is related to an aspect of
semiosis. This typology is depicted by Table 15 and Figure 88.
The three system types are nested levels exhibiting progressively higher degrees of internal
differentiation and freedom. Self-organizing is the first necessary and sufficient condition for
system emergence. Self-organization refers to spontaneous pattern formation. At this level of
organization, a system first distinguishes itself from its environment by exhibiting a structure of
relationships between its elements. Its micro-structure exhibits a self-organizing pattern. A
snowflake is an example of a primitive self-organizing system. It can also be regarded as
exhibiting the property of reflection, in the sense that it selects one option from among several
possibilities, and thereby produces a self, or system, in relation to an “other”, or environment.
Note that it does not relate to its environment in terms of linear cause and effect, or input and
output. A snowflake is its own cause. One can trigger a snowflake into existence, but its
emergence is not determined at the level of its elements.
The second system type is self-reproducing or “autopoeitic.” Self-reproducing systems have a
differentiated internal structure, selecting both a pattern of related elements and a system state or
condition. The system in a sense has a new capacity to “choose” from among several possible
states or conditions that are global conditions. This constitutes an added degree of freedom for
the system relative to the self-organizing system, the state of which is completely determined.
Self-reproducing systems exhibit a capacity for representation: they generate internal
representations of the outer world, distinguishing between sensors and effectors. All living
systems are self-reproducing systems. They distinguish themselves from an environment, and
can represent this environment by entertaining a “model” of it. This capacity is exhibited by the
smallest and most primitive of organisms (cf. Rosen 1985). Unlike a snowflake, an amoeba can
observe and respond to its environment.
Table 15. Typology of Systems

Level
1. Microstructure
2. Meso-state
3. Macrobehavior

System Type
Self-Organizing
Self-Reproducing
(Autopoeitic)
Self-Recreating

Relationship to
Enviroment
Reflection/
Perceiving
Representation/
Interpreting
Anticipation/
Decision-Making
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Semiotic Level
Perceiving
Semantics
Pragmatics

Figure 88. Reflection, Representation, Anticipation.

The last system-type is the self-creating, anticipatory system. The mathematical biologist Rosen
(1985) coined the term “anticipatory systems” to designate those organisms that not only react to
environmental stimuli, but also posit models that enable them to anticipate consequences of their
actions in order to guide their re-actions in the present. To accomplish anticipation, an organism
must generate a model or representation of the (relevant aspects of its) environment whose
internal clock ticks at a faster rate than the environment itself, while at the same time, dealing
with its on-going environmental interactions, which it may then use to modify the anticipatory
model.
An anticipatory model provides something like choice or an extra degree of freedom to the
system that possesses it. Its reactions are no longer hard-wired, but can be changed depending
on its anticipations, which are available for reconstruction. Yet another way to say this is that
multiple models of reality are available for the organism in order to make sense of its
surroundings. This type of system can not only react to its environment, but can proactively
adapt to it. This is accomplished by its ability to entertain a more complex model of its self
relating to its environment. These inner models enable the system to anticipate the results of
their own actions. Anticipation can be regarded as a recursive model of the system‟s modeling,
or a meta-model, depicted in Figure 89.
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Figure 89. System Anticipation

In this illustration, E stands for environment, S for system and M for model. The letters with a
prime suffix indicate that these are mental models, or anticipations. Notice, however, that this
representation also indicates the presence of self-reference. The system entertains a model of
itself, and that, moreover, this model excludes other possible models: in other words, the model
has its own environment, a space of all possible models. With sufficient degrees of freedom, a
system can entertain the notion that its own anticipation is but one of many possible anticipation,
and can regard the model itself as a selection.
To refer is closely related to the operation of observation. 124 To observe means to draw a
distinction in order to indicate one side of a distinction. Observation occurs when this indication
is made with the purpose of acquiring information about that which is distinguished. Reference
is a weak form of observation, which does not necessarily entail the processing of information.
Following Luhmann, (1995: 440), if a system orients itself towards the unity of the difference
established by this distinction, we say that it the system has gained distance from itself. A
system that gains distance from itself operates simultaneously at a basal and meta-level of
distinguishing and distinguishing its distinctions from other possible distinctions. Such
amplification of selectivity facilitates system differentiation, as for instance, when exchange
becomes the exchange of exchange, as in a financial system. Self-reference, thus does not
pertain merely to theories of the world, but describes systems within the world, including and
especially functional sub-systems such as the economy, and arguably, finance.125

124

In the sense that George Spencer Brown uses the term.
System does not mean a mere model or analytical construct. Systems are ultimately constructed, but they are
constructed by themselves. This distinction is often confused. System can be distinguished from system-reference,
where the latter means a model or concept of system. The two only overlap in special cases. To refer to a self
125
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When dealing with systems that process meaning, i.e. systems constituted with the distinction
between what is and what is possible, moreover, system differentiation takes place via the
reduction of uncertainty in its anticipation of the future. Differentiation proceeds at the cost of a
presumed certainty in its modeling. For example, one can observe the use of money and be
certain that an exchange is at least formally voluntary (i.e. that one is not observing a relation of
coercion); and in the time dimension, one can be certain that the receipt of money will enable a
future payment, thus enabling one to postpone decisions regarding one‟s immediate needs. What
is possible is thus constrained, but at the same time open. Explicating how expectations are
coordinated between anticipatory systems has been a central focus of sociological systems theory
(e.g. Parsons 1951).
The approach taken here is that the financial and economic systems are anticipatory, selfreferential social systems. This statement deserves some clarification. Traditionally, the concept
of self-reference has been regarded as a property exclusively belonging to consciousness.
Reference to the ego established the Cartesian dualism between subject and object. Selfreference is an alternative to the concept of the subject, both as consciousness and in its
grammatical meaning, as in the subject of a sentence. According to Luhmann, self-referentiality
“is a condition that occurs when a system is operationally closed, i.e. when in their
communication processes the system‟s constitutive elements refer exclusively to other elements
of the same system and never to anything beyond the universe constructed by this system”
(Blühdorn 2007: 13).
Whatever is meaningless from the perspective of a model (subsystem) can be considered as
noise, or error (Rosen 1985). However, this "noise" is a necessary precondition for
meaning. Order requires not only disorder but noise. 126 Without the noise as background,
meaning could not be distinguished. All systems, including meaning-processing systems exist
only under “ecological conditions” (Von Foerster 1985). By 'meaningless noise' I do not mean a
message that “this is meaningless” (e.g. a observer‟s reaction to modern art), but rather, the
unseen environment of meaning, for which the distinction of actual and possible is not registered.
Responses are geared towards expectations. Unexpected or surprising events may occur, but
whether or not events are unexpected depends on the expectation. Much like Thomas Kuhn's
paradigms, expectations are, in general, recalcitrant against disturbances (cf. Heise 1979). Even
a reluctant and belated gestalt-switch that appears to be generated exogenously is in fact
engendered by the system that generates the expectation: the anomalous data are only triggers or
signals for systems with the requisite degrees of freedom to reorganize themselves, that is, to
make selections. Anything that changes the state of a system does so only by determining the
system to determine itself (Luhmann 1995; Fenzl and Hofkirchner 1997). Once adopted, new
means to distinguish and indicate a self, but this self can be an element, a process, or a system. Only when the self
is distinguished according to the distinction of system-environment do system and system reference overlap.
126
This is taken from von Foerster‟s “Order from Noise” principle. (Cf. von Foerster 2003). Luhmann writes that
“social systems come into being on the basis of the noise that psychic systems create in their attempts to
communicate” (214). Misunderstanding then would be a requisite of social systems.
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expectations (of the situation) can steer and orient different sets of control efforts and engender a
switch in the context of relevance. In this sense, a new situation may emerge in which novelties
are recorded and provided meaning against new background assumptions.
In my view, this distinction is a relative one, a matter of degree. This has important implications,
for that which is regarded as more meaningful by a system is that which is regarded as
potentially otherwise and hence not constant. Conditions that are relatively constant (i.e. slow to
change) become part of the background of meaningful events. This also follows from the fact
that communication systems, in order to continue, must continually process events as
meaningful. In order to detect events, a distinction between a before and after is necessary. A
condition with values are slowly changing, however, cannot be registered with respect to the
difference between before and after. A stock variable such as debt can also be regarded as
something that would be less relevant to a system detecting only variations in flows.

The Meaning of Uncertainty
The environment of a system can also be registered, or observed, according to two different
reference frames. The system's relation to its environment can be described as one of
dependency, whenever the environment is interpreted as a resource, or as uncertainty, whenever
the environment is viewed as information, although these are not mutually exclusive (184).
Table 16 and Figure 90 depict the two modes of observing systems and environments and an
illustration. These are necessarily static representations of underlying dynamic processes.
Importantly, information and resources can be regarded as two ways of observing the
environment, rather than inherent characteristics of an environment. Strictly speaking, the
environment is not a thing, but the outside of a boundary drawn by an observing system.
Importantly, economics regards the environment of the economy primarily in terms of
uncertainty regarding the future and/or uncertainty between market participants (e.g. as in a
bank run or panic), rather than in terms of dependency upon natural or social resources.
The environment of a system can be observed in terms of information or as a resource. The
latter reference frame is adopted when a system entertains a (modeled) relation of uncertainty
and the former when the system entertains a (modeled) relation of dependence. These relations
constitute system distinctions facilitating selection.
Table 16. Decomposition of System and Environment

System

Environment

Type of Decomposition
1. Elements/Relations
2. Subsystem/Environment
Type of Relation
1. Dependency
2. Uncertainty
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Type of Theory
Complexity
Differentiation
Observed as
Resource
Information

Figure 90. Environment as Resource or Information

The non-selected parts of the environment will be interpreted as meaningless noise or as
background conditions. Just as background, or unobserved, conditions can be regarded as
necessary presuppositions of system observation, so too can noise, which can be regarded as the
fuel or “resource” of information-processing.
Luhmann‟s conceptual model of the distinction between information and meaning is not that of
an outcome of a recursive selection of uncertainty. Instead, meaning is distinct from information
because a piece of information that is repeated is no longer informative (i.e. no longer possesses
value as information), but nevertheless retains its meaning. Luhmann defines information as “an
event that selects system states” (1995: 67), and writes that “all information has meaning” (67,
my emphasis). Luhmann thus presupposes information that has been selected and made
meaningful by a system that observes it. Accordingly, Luhmann‟s information refers to Batesontype information rather than Shannon-type information.
What counts as information is always determined by a system that distinguishes signal and noise,
or what is informative from what is not, and the system's reaction to this information is always
determined by the system itself, for only a system can change its own state. Luhmann thus
speaks of information as appearing to systems as a “determination for self-determination” (68).
Information constraints entropy in that the system's response is not entirely random, or in other
words, the system's possible reactions to information are not equally probable, because this
would indicate the changes in the system are entirely stochastic and thus not influenced at all by
the processing of information. Importantly, however, information processing never entirely
“[pins] down the system” (68); information never entirely determines the system's behavior.
Social systems cannot be entirely certain as can individuals. Social systems are, according to
Luhmann, “inherently restless” (1990: 9). This has interesting consequences for the idea of
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system maintenance. Rather than being a process of simple reproduction of the same patterns, it
is primarily the “production of next elements” which have to be different from the previous ones
in order to be recognized as events (1990: 10). In a passage reminiscent of Schumpeter‟s idea
of creative destruction, Luhmann states that system “stability is based on instability” (1990: 10).
In other words, in order for the system to continue, it must neither be totally certain (i.e. fixed) or
totally uncertain, or random, in which case it would no longer exhibit the property of a system.
An illustration of how knowledge, meaning, and information can be regarded as processes of
uncertainty reduction is provided below. Note that uncertainty (i.e. surprise, novelty, variation,
difference, or noise) is a necessary precondition for the processing of information, meaning, and
knowledge.

Crisis of Expectations
One way to frame uncertainty and complexity is in terms of crisis. The word "crisis" comes
from the Greek which means "to separate or divide" and also "to sift, to decide." In ancient
Greece, crises signified "moments of truth when the significance of men and events were brought
to light" (O‟Connor 1987: 54: my emphasis). During the course of an illness, crises were
regarded as revelations or as turning points when fate decides whether or not an individual will
recover. The word "crisis" was not used to describe general market disequilibria until the late
17th century. The term crisis, in its original meanings, connotes both uncertainty and the
necessity of deciding (i.e. selecting) that this uncertainty compels. When the unity of the group
is threatened, the unity of a decision is required in order to cancel out the possibilities
engendered by fragmentation.
Sociologically, crisis can be understood, not in terms of a so-called crisis of representation, a
philosophical preoccupation which, moreover, does not prevent this crisis from being
represented, but rather, in terms of the complexity of society‟s self-representation qua
communication. Sociology today, more than any other discipline, can be regarded as a “science
in crisis” (Leydesdorff 2003: 35; Gouldner 1970). It is only fitting that sociology, as a science
that is not itself unified, make efforts to comprehend the complexity of a society that is likewise.
Sociology, as a meta-reflection, can observe the crisis without reifying it.
A system is complex when it has more possibilities that it can actualize at any given moment.
This surfeit of possibility for social systems can be regarded as the differentiation of
communication “channels”, each of which posits its own expectation of what society is and/or
should be. Indeed, from a sociological point of view, society‟s apparent militancy against the
realization of its immanent possibilities (e.g. Postone 1992) can be regarded as the predictable
form of observation in a society whose possibilities are neither fixed nor observer-invariant.
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For a theme of communication to continue as something other than catechism, participantobservers within thematic channels 127 require some degree of uncertainty, reflected in the
combination and recombination of meanings that are never pinned down once and for all as a
final answer (which would dissolve the discourse). One resource for uncertainty, and also, for
the updating of a communicative theme, can be provided by observed events, observed and made
relevant by an observing system that uses these events as an occasion for its continuation. The
world is in crisis, but even this presupposes that society as communication about crisis continues.
Crisis discourse adds itself to a growing list of potential self-descriptions of communication.
Much of this crisis-talk takes the form of protest, as “communications addressed to others calling
on their sense of responsibility (Luhmann 2005: 125). Markets are irresponsible, as are
governments, neoclassical or “utopian” economics (Cassidy 2009), lenders, borrowers, the credit
ratings agencies, the government sponsored enterprises (e.g. “Fannie and Freddie”), China, and
capitalists. Sociology need not conduct a judicial review. Each of these discourses has found its
own communication niche, within which the whole can be bounded and observed. Each is a
means for the self-simplification of self-observation.
Sociologically, we cannot take these incompatible (or at least discrepant) attributions for granted.
How is it possible that social selection processes have not reduced the uncertainty of the crisis,
both with respect to its causes and with respect to its probable or possible resolutions, into a
canonical explanation and meaning? Moreover, how is something as complex and ambiguous
as the concept of “crisis” capable of being observed and communicated about in the first place?
What does a housing bubble have to do, in principle, with the recent bailout of Greece? The
capacity to formulate the crisis as a singular problem must be problematized, or in other words,
regarded as improbable. The ability to sustain multiple, and often incompatible, forms of protest
communication presupposes that the observed crisis is also observed as a contingent state of
affairs, and hence, could also be otherwise.
What is important from a sociological point of view, in my opinion, is to develop a sociological
concept of crisis. By concept, I mean a distinction in which both sides are indicated: hot/cold;
just/unjust; payment/non-payment; enemy/friend; etc. Thus, concepts are distinguished from
things, (e.g. chair), for which the other side of the distinction is “everything else.”128 From what
is the concept of crisis distinguished? For economics, “crisis” as an object generally refers to
those phenomena associated with loss, or expected future loss (unemployment, loss of
anticipated economic growth, debt defaults, and so on), so becomes a variant of the distinction
between desirable/undesirable, or equilibrium/non-equilibrium. For sociology, possible
distinctions include normality/abnormality; unity/fragmentation; reversible/irreversible;
intended/unintended; organized/self-organized (or dis-organized); preventable/inevitable;
attributed to system/attributed to environment. Yet another possibility is that crisis can be
formulated as the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated. A crisis is, in some

127

I prefer the term “channel” over “discourse” because the latter seems to exclude quantitative or semantically
meaningless communication. When I purchase gas with my ATM, this can, in a sense, be regarded as
communication, even when I speak to no one.
128
The (concept of) concept, incidentally, is the conceptual distinction of: (thing/concept).
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respects, unanticipated, although this does not account for all of those who did anticipate, and
those who did not, but in retrospect should have.
In my view, a system experiences129 a crisis when it observers a persistent discrepancy between
its perceptions and its expectations. This can also be formulated in terms of control theory: a
crisis arises whenever a system observes that it cannot any longer control essential control
variables. 130 Specifically, what is called the ongoing economic crisis can best be regarded as a
societal crisis of communication.

Observing Risk
The distinction between risk and uncertainty was first introduced by Frank Knight (1921).
Georgescu-Roegen provides a succinct description:
Risk describes situations where the exact outcome it not known but the outcome does not
represent a novelty. Uncertainty applies to cases where the reason why we cannot
predict the outcome is that the same event has never been observed in the past and, hence,
it may involve a novelty (1971: 122)
Accordingly, the term “„calculated risk' if taken literally is a mere parade of mathematical terms"
(1971: 83). Risk refers to events that are unknown but not novel; risk can be characterized as
arising from imperfect knowledge (e.g. such as intrinsic randomness). Uncertainty, on the other
hand, refers to those events that are totally unanticipated, and hence novel. Uncertainty arises
from incomplete knowledge. The fundamental principle of uncertainty is important to the work
of John Maynard Keynes, who regarded many economic events as unpredictable in principle. 131
For Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007), all important events in history as Black Swan Events, which
he characterizes as possessing: rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective (though not
prospective) predictability. 132
The etymology of the term risk is generally not known. Its first widespread appearance in
Europe occurs in the 16th century. Luhmann suggests that the emergence of the concept of risk,
and that of rational calculation, is the compensatory counterpart to an increased perception of
control of circumstances: “Both concepts appear to be able to guarantee that even if things do go
wrong, one can have acted correctly. They immunize decision making against failure, provided
129

I use this word suggestively, for Luhmann distinguishes between experience and action, where the former is
attributed to environment and latter to system. We undergo experiences, but commit actions.
130
I use the term “control” in its cybernetic sense, to indicate a process by which perceptions (aka input signals) are
kept near some reference level (aka goals, reference signals, standards) through processes of negative feedback,
involving the variation of system behavior (aka output). Essential refers to those variables defined in terms of
distinctions constitutive of the system itself.
131
See for instance Robert Skidelsky‟s Keynes: The Return of the Master (2009). Skidelsky pinpoints three
neoclassical concepts that led academics and policymakers astray: the rational expectations hypothesis, the real
business cycle theory, and the efficient financial market theory. For a review and interview, see Lawler (2009):
http://spectator.org/archives/2009/10/06/keynes-uncertainty-principle
132
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1st-tale.html?_r=1
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one learns to avoid error” (2005: 13). In other words, the concept of risk presupposes
identifying a decision without which the loss would not have occurred (16).
Following George Spencer Brown‟s calculus of indications, Luhmann devises a concept of risk.
Luhmann distinguishes between objects and concepts: the former specifies something as distinct
from everything else, without specifying the other side of the distinction, whereas the latter
indicates both side of the distinction (e.g. hot/cold; women/men; justice/injustice). What does
the concept of risk indicate? What is its negation? Luhmann considers the pair risk/security, and
argues that this distinction is not theoretically fruitful because security is something we desire, so
the distinction risk/security becomes another variant of desirable/undesirable. Moreover, it
conforms to a mode of first-order observing of facts, rather than a mode of second-order
observing of how facts are constituted through observation.
Luhmann then proposes that risk be distinguished from danger: {Risk\Danger}. Both Risk and
Danger presuppose that uncertainty exists in relation to future loss. This gives rise to two
possibilities: either loss is a consequence of a decision, and is therefore attributed to system; or
b) the loss is caused externally and is therefore attributed to environment. Security constitutes
the unmarked space or blind spot of the distinction: Security {Risk\Danger}, where attention is
focused within the brackets {}. The advantage of this distinction is that it focuses on
attributions, which can be empirically observed.
Elsewhere, Luhmann (1995) distinguishes between action and experience, which corresponds to
system-attribution and environment-attribution, respectively. The term “experience” is
somewhat confusing, so I will use the term passive experience to indicate an experience that is
attributed to a system‟s environment. Risk and Danger can thus be regarded as the active and
passive experiences of future loss. System and environment means roughly “self and other”
where these concepts do not refer necessarily to psychological or biological selves.
Luhmann argues that up until the 18th century, danger has been emphasized over risk. Social
losses were not primarily those attributed to decisions. Prevention can be used to avoid future
losses perceived as danger and risk. Preventing future losses as a result of danger involves
preparing for future losses that are not the result of your own decisions, such as a natural disaster
or foreign invasion. The prevention of risk, however, becomes significantly more complicated
because the prevention strategies influence the willingness to take risks (e.g. moral hazard).
Moreover, the prevention itself will also incur risks. Luhmann notes that the terrorism can be
regarded as either a risk or danger, which impacts heavily how it is handled politically.
Luhmann posits that modern society communicates more and more in terms of risk, which means
future losses are anticipated and evaluated (ex post) as arising from decisions. The attribution to
decisions reinforces the difference between past and future, causing a shortening of the perceived
duration of the (durationless) present. The reinforcement of the distinction between past and
future refers to qualitative novelty. Why is this? To attribute an outcome to a decision means to
mark a distinction between the actual and possible (counter-factual) event. This presupposes
marking the event as a loss relative to some reference standard. In other words, loss presupposes
the active observing of past or anticipated losses, and thus, presupposes a socially enhanced
capacity for communication to codify and stabilize discursive observations of loss. The
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attribution of losses to decision reinforces and amplifies the experience of decision, and hence,
the monitoring of action.
Decisions also reinforce the distinction between past and future in a more direct sense. Decisions
are related to observation. Both distinguish in order to select one side of the distinction for
indication. Unlike observation, however, decisions remember what is not selected as that which
is excluded. The memory of past decisions generates a linear, historical sense of time and
necessitates the production of codified self-descriptions. Individuals have, for much of recorded
history at least, made conscious decisions and have related these conscious decisions to
themselves and others in the form of self-descriptions and historical reports. However, in
modern societies a new societal system emerges which operates exclusively via the distinction of
decision/non-decision, namely, the organization. Organized communication thus enhances the
capacity of society to relate to itself in the form of histories of decisions, each of which marks
the irrevocable distinction of a before and after.
The attribution to decision simultaneously mollifies anticipated risks and amplifies the impact of
unknown uncertainties. I call this the paradox of control, namely, that for systems capable of
experiencing qualitative novelty, (cybernetic) control presupposes and reproduces the absence of
control. This occurs when control efforts are not only oriented towards some observed objects,
but towards observed controlled efforts themselves. The observation of control means that
control efforts are reflexively observed as a process of decisions, which implies that things could
have been otherwise. Control is transformed from a necessary (first-order) action into a
contingent (second-order) experience. Furthermore, systems cannot attain certain knowledge
about social conditions because their decisions are based not only on information from the past,
but on the anticipations and expectations of others about the future, generating an irreducible
element of uncertainty.133
One hypothesis, derived from the preceding considerations, is that a co-relation exists between a)
an increase in the ratio of system-decision attribution (risk) to environment-accident attribution
(danger), and b) the acceleration of historical time. For example, the speeding up (acceleration)
of monetary transactions via financial media is a shortening of the distance between past and
future. The metaphor of speed is perhaps more appropriate than size to describe “large”
monetary transactions: a single $1 million dollar payment can be regarded as one million
separate, sequential $1 payments. According to Rosen (1985), the frequency of the update will
determine whether the global optima of the system or the local optima of the sub-system will
tend to prevail: the faster sub-system will prevail in the short-run but ultimately, the slower
dynamics of the embedding system are decisive. This insight can generate interesting
hypotheses regarding the rise of (fast) finance at the expense of the (slow) overall economy and
its (even slower) social and biophysical support systems.
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George Soros (2008) formulates this as the concept of reflexivity. Fundamental uncertainty is a necessary
outcome of the simultaneous efforts of participant-observers to both observe and participate in social situations.
Soros refers to the former effort as the cognitive function and the latter as the manipulative function. Because they
aren't sequential but simultaneous, each function deprives the other of its independent variable.
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What becomes apparent when examining how systems observe risk is the extent to which they
are not equipped to observe risk in any other terms except that provided by their operational
codes. The financial system examines risk as a "strictly money-economy problem" (Luhmann
2008: 175, Risk). And how could it observe otherwise, since the function of the financing
system is precisely to avoid the central risk of insolvency (176). In the risk/danger schema
proposed by Luhmann, economic risk belongs exclusively to investment and credit risk, that is,
to the risk of not being paid back, that is, to future disappointments directly attributable to
decisions by individuals or institutions (i.e. to the system), rather than to outside and
uncontrollable circumstances (i.e. to the environment). The latter are more properly called
dangers. Luhmann also observers the tendency for financial institutions to resort to 'secondorder observing', that is, the observing of their peers in order assess risk, a phenomena White
(2002) also introduces as a fundamental process in his theory of price formation. This means
that risk, is increasingly assessed by means of observing how others assess risk, in part because
the future is inherently unobservable and because the future can be expected to be increasingly
unlike the past, to the extent that events in the world are increasingly attributed to decisions (and
thus processed as risks rather than dangers).
Is it more desirable (rational) to generate more profits now at the expense of increased risk of
loss in the unspecified future, or is it more desirable to generate less profits now, with the
expectation that prudence will pay off in the unspecified future? This appears to be not an
outcome entirely determined by decision, as outsider onlookers, (e.g. investors) will 'vote with
the feet.' In other words, the market entails also, and importantly, a relative coordination of the
time-horizon that is relevant for assessing risk. The relevant time-frame is bound because as
Keynes said, in the long-run we are all dead. Death for economic actors essentially means
insolvency.
The carrot of above-average growth, coupled with the stick of bankruptcy, suffices to constrain
economic behavior within bounds. For example, only monopolies can run at a loss for extended
periods of time, and wise investment firms, must still find money to invest, and this means
attracting potential investors in the present. The calculation of future risk therefore is
constrained as a periodically updating collective assessment. It is this periodicity, or frequency,
of the decision-making that tends to speed up in times of chaotic market behavior, which
introduces the possibility of multiple futures, or second-order uncertainty with respect to
anticipatory models.134
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This has been simulated by Leydesdorff (2006).
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IV.

SOCIAL COMPLEXITY, CONTINGENCY, AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF NORMATIVE CONTROL

The Critical Tradition of Sociology and the Structural-Functionalism of
Parsons and Luhmann
Since its inception, sociology as the study of modern society has had an abiding interest in using
Reason to illuminate the latent dimensions of social life, in order to fundamentally improve the
human condition, or at least an interest in claiming to do so. The systematic investigation of how
society fails to live up to its own promises and self-description, can be regarded as one unifying
orientation of the classical sociological tradition. The promise of sociology as conceived broadly,
if not always explicitly, in the classical tradition, has been that “a science of man” could not only
investigate and uncover hidden “laws” of the social world, but that this science could be used to
bring about a better society. The purpose of social research, broadly stated, was to use Reason to
transcend common sense, with the aim of examining the discrepancy between social structures as
they are intended or believed to be, and structures as they actually are. For instance, Marx
sought to uncover the hidden laws of the market, which operated behind the backs of those who
constituted and sustained it, and which generated impersonal forces of domination, most notably
in the sphere of production, that stood in contradiction to the appearance of individual freedom
manifested in the sphere of exchange.
Classical sociology was not only concerned with analyzing the differentiation of society, but
more fundamentally, it concerned itself with synthesizing the knowledge gained from analysis
into a comprehensive, integrative understanding of social life viewed as an ongoing, unified
process or movement in history. In other words, it was understood that the emerging dimensions
of social life, such as career and family, or of the state and the private sector, were in principle
connected, not only by their common evolutionary and historical origins, but also interrelated in
the present through a web-like, but opaque, network of inter-dependencies. Moreover, the social
could be conceived of, not only in terms of an empirical or factual totality, but also as a
normative totality, subordinating the various functional sub-systems of society to the latent, but
common interests of concrete, historical, and above all, human, agents. In addition, the classical
tradition emphasized the Totality, i.e. relating the personal and fragmented daily life to society,
as a whole. The distinction between surface appearances and underlying deep structure was
therefore coterminous with the distinctions between plurality and singularity, fragmentation and
unity, or subject and object. Penetrating the veil of Maya entailed ascending to the Archimedean
point of reflection from which the social totality, in its singularity, can be apprehended. This
apprehension of the totality would, furthermore, be a necessary precondition for the evaluation of
efforts to improve society. The totality of modern society, however, is necessarily latent.
I do not mean to imply that classical theorists were at all Pollyannaish in their estimations of the
future, or even that they were optimistic about the likelihood of the promise of sociology, or
more generally social science, ever being fulfilled. Max Weber, in particular, regarded the
narrow understanding of human reason in terms of instrumental rationality as potentially
facilitating invisible barriers to human development and freedom that were 'as hard as steel.' In
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addition, the thesis that the advancement of human Reason (or perhaps more accurately,
“rationality”) at some point ceased to coincide with the advancement of human freedom, has a
long tradition in sociological theory. Horkheimer and Adorno, for instance, regarded the
technological mastery of nature facilitated by human reason, which became focalized and
amplified during the period of the Enlightenment but whose trajectory could be discerned in the
very origins of human history, as the simultaneous colonization of inner human nature and
experience. In contrast to Adorno and Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas, as the central member of
the second generation of critical theorists, adopting a more sanguine view of the relation between
human freedom and Reason, has regarded the development of the productive forces as a
necessary but insufficient precondition for the progressive emancipation of humanity. For
Habermas the emancipation of humanity requires the cultivation of both productive and
reflective knowledge.
The link between the distinction of the totality and its parts, and between the surface
manifestations and latent structure has been broken by recent developments in systems theories.
Rather than the relationship between totality and its parts, the relation between system and
environment remains central. Rather than the distinction between surface appearances and deep
structure, observations are made possible by unobservable blind spots. Rather than social science
revealing a singular, but latent totality, what observing systems observe becomes a function of
how observing systems observe. In short, whereas classical sociology has posited unity as its
guiding orientation, new second-order systems theory has been guided instead by the unity of
difference. As such, systems theoretical perspectives constitute a radical paradigm shift that
cannot be easily integrated into the classical tradition.
A common presupposition of sociological theory has been its humanist orientation. Human
beings are at the center of social theory. This too, has been rejected most radically, by Niklas
Luhmann, who presupposes instead that human beings, more specifically their minds and bodies,
relate to the social system as part of its environment. Communications, not persons, constitute
society, and only communications, not persons, can communicate. The implication is the fact
that though we may feel or think personally, this has no impact sociologically, except only
insofar as it is communicated. Communication, or inter-action, thus constitutes an alternative
frame of reference for observing the social world.
The transition to modernity entailed the increasing generalization and abstraction of the concept
of the common good. The increasing abstraction of the categories used to observe social life can
be regarded as compensatory efforts to make sense of an increasingly abstract world, that is, as
efforts to provide meaning to a reality whose meaning, as a whole, could not be specified. The
unity of the social world cannot be taken for granted for it no longer possesses a unified identify
or “self.” The complexity of the world forces observers to adopt (i.e. select) coordinating frames
of reference in order to provide social life with some semblance of coherence and meaning. That
this adoption is a selection is an empirical fact. This was, in my opinion, one of the central
insights of early sociological theory, which generated sufficient theoretical complexity in its own
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right, to observe society as a complex, and hence, uncertain, unity. I will regard the notion of
“society” hereafter as fundamentally uncertain: social order is a hypothesis135.

Social Complexity and the paradoxical foundations of modernity
William Rasch (2000) has defines modernity as “the name we have given to this necessarily
contingent world” (20: italics mine). This necessary contingency refers to the certainty of
uncertainty that Rasch believes provides the paradoxical foundations of modern society. Rasch
states that “were we ever to lose our „faith‟ in contingency, we would lose our faith in the
legitimacy of modernity” (Rasch 2000: 23).
What does he mean by this, and in what way is modern society characterized as contingent? He
means in part that there is no necessary relation between an object and its description, simply
because there are always multiple ways of describing the same object. The logician Willard van
Oman Quine takes up this idea and espouses an ontological relativism. But, what is the status of
this relativist assertion? On the one hand, the statement that “there are objects” is rendered
untenable. Yet, its counterpart, “there are no objects, just descriptions” can neither be affirmed
exclusively because the tenet of relativist ontology asserts that the former statement must also be
„true‟ (or acceptable relative to some criterion) as well! Quine, in response to the question about
whether there are is a single, necessary accurate description of the world, attempts to take the
middle ground between yes and no, but implicitly sides with the No in excluding exclusivity.
And yet, at the same time, this position is not coextensive with the negative answer either.136
For purposes of this essay, the referent is society itself, the sum total of such descriptions. To
say that society, as object, cannot be unambiguously distinguished from its referents, is to
suggest that references cannot distinguish references from the object of reference. Another way
to say this is that modern society is complex.
I will provide two reference frames for understanding the concept of complexity. First, a system
becomes complex whenever it is no longer possible to relate every element to every other
element in every conceivable way at the same time. In other words, a system is complex when
there are available at any given moment more possibilities that it can actualize. This means that
135

The British neuropsychologist Richard L. Gregory, author of a textbook on sight, Eye and Brain (1966), when
asked what reality is, replied: "Reality is a hypothesis." And when subsequently asked whether reality could be
described as a simulation, Gregory replied: "Oh, that's probably a better way of putting it" (1989 in NØrretranders
1999: 191).
136
Translated into system-theoretic terms, Quine demonstrated that the analytic-synthetic distinction is itself
analytic, and not synthetic. What I mean is this: the distinction exists empirically, but cannot be attributed to the
'world'; there is no empirical criterion which would demarcate between the two. The prime example is that
synonymy (when things mean the same) can only be empirically examined (and hence is not logically necessary- we
can always discover discordant usages). We can stipulate that things mean the same thing, but there is no logical
criterion (i.e. analytic!) that enables us to make the distinction before we've made it. Interchangeability fails because
of sentences like "Every creature with a heart is a creature with kidneys", which is unlike "all unmarried men are
bachelors"; in the latter case, we presume that bachelors = unmarried man because of intentional (!) meanings,
whereas "creature with a heart" = "creature with a kidney" is true by accident, but we can nevertheless interchange
them. I prefer Luhmann's use of the distinctions self and hetero-reference, action and experience, etc.
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complexity forces a system to make a decision, or to select, from among available options, but
every choice cannot be realized at the same time. Because systems are always less complex than
their environments, systems exist by creating boundaries to distinguish them from their
environments
In a second formulation, a system is complex to the extent that we can observe it in nonequivalent ways, that is, observe it through multiple frames of reference. In other words, if there
are multiple ways of “seeing” or “understanding” something, it is complex. As a corollary, it
follows that a system is complex to the extent that we can discern many distinct subsystems of it
(Rosen 1985). We can consider a mental model or abstraction of a system a “sub-system”, or
partial perspective, of the system as a whole, since to abstract literally mean to “cut-out.” A
system is complex if we can entertain different models of it, which is equivalent to saying that
we can observe it in non-equivalent ways, or discern many sub-systems of it.137
The Necker Cube, depicted in Figure 91, provides a geometrical representation of complexity.
In the Necker Cube, the image can be viewed from two apparently contradictory perspectives,
but not at the same time. It therefore possesses more possibilities that it can actualize at any
given moment. According to the criteria above, it is complex in the sense that we can entertain
more than one mental image (or "model") of it, and because we cannot see all images
simultaneously. At best, we can oscillate back and forth between several perspectives across
time.
Complexity necessitates selection, that is, decisions that cut off from possibility some choices
while realizing others, and selection constitutes an “experience of contingency” (Luhmann 1995:
184). Because the complexity of the environment always exceeds the complexity of system, the
latter can only exist as an effort to abate this complexity. Yet, is it complex in the sense that its
elements cannot all be related at the same time? This depends on how element is defined and
distinguished from relations.

Figure 91. Necker Cube
137

The concept of complexity as I have formulated it here is roughly the same as Niels Bohr's Principle of
Complementarity in physics, according to which a phenomenon may exhibit apparently contradictory properties, all
of which cannot be simultaneously observed by a single observational lens. Other formulation s of this idea include
David Bohm's notion of the qualitative infinity of nature and the concept of the over-determination of social events.
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We can regard its lines (or alternatively its imagined planes) as its elements related, for example,
by contiguity, in which case not all lines (or planes) can be connected to every other line without
transforming the cube.138
The property of complexity is not an innate property of the object, but arises from how we
interact with or observe it. Accordingly, complexity is not an intrinsic property of observed
systems, but is instead an emergent property arising from how observed systems interact with
observing systems (cf. von Foerster 1984; Rasch 2000). Systems can be complex or not
depending on how they are projected and the relative invariance of their distinguished features.
Moreover, the concept of complexity is itself complex if we regard the distinctions just
mentioned as distinguishable and hence non-equivalent.
The Necker cube provides a useful analogy for social complexity. This complexity is attested to
by the many attempts within sociological theory to grasp the unity of society without unifying, in
practice, these theoretical reflections themselves. Sociology, as a meta-reflection on society
considered in its totality, can moreover no longer be regarded as an essential contribution to
society‟s self-understanding, above all because the unity constituting such a self remains elusive.
Society has no self, or to state it differently, society, from the perspective of a theory adequate to
apprehending it as a complex object, consists of multiple models of what society is and should
be. Societal reference frames are distributed.
Rasch describes the modern mode of observation in the following way: “What we see, in other
words, is not a single elephant described variously by different blind men but various elephants
made visible by different blind spots; and this modern „loss‟ of objectivity cannot be
compensated for by the „rational‟ demand to see what one cannot see” (33). He has in mind here,
Habermas‟s „rational demand‟ that a participant in discourse be “bound to a universal
community by way of a cooperative quest for truth” (Habermas 1987: 347, in Rasch 2000: 32).
An important consequence of social complexity concerns the regulation of social relations via
morality. Morality, as the generalized medium of communication pertaining to the question of
“whether and under what conditions human beings esteem or disdain one another” (1995: 235),
becomes insufficient for guaranteeing social order in complex societies. This is because the
differentiation of communication requires the differentiation of communicative media to
motivate and make intelligible social communication and a corresponding degree of indifference
to communications elsewhere. For example, one does not need to esteem or disdain a check-out
counter clerk in order to purchase a bag of chips, nor must one esteem or disdain all
138

On the other hand, if we not interested in geometrical equivalence but rather in the weaker form of topological
equivalence (based on isotopy), the cube can be pushed into an equivalent sphere, in which case all lines are related
by contiguity. We could also specify a relation or set of relations other than contiguity which meet the requirement
that all elements be related (e.g. all imagined planes in one of the imagined 3D projections are either orthogonal or
parallel).
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communications that can be observed. For society to become complex, increasingly more
communications must become orthogonal to morality. In this way, society exceeds the
boundaries of morality, becoming multidimensional. Luhmann writes that “a complex society
needs so many different kinds of expectations for its autopoeisis … that is it impossible for it to
sanction all these expectations via the acquisition, maintenance, and loss of esteem” (1995:
253).

Habermas, Complexity and the Problem of Order
For Habermas, communication is always oriented towards a consensus of understanding, even
strategically oriented communication, which entails redefining a situation so that consensus can
be achieved. For Luhmann, on the other hand, communication has no telos. It either contributes
to the autopoiesis of communication, or does not. For Luhmann, misunderstanding is just as
important as understanding. Luhmann begins by describing a world without communication, and
then proceeds to explain how communication systems constitute and reconstitute themselves.
Any consensus must be an improbable and unstable outcome of these selectively coordinating
processes. Habermas, on the other hand, begins and ends with consensus.
Another way of putting this is that Luhmann assumes variation and heterogeneity and then
proceeds to generate provisionally stable communications as an outcome of selection processes.
The noise of communication can be expected to intrude in any and all communications, because
of the inherent variation and interference of communication channels that are not biologically or
technically hard-wired. Habermas, on the other hand, in a move similar to Chomsky's, reduces
variation to constancy, and difference to identity, positing a latent, but universal and singular,
motivation to language.
Habermas‟ aim is to reduce the complexity of the system, or at least shepherd it, so that
differentiation does not slide into irrational deviation. Reflection, “in the form of reconstruction,
has become the reductionist move that allows Habermas to ground complexity in, and judge
complexity by, underlying simplicity” (Rasch 2000: 43). The force of the better argument is
intended to be binding, but such binding implies that all participants end up thinking alike and
coming to the same conclusions. This of course, makes heterogeneity and pluralism superfluous.
Habermas‟ project, then, can be seen as an attempt to reduce such complexity, which can only be
accomplished only by prohibiting (by force of argument or otherwise) the possibilities of
observational selection.
For Luhmann, however, there can be no final, Archimedian point of view from which to reduce
the complexity inherent in observation. And yet, in stating this, the impression has been created
that a universal statement has been made: “An observing system observes itself failing to observe
itself fully. There is always a blind spot, and each illumination of a previous blind spot creates a
new one. The system acknowledges this and thereby gives the paradoxical impression of having
at last fully observed itself as a system that cannot be fully observed” (Rasch 2000: 47).
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If one says that one wants to “ground” a discourse, it means simply that one desires that one‟s
statements have more authority. Habermas wants to make his statements more authoritative, but
without relying on force. He implicitly wants people to agree with him. Yet there is no
empirical connection between intent and effect, which is precisely the point of the concept of
communication as system. To speak of “Grounds” or conditions of validity is also a way of
appealing to authority. Habermas argues that his concept of communication is universal and
self-inclusive, but to do this, he has to argue that his concept of communication was really there
all along, latent in all communication. Everyone really possesses this concept, they just don‟t
know it. Habermas‟s argument can be boiled down to the following: the force of the better
argument should win out because the argument that the force of the better argument should win
out is the better argument, and if you read this you know this to be true because you are agreeing
with it. The problem is that we can‟t seem to agree on much else, but this is admittedly a
descriptive rather than normative statement.
One wonders, what is the purpose of trying to prove that all language use can be evaluated
according to universal rules of validity? The sociological implication is that society could be
regulated (i.e. “steered”) rationally. Habermas, it should be noted, gives an exhaustive account
of social theories and categories of rationality, but never really defines what comprehensive
rationality is. He equates it, however, with communicative action, and implicitly, with the
common good. For Habermas, the public is the space in which, at least potentially, this universal
and free discourse can take place that would advance the common good.139

Habermas and Human Emancipation
In volume 1 of TCA, Habermas remarks that of all the academic disciplines, only sociology is
capable of retaining a focus on society as a whole. What is the relation between the “parts” of
society and the “whole” of society? Are the parts individuals, or sectoral sub-systems, such as
economy and law? Can all of these be regarded as subordinated to a single common good? If so,
how would this common good be defined?
Habermas‟s project has a clear political component. In many ways, his project in TCA is a direct
extension of his earlier work, including Knowledge and Human Interests (KHI). In KHI,
Habermas argues that the emancipation of humanity requires both productive and reflective
knowledge. Productive knowledge is essential because its development facilitates the
emancipation of society from nature, and by extension, makes possible the further emancipation
from social domination. The development of productive forces is therefore a necessary
precondition for the emancipation from social domination and the reduction of necessary labor
time. Capitalism, because of its dynamic tendency to revolutionize the forces of production,
possesses the capacity to overcome the historic problem of scarcity. Only after the problem of
fundamental scarcity is solved can the class struggle be transcended. Class antagonism and
139

Habermas writes: “Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being
subject to coercions; thus with the guarantee that they may assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their
opinions freely” (1989: 231).
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social domination do not automatically vanish, however, once technological production has
overcome the problem of scarcity. Instead, once domination is rendered unnecessary,
it now stems . . . only from the masochistic gratification of a form of domination that
impedes taming the struggle for existence, which is objectively possible, and puts off
uncoercive interaction on the basis of communication free from domination. This
domination is then reproduced for its own sake. (Habermas 1971: 314)
The goal of self-reflection and its emancipatory interest is the realization of the collective selfconscious control of society and the overcoming of the existing imperatives of automatic
regulation. Social development is viewed as “a supersession of constraint” in order to achieve
“the organization of society linked to decision-making processes on the basis of discussion free
from domination.” (1971: 54).
If self-reflection is a motive force in history, then how does it operate collectively to emancipate
the disadvantaged from domination? Habermas remains reticent on this issue, but does point to
psychoanalysis as “the only tangible example of a science incorporating methodical selfreflection.” (1971: 214). Presumably the possibility of incorporating self-reflection into a
collective social science remains as of yet unrealized and only anticipated in Knowledge and
Human Interests. Psychoanalysis, however, provides a working model for self-reflection at the
individual level, in which blockages to free communication experienced in resistances are
overcome. To resist, Habermas says, is to keep from consciousness, i.e. to remove from public
communication. It is this process of resistance at the individual level which he takes as the model
for resistance at the institutional level which blocks collective self-reflection and impedes the
realization of humanity‟s further emancipation.
Viewed in the context of its inaugural emancipatory agenda, Habermas‟s TCA, according to
Gouldner, is best read as a new critique of censorship. 140 Habermas‟ project, however, is
necessarily ambiguous because he is reluctant to establish the conditions upon which free and
unfettered communication could be implemented.
Moreover, his thesis regarding the uncoupling of system and lifeworld due to the expansion of
instrumental or purposive rationality embodied in potentially emancipatory technological
domination of nature contains a fundamental ambiguity. 141 If progress in science and technology
are necessarily tied to the growth of instrumental reason, it isn‟t clear how it is possible for the
140

Gouldner (1976) points out many possible problems with practically implementing his ideal speech situation.
For example, doesn‟t violence sometimes create conditions under which communicative intent is made explicit?
Wouldn‟t exposing the non-rational aspects of another‟s communication potentially inflict symbolic violence upon
them? After all, a revelation that one‟s beliefs or modes of communicating are irrational can be quite traumatic. In
addition, what level of competency is entailed in his notion of universal pragmatics? Must a more competent speaker
stoop to the level of the least competent? Finally, aren‟t some limitations necessary for communication to take
place? For Habermas, free and unfettered speech constitutes the inherent telos of communication, but making the
reality of communication approximate its own goal remains practically problematic.
141
Habermas‟s thesis is that: "The rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible the emergence and growth of
subsystems whose independent imperatives turn back destructively upon the lifeworld itself" (TCA 2: 186)
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life-world to resist the colonizing power of instrumental reason. If, however, it can resist this
power, then it isn‟t clear how it has succumbed to it in the first place (cf. Postone 1992: 241).
The political point is one familiar to critical theory, namely that the rational pursuit of selfinterest can generate socially irrational results. Habermas wants a way of deciding apodictically
not only whether the means of any given action are rational, but also whether the ends
themselves are rational. Is economic growth, for example, collectively rational in the long run?
For example, what does it mean to optimize utility, and how can people come to some sort of
agreement about what is socially optimal? These are important questions which have
considerable bearing on social policies, including economic and environmental policies. The
paradox is that modernity inaugurates the possibility for collective normative regulation with the
emergence of what Habermas calls the public sphere, but at the same time the complexity and
differentiation that this transition entails makes the unification of a public sphere as collective
consensus increasingly improbable.

Social Differentiation, Triple Contingency, and the Emergence of a HyperReflexive Public
Differentiation can be analytically distinguished from complexity. Differentiation and
complexity correspond to two methods of decomposing systems and thus to two reference
frames for observing systems: first, according to a theory of system differentiation, systems can
be decomposed into subsystems based on internal system/environment distinctions; second,
according to a theory of system complexity142, systems can be decomposed into its elements and
relations. 143 Differentiation and complexity are therefore distinct, although a growth in one
almost always entails a growth in the other.
To elaborate the historical genesis of the model of functional differentiation, it is necessary to
discuss the theoretical development of the related concept of the public. According to Piet
Strydom (1999) who introduced the concept of „Triple Contingency‟ into social theory, “the
emergence of modern society, including the social sciences, sociology in particular, coincided
with the appearance, as it were, of the absent, unknown, faceless collective third person, the
public" (5).
Beginning around the 18th century, the public became a constituent component of
communication. Beginning with the collapse of the religious worldview, scholars began to
appeal to the public and to vie for public attention. Communications begin to refer to a public
that is physically absent. It is generated as an anticipation of an anonymous opinion or observer.
Talk emerges as a new degree of freedom for communication encounters. Gatherings, meetings,
and assemblies begin to take place "drawing a self-selecting membership" in which relevance is
142

This is similar to what DeLanda (2002) refers to as a “meshwork” and what Latour (2005) refers to as a net-work,
that is, the process by which heterogenous elements constitute a unity and co-relate.
143
This distinction is taken from Luhmann, who writes that the distinction between part and element is “equally
constitutive difference” of systems: “just as there are no systems without environments or environments without
systems, there are no elements without relational connections or relations without elements” (1995: 20).
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circumscribed by theme and topic (4). Achievements such as the abolition of censorship,
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the emergence of the mass media mark the
milestones of the emergence of the public. The proper role of the public in sociological theory,
however, is lacking. How does this anonymous public arise? One answer is in the exponential
growth of communications that raise the frequency of impersonal and anonymous speech.
Ivan Illich observes that:
Fifty years ago, most of the words heard by an American were personally spoken to him
as an individual, or to somebody standing nearby. Only occasionally did words reach
him as the undifferentiated member of a crowd- in the classroom or church, at a rally or a
circus. Words were mostly like handwritten, sealed letters, and not like the junk that now
pollutes our mail. Today, words that are directed to one person‟s attention have become
rare. (1996[1978]: 17)
My argument is that this notion of a public created and was created by the functional
differentiation of communication. The birth of the public marked the transition to a society that
not only provided the media by which communication perspectives could be entertained, but
more importantly, marked the emergence of a second-order perspective that also entertained
models of these communication perspectives. This has consequences for how “social order” is
resolved.
Three stages (which can be conceptualized diachronically or synchronically) of social order can
be identified:
1. Social order is fixed, natural and immutable;
2. Social order is unnatural, artificial, and contingent;
3) Social order is anticipated, emergent, self-organized.
These perspectives can be thought to vary along a continuum of lesser to greater uncertainty.
The emergence of the public marks the last stage, which then orders social relations in that
participants in interaction orient themselves towards an unobserved observer, the public, which,
however, unlike god, is uncertain.
For Habermas, the public arises whenever citizens can express their opinions regarding the
general interest freely. Historically, a public arises in Europe during the 1700s whenever the rise
of the market economy extends the reproduction of life beyond the private domestic sphere
(233). Early on, Habermas gives the public a normative interpretation, which he later conceives
of more abstractly as domination-free discourse, or the ideal speech situation, which can be
regarded counterfactually as the anticipated result that would have occurred in the absence of
external restraint (Strydom 1999: 13). Still later, Habermas would identify this third perspective
with the moral point of view adopted by social movements. But as Strydom points out, however,
Habermas equivocates between two understandings of the third perspective, one of which is a
context independent moral point of view presupposed by everyone, and the other is a specific
point of view embodied in social movements. Furthermore, by identifying the moral point of
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view with social movements, Habermas renders any critique of these social movements
impossible (Strydom 1999: 20).
Double contingency refers to a socially undetermined situation in which two actors confront one
another, but base their actions on the actions of the other. If I want what you want, and you want
what I want, how is it determined who wants what? Nevertheless, situations of double
contingency are resolved, that is, determined. The situation is thus a hypothetical which poses a
question about the conditions of possibility of inter-relating between any two individuals. The
concept of double contingency has built within it the concept of anticipation: actors do not
simply react to perceived environmental disturbances and respond; rather, they anticipate and
thus act on the basis of predictions of others behaviors in relation to one's own. 144 One must act,
but in anticipation of the others responses to one's actions, and vice-versa. The situation is
undetermined and both are equally uncertain.
Whereas Parsons defines contingency as dependence, Luhmann also underscores the modal
meaning of contingency as something that is otherwise possible, or not necessary: that which is
contingent is neither necessary nor impossible. Luhmann's “solution” is that determinacy in a
social situation can arise from stochastic disturbances, a principle he calls order from noise,
following Heinz von Foerster. The idea is that random or unlikely occurrences, once they occur,
can set in motion self-reinforcing processes that stabilize interaction patterns through path
dependency. For instance, a chance encounter can generate a life-long marriage. The necessary
ingredient of these path dependent processes is unexpected, and thus become meaningful only in
hindsight.
Strydom goes on to argue that the emergence of the public introduces a third contingency, but in
my view, this can provide the necessary background, or noise, which can stochastically order
expectations. Thus, although what can be observed in any encounter can be, depending on one‟s
observational schema, unpredictable (akin to the 3 body problem in astronomy), order of some
kind is generated. Double contingency is solved once subsets of possibilities select upon each
other to render more probable hitherto improbable events (Baecker 2001: 60). The public can
be regarded as yet another selection mechanism that serves to coordinate expectations.
The significance of double contingency can be understood from two perspectives: that of the
participant-observers themselves, and that of the third super-observer, or what I am calling the
unobserved observer. The distinction corresponds to what Leydesdorff calls the distinction
between infra-reflexivity and hyper-reflexivity, respectively. From the perspective of the two
actors facing double contingency, the third observer, or the public, becomes uncertain. It is
possible to anticipate public reaction, and in fact this anticipation is often experienced as a noncontingent necessity, but it becomes in principle impossible to predict public reaction with
certainty. This is why, for instance, it is necessary to constantly poll public opinion, which
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As Parsons puts it: "Part of ego's expectations, in many cases the most crucial part, consists in the probable
reaction of alter to ego's possible action, a reaction which comes to be anticipated in advance and thus to affect ego's
own choices" (1951: 5). See also Bigelow, Rosenblueth, Wiener (1943); Fenzl and Hofkirchner (1997); and Rosen
(1985)
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becomes distributed across orthogonal semantic dimensions (which is another way of saying that
people can be expected to disagree or hold varying views across multiple topics and themes).
A caveat, however, is in order here, for there is a danger of misunderstanding this third-person
perspective as something other than an anticipation. In fact, what is argued here is that the infrareflexive and hyper-reflexive perspectives are not perspectives belonging to different types of
persons, but rather, they constitute distinguishable types of perspectives capable of being adopted
by any person in any given situation. In short, one can be expected to oscillate between the
perspective of an actor embedded in a situation, and hence participating and observing within it,
and also, of a disembedded observer of a situation. 145
In non-modern societies, contingency is absorbed by processes of group identity integration. A
god-king centralizes and coordinates the perspective of the super-observer, and banishes other
possibilities for meaningful reflection onto an outside environment inhabited by an alien other
(e.g. the barbarians to the Greeks). This all still occurs today (cults being the limit case), but
functional (sub)systems no longer provide means of integrating identities.
Parsons's solution to the problem of double contingency is to invoke culture, as an already
available shared system of meaning. Socialization is the means by which actors can assent to a
stable definition of the situation. Both Habermas and Luhmann have criticized Parsons for
reifying culture, but implicitly accept the concept of double contingency. We should not reify
social order. Norms do not exist outside us at the top of a control hierarchy. Control, only and
always occurs within persons. Control, however, can be influenced or conditioned via
communication.
The knowledge that one is being observed changes one's behavior: e.g. Hawthorne experiments.
The observation or feeling of being observed is not itself a communication, but the knowledge
that a judgment will be issued, is a communication that hasn't happened. In other words, double
contingency is the anticipation of communication, which can remain latent. Double
contingency changes the dynamic of interaction: specifically, it alters the conditions under
which co-action occurs.146 Co-action becomes inter-action or trans-action as soon as one
recognizes this condition: the condition exists as an expectation. The experience of double
contingency presupposes, rather than makes possible, communication. What is communicated
here is presence, if nothing more.
It is also possible that one observes without observing that one is also being observed, but I
exclude that complication from consideration here. The mere perception that one is being
perceived also counts as communication, in the sense of the strict definition, because one's being
watched changes the dynamic (i.e. decision rule) for one's behavior, as a result of the
145

Logically, this condition is possible because of what Gunther calls poly-contexturality, in which no context or
super-set of situations embeds all others from the point of view of all others. Linguistically, it is my hypothesis that
triple contingency can be generated via the capacity for human language to communicate digitally (in addition to
analogically).
146
I propose that double contingency can be modeled as the introduction of a new parameter value in a state space
model. As a condition, it does not necessarily change the selected actions but changes the probability (or frequency)
distribution of actions. In other words, it changes the decision-rules by which actions are determined.
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anticipation of a communication. For example, a boss is watching me, and I act in anticipation
of the communication of some judgment from him.

Figure 92. Triple Contingency and the Public.

Triple Contingency arises concurrently with the hyper-reflexive observation of communication.
It is asymmetrical because the two communicants (participant-observers) do not expect
communication from the hyper-reflexive observer. This means, the hyper-reflexive orthogonal
reference frame is more akin to voyeurism than supervising: one observes without being
watched. In the former case, the communicants are not aware of being observed. If they were,
they would then sense a third contingency, for example, a feeling or sense of being observed.
This alone is sufficient to communicate one's presence. These relationships are depicted in
Figure 92.
Implications of Triple Contingency for Markets
Sociological and economic theory rely on dyadic models of action (or inter-action) and
exchange, respectively. The concept of system, as I envision it, requires taking into account
triads. In economics, this has been thematized in terms of externalities. This concept can be
generalized to account for the (unintended) consequences arising from all indirect
communication. Moreover, the concept of the triad does not necessarily relate to third persons,
but rather, to third perspectives, the internalization of which presupposes a degree of (internal)
differentiation.
These third perspectives account for social systems as (ex ante) hypotheses. In sociology, the
model of double contingency accounts for two persons, whereas in economics this duality is
reconstructed as the duality of buyers and sellers, two categories containing a potentially infinite
set of members. The contingency of each is reduced via utility maximization axioms. What
both models have in common is an exclusion of indirect communication or influence, which can
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also be regarded as the uncertainties generated from recursive reporting of reporting, and
modeling of modeling. In the ideal case of the market, such complexities do not arise because all
participants connect to all others immediately via a common center. In economics, this condition
is framed as a problem of asymmetrical information.
The market thus resembles Habermas‟s ideal speech situation in which communication occurs in
a common forum, mutually accessible to all. One does not need to report on what a counterparty
has said, because that counterparty is present to say it. Accordingly, representation does not
occur: the system equilibrium is a case of reflection, whose outcome is determined, rather than
selected, by the outcomes of individual actors. They are not influenced by general (meso-level)
conditions of the market that could be otherwise, because they have no capacity to report or
reflect on the general condition of the market itself as a system. Finally, the model of the market
cannot conceptualize the sphere of economic relations (of buying and selling) as one possible
sphere or system in interaction with other systems, whether biophysical natural systems or other
human systems such as moral and political systems.
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CONCLUSIONS
The real crisis, in its vernacular sense, is the human alienation and anomie that arises from the
insecurity produced by the uncertainty about future solvency and employment. However, there
is no logical necessity to the coupling of purchasing power and organizational membership, in
the form of “work.” Nor is it necessary that purchasing power be distributed exclusively through
organizations (e.g., banks) rather than individuals, and in the form of debt. One potential policy
recommendation is the so-called universal basic income (UBI) or universal grant, provided
unconditionally and universally. It is far outside the scope of this essay to detail the long history
and extensive literature regarding this radical reform. However, a few rough calculations are
worth mentioning.
According to the US Census, there are approximately 307 million residents presently in the U.S.
About 230 million are over the age of 18. A basic grant of $500 per month to every man,
woman, and child would cost $500*307 million * 12 (months) = $1,842,000 MILLION, or $1.8
TRILLION. Receipts for the US government in 2010 totaled $2.381 TRILLION, the budget
itself was $3.55 TRILLION, the difference constituting the deficit for 2010. The US GDP for
2008 was $14.441 TRILLION. Therefore, a basic income grant would equal 75 percent of total
government receipts and about 12 percent of total US GDP in 2008. However, this neglects the
fact that all of this purchasing power would reenter the economy, thus boosting economic growth
and tax receipts. This is in accordance with the principle that the state (i.e., polity) constitutes
the aggregate demand that it captures in the form of taxation. Moreover, consider that in 2007,
estimates for the value of Credit Default Swaps (CDS‟s) alone range from $45 TRILLION to
$62 TRILLION! More fundamentally, this policy would abolish the anachronistic severance of
economic rights from political rights, and would generate the necessary conditions for a society
motivated by the “rational” imperatives of communicative action.
A systems-theoretical account of communicative events provides one useful framing device for
generating new and imaginative understandings of the how our society is in the process of
reconstituting itself. This study has attempted to provide new venues for future research by
applying systems-theoretical perspectives to a particular case study: the global debt crisis, which
today is a crisis of anticipations. One area of future investigation will be to examine specifically
how organizations (i.e., organized communications) interact with societal subsystems such as
money, to generate programs and to devise histories on the basis of organizational decisions. In
modern society, organizations mediate and distribute flows of money and credit to individuals.
Because organizations are predicated on the distinction of decisions-within-networks/notdecisions-within-networks, a distinction which establishes a distinction of membership and nonmembership, as well as temporality, inequality is built into the very infrastructure of modern
society. The relationship between organized communication and the specificity of the monetary
societal system still is an important area of future research that could potentially illuminate both
how social systems interact and how they adapt to change in modern society.
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APPENDIX: The Credit Crisis: Timeline of Events 2007-2008
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2007
February: First noted increase in subprime mortgage defaults
June-July: Difficulties over how to value MBS‟s à market dries up
**IKB (small German Bank) requires 3.5 billion euro rescue package
August
6th- **American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. declares bankruptcy
9th- **French bank BNP Paribas is unable to value structured products à cuts financing to 3 large investment funds
17th- Fed reduces „discount rate‟ to 5.75; broadens collateral banks can use
September
18th- Fed lowers interest rates to 4.75; discount rate to 5.25%
**Northern Rock- First bank in UK to fall victim to a bank run in over a century
December
11th- Fed cutes „federal funds rate‟ by .25 percentage points
12th- Fed announces creation of Term Auction Facility (TAF)
2008147
Week of September 7
 The U.S. government seized control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, institutions that own or guarantee
about one-half of all mortgage assets in the United States.
Week of September 14
 The U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch was taken over by the
Bank of America for $50 billion.
 The U.S. government seized control of American International Group Inc., providing an $85 billion
emergency loan and taking a 79.9 percent equity stake in the firm.
 Britain‟s largest mortgage lender, HBOS, agreed to be purchased by Lloyds TSB in an $18.9 billion deal.
 The Russian government pledged to provide $120 billion to support financial markets and banks (the
amount was increased by $50 billion on October 7).
 U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson introduced the Troubled Asset Relief Program, a key element of
which enables the government to buy up to $700 billion of mortgage-backed securities. An amended
version was signed into law on October 4th.
 AIG (invested heavily in CDS‟s) ; stock prices fall 90% on Sept 16th.
Week of September 21
 Goldman-Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies.
 The U.K. government nationalized the mortgage bank Bradford and Bingley (a loan portfolio of $90
billion).
Week of September 28
 Washington Mutual became the largest bank failure in U.S. history, with assets valued at $328 billion.
 The Belgian, Dutch, and Luxembourg governments each took a 49.9 percent equity stake in the operations
of the banking and insurance company Fortis within their respective borders, each injecting $16.4 billion in
capital.
 One week later, the Dutch government took full control of the company‟s operations in the Netherlands.
Fortis‟ operations in the BENELUX countries were later sold to the French commercial bank, BNP Paribas.
 The German government, together with commercial banks and federal regulators, provided $50 billion in
credit guarantees to Hypo Real Estate.
147

Time line for 2008 is compiled from World Bank's World Economic Outlook 2009 (20-21).
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Citigroup agreed to buy the banking operations of Wachovia.
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg injected $9.2 billion into the French-Belgian bank Dexia.
The Icelandic government took a 75 percent equity stake in Glitnir, the country‟s third-largest bank.
The Swedish central bank announced that it would lend up to $700 million to the Swedish unit of the
Icelandic bank Kaupthing.
Ireland announced unlimited guarantees on retail, commercial, and interbank bank deposits. Similar
measures were adopted in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal.
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States raised limits on deposit guarantees. On October 3,
European finance ministers agreed to raise the minimum guarantee on bank deposits to 50,000 across all
EU member states.

Week of October 5
 The Icelandic government loaned $683 million to Kaupthing, and seized control of Landsbanki, and sought
a $5.5 billion loan from Russia.
 The Spanish government established a $40 to $68 billion emergency fund to purchase assets held by
Spanish banks.
 The U.S. Federal Reserve intervened in the commercial paper market for the first time since the Great
Depression.
 The British government made available $87 billion in emergency loans to the banking system and offered
to purchase capital in eight of the largest banks. The package includes guarantees of £250 million for new
debt and the same for liquidity provisions.
 The central banks of the United States, the Euro Zone, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland each cut their
benchmark rates by half a percentage point in an unprecedented coordinated effort. Separately, China‟s
central bank lowered its key one-year lending rate by 27 basis points, the second reduction in three weeks.
 The Icelandic government placed Glitnir into receivership, seized control of Kaupthing Bank, and
abandoned its attempt to peg the krona at 131 per euro, established one day earlier, after it touched 340
against the euro.
 California, the most populous U.S. state, asked federal authorities for a $7 billion emergency loan as it was
unable to obtain financing in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
 The British government announced a $685 billion plan to restore confidence in financial institutions, which
included insuring up to $438 billion in new debt issued by banks, along with providing as much as $88
billion in equity capital.
 The National Bank of Ukraine seized control of Prominvestbank, the country‟s sixth-largest bank.
Week of October 12
 European governments announced financing packages totaling over $2.5 trillion. The packages include
recapitalizing the banking sectors, credit guarantees on interbank lending, and direct loans.
 The British government injected $60 billion in equity capital into the country‟s three largest banks.
 The United States announced that it would commit $250 billion of the $700 billion rescue package to
recapitalize the banking sector.
Week of October 19
 The IMF agreed with Iceland on an economic recovery program supported by a two-year loan of $2.1
billion.
 The Belarusian authorities requested financial assistance from the IMF under a program that could be
supported by a Stand-By Arrangement.
 The Pakistani authorities requested discussions with the IMF on an economic program supported by
financial assistance from the IMF.
Week of October 26


IMF staff agreed with the Hungarian and Ukrainian authorities‟ economic programs supporting loans of
$15.7 and $16.7 billion, respectively.
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The European Union stood ready to provide a loan of $8.1 billion to Hungary and the World Bank agreed
to provide $1.3 billion.
The IMF announced the Short-Term Liquidity Facility designed to channel funds quickly to emerging
markets that have a strong track record, but that need rapid help during the current financial crisis to get
them through temporary liquidity problems.

Week of November 9


The Leaders of the Group of Twenty agreed to a plan of action to restore global growth and achieve needed
reforms of the world‟s financial systems.



IMF staff and Pakistani authorities reached agreement on an economic program supported by a $7.6 billion
loan. The Executive Board of the IMF was expected to discuss the program shortly under the IMF‟s
Emergency Financing Mechanism procedures.

Week of November 16


IMF staff and Serbian authorities agreed on an economic program supported by a $0.5 billion loan.
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